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36 REPORT ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF PENSION FUNDS 
TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS  OF THE 
EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  COMMUNITY 
This  study  on  the  means  of  enhancing  the  contribution  of  pension  funds  to  the 
capital  markets  of  the  European  Economic  Community  has  been  entrusted  to 
l'Union  Internationale  d'  Analyse  Economique  et  Financiere  EuROFINANCE  by 
the Direction Generale des Affaires Economiques et Financieres of the Commission 
of the European Economic  Community.  The  text of  the  present  report has  been 
drafted by Mr.  Anthony de Jasay,  Directeur of Eurofinance,  and  the opinions  and 
recommendations expressed in it do  not necessarily  reflect  the views  of  the corpo-
rate entity he  represents. 
This  study  does  not reflect  the  views  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Com-
munities  and  merely  represents  a starting point for  the work it may  undertake in 
this  field. 
5 INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies sponsored by the Commission of the 
EEC  and  by  other  official  and  private  bodies  on 
problems of the capital markets in the member coun-
tries  have  already  pointed  out  the  important  role 
that  contractual  saving  can  play  in  enlarging  these 
markets  and  also  in  improving  their  stability  and 
general quality. Saving linked to employment contracts 
was diagnosed as a particularly dynamic and promising 
form  of  contractual  saving (1 ).  The  present  report 
provides  more  detailed findings  on this  subject, with 
the  ultimate  objective  of  defining  the  means  and 
the  policies  which  could  promote  such  saving  and 
its  contribution  to  the  capital  markets. 
The scope of the report is essentially limited to saving 
in  the  form  of  accumulating  pension  funds  from 
contributions by employers and employees to provide 
pension benefits over and above  the old-age pensions 
provided by the State social  security  systems.  Refer-
ence,  however,  is  also  made  to  the  latter  because 
the actual and potential role of private pension plans 
depends  to a large extent on the nature of the State 
system, especially on how far  the benefits it provides 
are graduated according  to the lifetime or immediate 
pre-retirement earnings of the beneficiary. Private plans 
for  employees  purchased  with  contributions  to  an 
insurance company (insured plans) are excluded from 
explicit  consideration,  as  they  do not basically  differ 
from  life  insurance  (a  subject  which  would  demand 
a  separate  study)  and  also  because  data  relating  to 
the insurance  industry  do  not  as  a  rule  permit  the 
segregation of pension from other insurance. 
In delimiting  the  scope  of  the  study,  certain  incon-
sistencies  had  to  be  accepted  for  practical  reasons. 
Although our central subject is funded pension plans, 
we  are  also  treating  the  French  complementary 
pension  plans  which  are  based  on  the  repartition 
system,  because  they  have  to a  certain  extent  built 
up  reserves  and  are  likely  to  do  so  in  the  future. 
Moreover,  while  the  pension  plans  we  treat  are 
generally based on the employer-employee relationship 
which is  a voluntary contract,  we  are  also  consider-
ing  the  Italian  severance  payment  funds,  contribu-
tions  to which  are compulsory  by law;  certain occu-
pational schemes,  adherence  to which  is  compulsory 
once  the  majority  of  employers  in  an  industry  has 
adhered to them, and German provident funds which 
have  no  contractual basis  at  all. 
In Chapter I, certain conceptual and theoretical con-
siderations are  reviewed in summary fashion  to facil-
itate  the  subsequent  treatment  of  more  specific 
problems. 
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Chapter  II  describes  the  present  status  of  pension 
funds,  the  legal  and  fiscal  environment  in  which 
they operate, and their quantitative importance wher-
ever  the  availability  of  data  permits,  in  some  non-
E.E.C. countries (such as the U.K. and the U.S. where 
the great contribution of pension funds  to the capital 
market  may  permit  some  lessons  to  be  drawn)  and 
in  Holland,  Germany,  Italy,  Belgium  and  France. 
A few  brief case  studies  drawn from  the experience 
of EuROFINANCE are also presented to illustrate certain 
tendencies  or problems,  although  actual figures  have 
been  sufficiently  modified  to  prevent  direct  identi-
fication of a particular employer company. 
Chapter III is  devoted  to  an  essentially  quantitative 
analysis  of  the likely  future  contribution  of  pension 
funds to total saving and to capital markets, assuming 
that the legal and tax framework remains unchanged; 
forecasts  based  on  demographic  factors,  on  prob-
able  future  coverage,  future  benefit  levels,  wage 
and  other economic  trends  are  presented  to 1980. 
Chapter  IV  suggests  and  discusses  the  implications 
of  certain  reforms  in  pension  fund  regulations,  tax 
laws,  etc.  Some  of these would be needed simply to 
improve the security of this growing mass  of savings 
and  avoid  certain  latent  dangers  and  disequilibria 
which are tolerable today but may become disturbing 
as fund totals come to reach larger dimensions.  Other 
reforms  would be likely  to  accelerate  the growth of 
saving through pension funds, channel their resources 
to  the capital  market  without discrimination  against 
certain  sub-markets  and  against  the  geographical  di-
versification  of investments. 
The  study  has  encountered  considerable  obstacles 
through  having  to  treat  a  subject  to  which  little 
detailed  research  has  so  far  been  devoted  in  the 
countries  of  the E.E.C.,  whose  statistics  are  incom-
plete  and  in  some  cases  non-existent,  and  where 
even  terminology,  concepts  and institutions are  suffi-
ciently  different  from  country  to country  to  render 
uniform  analysis  difficult  if not impossible.  It is  to 
be hoped that the attention now devoted to  pension 
funds  by  the Direction Generale des  Affaires  Econo-
miques et Financieres of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Economic Community will promote greater inter-
est in the subject by national governments  and  will 
advance  quantitative  knowledge  and  understanding 
of its problems. 
(1)  Report on The Development of a European Capital Market, 
Ch.  2,  §§  8  and  27,  Ch.  12,  §  20. L. 
CHAPTER  I 
Some  Conceptual  Considerations 
Apart  from  the  timeless  practice  of  saving  in  one's 
own working lifetime  to have  something to fall back 
on  after  retirement  (i.e.  individual  provision  either 
through  direct  accumulation  of  assets  or through  an 
endowment insurance), institutional provision for old-
age  can  take  one  of  two  major  forms.  Although 
these do not in practice always occur in a pure form, 
and  at  the borderline  one  form  may  contain  certain 
features  of  and  be  commingled  with  the  other,  for 
purposes  of  conceptual  clarification  it  will  prove 
helpful  to  draw  a  fairly  sharp  distinction  between 
what might be called  the  system of current  transfers 
and  of  funding  (capitalization). 
1.  Current  transfers  ("repartition"  or  "pay  as  you 
go")  imply  that  the  current  income  of  part  or  all 
of the working population is  reduced and that of the 
retired population (or of their surviving  dependents) 
is  increased,  (although  not  necessarily  by  an  equal 
amount).  The  transfer  may  take  place  via  a  volun-
tarily agreed redistribution of income within a limited 
set  of  working  and  retired  people  (typically  within 
members of an  occupation, an industry or more con-
cretely  of  a Caisse  de  Retraite  Complementaire).  It 
may  also  be  organized  through  the  intermediary  of 
the fisc,  and financed partly from direct contributions 
of part or  all  of  the  working  population  and  partly 
from  general  taxation  (most  state  old-age  schemes 
are  of  this  nature). 
This system of current transfers has  ancient  roots in 
social  history,  - it  can  be  regarded  as  a  direct 
descendant  of  the  principle  that  sons  in  the  prime 
of  their  life  should  support  their  aged  parents.  In 
the  context  that  interests  us,  the  principle  is  not 
applied within the framework of a single  family,  but 
in larger collective units such as  a firm,  a profession, 
an industry or the whole nation.  It is  an  expression 
of  solidarity  between  different  age  groups,  and  its 
stability  and  continuation  depend  essentially  on  the 
continuing strength of this  sense  of solidarity. 
Evidently,  provision  for  old-age  via  some  system  of 
current  transfers has  no direct effects  on  saving  and 
the  accumulation  of  capital,  nor  on  the  market  for 
capital.  There  are,  however,  certain  indirect  effects 
on  saving,  which  have  been  the  subject  of  a  great 
deal of discussion  in the literature,  and whose  effect 
is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  measure,  although 
there is fairly wide agreement as  to the probable sign 
(positive or negative) of  the effect. 
a)  A  transfer  of  income  from  the  working  to  the 
retired population is in the majority of cases a transfer 
from  a higher  to  a lower income group.  As  such,  it 
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is  generally  presumed  to  result  in  lower  aggregate 
personal  saving  even  if the  marginal  propensity  to 
save  of  each  income  group  remains  the  same. 
b) A somewhat less  widely accepted argument is  that 
the  sense  of  security  enjoyed  by  the  working  popu-
lation  regarding  its  maintenance  in  old-age  removes 
or reduces  one  of  the  incentives  for  saving,  namely 
one's  own  individual  need  to  provide  for  old-age. 
Empirical research has  not found conclusive evidence 
of  this  effect. 
c) To the extent that state old-age pensions are finan-
ced from general taxation (i.e.  that a state scheme is 
run  at  a  deficit  between  contributions  and  benefit 
payments) there is  an additional negative influence on 
total aggregate saving over and above the effect noted 
under a),  at least  to  the extent that taxation is  pro-
gressive  at  the  margin.  Diverting  income  to  pen-
sioners via  progressive taxation amounts  to  reducing 
the aftertax income  of corporations  and  high-income 
individuals, who tend to  have  a higher  than average 
propensity to save. 
d) There is  however a mitigating influence  operating 
within state old-age pension schemes which may partly 
offset  some  of  the  negative  influences  referred  to 
above.  This  influence  will  have  particular  force  if 
the  state scheme  in question  is  operating in  surplus 
with current  contributions  exceeding  current  benefit 
rates.  Since  contributions  are  applied  only  up  to 
a  certain  limit  of income  and  no  contributions  are 
levied  on incomes  over and  above  this  ceiling,  they 
operate  as  a  degressive  rather  than progressive  tax, 
and  their  effect  on  saving  will  tend  to be  symmet-
rical  with but in  an  opposite direction  to the  effect 
discussed  under c). 
Extensive  theoretical  refinements  of  the  above  con-
siderations  could  be  pursued  without  adding  very 
much to our quantitative knowledge.  Our best judg-
ment  would  be  that  the  effect  of  current  transfer 
pension systems  on saving is  more likely to be nega-
tive  than positive, but that the overall effect  is  pro-
bably  not substantial. 
As  will become  apparent later, in practice  many  sys-
tems  which  are  essentially  intended  to  operate  on 
the current transfer principle do in effect show mixed 
characteristics,  temporarily  or  permanently  accumu-
lating reserves and thus contributing directly to aggre-
gate  saving.  To  the  (usually  rather  limited)  extent 
that  they  do,  they  should  be  considered  as  falling 
under  the  other  major  alternative  category,  namely 
that of capitalization. Under  the  system  of  capitalization,  part  or  all  of 
the  provision  for  old-age  is  financed  from  capital 
built up over a past period by the same set of people 
whose  retirement it was  intended to secure (i.e.  em-
ployee contributions) or on their behalf (i.e. employer 
contributions).  In short, and in contrast  to  the cur-
rent transfer system, this is  old people having fended 
for  themselves  when  they  were  young  rather  than 
expecting  their sons  to do it for  them.  The  system 
does  not depend  on  any  kind  of  sense  of  solidarity 
between  age-groups.  This  distinction  is  drawn  here 
without any  reference  to family  or social  ethics,  but 
rather  as  a  clarification  intended  to  throw  light  on 
an  argument  which  is  sometimes  advanced,  namely 
that from  a  national  accounting  point of view  there 
is  no difference between the two systems.  This latter 
argument maintains that the method of financing (i.e. 
whether it is by repartition or by capitalization) leaves 
the sources  and uses  of the current national  product 
completely  unaffected;  whichever way  it  is  financed, 
institutional provision for  old-age  involves  a  transfer 
of  current  consumable  resources  from  the  young  to 
the  old.  This  diagnostic  has  some  validity  with  all 
other things  being equal,  and has  the  great  merit of 
shifting  the  emphasis  from  methods  of  financing  to 
the real resources involved.  However, as  will become 
apparent  presently,  it  overlooks  the  effect  of  the 
chosen  method  of  financing  on  the  accumulation  of 
capital in the past (and hence on the present level of 
the  national  product),  as  well  as  on  the  present 
rhythm  of capital  accumulation. 
2.  Funding (capitalization) in its  simplest and purest 
form  consists  in  a  set  or  subset  of  working  people 
(employees  or their  employers  or both) paying  con-
tributions into a fund, the rate of contributions being 
calculated in such  a way that if continued over their 
probable  working  life,  the  fund  should  build up  to 
a level which, at the time of their retirement, should 
just  be  equal  to  the  discounted  present  value  of 
planned pension payments  over  the  probable retired 
lifetime  of  each  participant  concerned  (or  his  sur-
vivor).  Many variants of this  system  are being prac-
ticed,  without  the  variations  affecting  the  principle, 
or more than marginally changing the economic effects 
of its  operation. 
Since  the  system  revolves  around  the  building  up 
of  a  capital  fund,  its  direct  effect  on saving  is  easy 
to diagnose.  In the  theoretical  borderline  case  of  a 
static  age  distribution  of  an  unchanged  number  of 
participants  in  a funded  pension  scheme,  with static 
earnings  over  their  working  life  and  static  pension 
benefits,  the contribution to saving is  of a once-and-
for-all  character.  Saving  continues  while  the fund  is 
being  built up from  nil to  its  actuarially  determined 
level;  at  that  point,  further  accumulation  of  fund 
reserves  ceases.  (More  precisely,  the rate of growth 
of the fund asymptotically approaches zero). Currently 
paid  pension  benefits  from  that  point  onwards 
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fully  exhaust  current  contributions  plus  the  income 
(interest, dividends, etc.) generated by  the fund,  and 
the latter becomes  self-perpetuating at  an  unchanged 
level.  Projecting  this  situation  to  the  level  of 
an  entire economy,  the effect  of opting for  the fund-
ing  rather  than  the  current  transfer  system  is  to 
increase the  total stock of capital in the economy  to 
a  level  higher  than  it  would  otherwise  have  been. 
Further secondary  direct  effects  may  be  a)  a  higher 
level  of  the national  product  (which  is  supposed  to 
be  an  increasing  function  of  the  stock  of  capital), 
b) a faster  rate of growth of the capital stock (since 
an  addition  to  the  capital  stock,  i.e.  current saving, 
is  supposed  to  be  an  increasing  function  of  the  na-
tional product), c) and so forth in an infinite and con-
vergent  series  of  secondary  effects. 
In  reality,  neither  the  working  population,  nor  its 
age  composition,  nor  its  earnings  are  likely  to  be 
constant.  Growing  earnings  and  growing  pension 
expectations  (and  in particular  the  tendency  to link 
pensions to pre-retirement earnings, especially in unin-
sured  pension  schemes)  will  usually  ensure  that  the 
majority of pension funds  should never reach "matu-
rity"  in  the  above  static  sense,  and  that  their  total 
should go  on growing  (albeit  at a  decelerating  rate 
after a while) as  far  as  one can  foresee. 
The indirect effects on saving of the funding approach 
to pensions are potentially more important and more 
complex to analyse than those of the current transfers 
approach. 
a)  As  regards  personal  saving,  it would be tempting 
to suppose that any substantial accumulation of assets 
in pension funds on behalf of future pensioners should 
appreciably  diminish  their  propensity  to  accumulate 
other assets in their working lifetime.  This tendency 
should  in principle  be  reinforced  by  the  application 
of the  vesting  principle:  the greater  and  clearer  the 
property rights to part of the fund vested in a future 
pensioner prior to his  actual retirement, the stronger 
should be his subjective sense of actually owning part 
of  the  reserves  pooled in a pension fund,  and hence 
the weaker  his  propensity  to engage  in other forms 
of  saving.  The  theoretical  basis  for  this  hypothesis 
is that while pension rights are an imperfect substitute 
for (freely disposable) personal assets, vesting decreases 
their  imperfection,  and  at  the  limit  one  hundred 
percent vesting  of  accumulated  rights  (employer  and 
employee  contributions  plus  past investment  income 
added  to  reserves)  renders  them  practically  freely 
disposable  and an  almost perfect substitute for  other 
personal  assets.  Hence  funded  pensions,  (especially 
if coupled with early vesting), should reduce all other 
forms  of personal  saving. 
It is  worth  special  emphasis  that empirical  research 
into personal savings has  found  no correlation which 
could serve  as  evidence  of  the above  hypothesis.  In the  United  States,  the  annual  net  accumulation  of 
saving  through  private  pension  plans  constitutes 
roughly one  third of  total personal saving  as  defined 
in  the National  Income Accounts.  This high propor-
tion demonstrates  that  saving  through pension plans 
in  the United States has  ceased  to be  a merely  mar-
ginal  contribution  to total  personal saving.  Yet des-
pite  its  relatively  large  weight,  recent  economic 
research  into  savings  behaviour  has  concluded  that 
the presence or absence of accumulating pension rights 
has no significant influence on the personal propensity 
to  save  in  other  forms ( 
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).  Putting  the  findings  of 
this research into a highly simplified form, one might 
say  that contrary to a  priori reasoning,  persons  pos-
sessing  claims  on  pension  funds  do,  in  addition  to 
these claims, save about as much out of current income 
as  persons who possess no  such claims.  Accumulated 
contributions can thus be fully or nearly fully regarded 
as  a  net  addition  to  aggregate  personal  saving,  -
with negative  indirect  effects  being  either  negligible 
or small. 
b) It remains to examine the possible indirect negative 
effect  on  corporate  saving.  It  is  sometimes  argued 
that if in addition to wages and salaries, the corporate 
sector must also make  a contribution to securing the 
old-age  pensions  of  its  labour  force  in  the  widest 
sense,  its  costs  increase  and  its  profits  decrease  pro 
tanto.  Hence from  the  apparent  and  direct  increase 
in savings due to pension fund accumulation, a deduc-
tion  must  be  made  corresponding  to  the  resulting 
reduction  in  corporate  profits  multiplied  by  the  net 
savings  propensity of  the  corporate  sector;  this  pro-
pensity  may  be  as  high  as  30-50%  of  total  net 
corporate  profits. 
Corporate saving behaviour does not lend itself to the 
sample  survey  or interview  method  of  research  that 
can  be  employed  to  analyse  personal  or  household 
saving.  Therefore, in examining the above argument, 
we cannot  have  recourse  to empirical  work.  Never-
theless,  we  think  we  are  on  relatively  safe  ground 
in  rejecting  the  probability  of  any  major  negative 
influence  of  (employer-financed)  pension  fund  accu-
mulation on corporate profits and hence on corporate 
saving. 
The history of employer-financed provision for old-age 
within  an  enterprise  tends  to  show  that  such  pro-
vision was undertaken as  much from enlightened self-
interest as  from  paternalism, altruism or other social 
motives.  The employer took the view that the grant-
ing of pension rights will reduce  the turnover of his 
labour force  and  increase  its  productivity.  (The fact 
that in the early days of the pension fund movement, 
vesting was  a  rarity  and  the parting employee  of an 
enterprise  either  lost  all  his  accumulated  pension 
rights,  or  at  least  that  part  which  was  employer-
financed,  supports  the  conclusion  that  the  granting 
of pension  rights  was  in  large  measure  intended  to 
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discourage  labour  turnover.  To  this  day,  vesting  is 
practiced  to only  a  limited  extent even  in countries 
with  an  old  tradition  of  private  pensions.  In  the 
United  States,  vesting  is  not  a  requirement  for  ap-
proval of a private pension  plan by  the US  Internal 
Revenue  Service (2).  In  the  United  Kingdom,  pro-
posals  to make  vesting  a  condition of approval  of  a 
scheme  by  the  Inland Revenue have  been under dis-
cussion for  the last few  years e>  without any legisla-
tive  action  having  been  taken  to date.  In all  coun-
tries  whose  legislation  we  have  surveyed,  vesting  of 
pension  rights  in  intra-enterprise  pension  funds  re-
mains  a  matter  of  voluntary  agreement).  In  more 
recent times, especially in countries such as  the United 
Kingdom,  the  United States,  Holland and  Germany, 
where  the  granting  of private pension  rights  by  the 
individual  enterprise  has  become  fairly  wide-spread, 
pensions  are  increasingly  regarded by both employer 
and  employee  as  part  of  the  total wage.  Collective 
bargaining tends to concentrate on total pre- and past-
retirement  remuneration  (wages  and  fringe  benefits) 
rather  than  simply  on  take-home  pay.  For complex 
political  reasons  into which  we  need  not go  in  this 
context, it even seems that some United States labour 
unions  have  recently  been  paying  more  attention  to 
pension benefits  than to actual wages  in their collec-
tive  bargaining  (United Automobile  Workers).  It is 
therefore  increasingly  realistic  to  consider  pensions 
as  deferred wages,  and to regard  the sum of present 
and  deferred  wages  as  being  jointly  determined  by 
some market mechanism to which all enterprises, oper-
ating  in  the same  industry within the same  competi-
tive  environment,  are  subject.  The  division  of  the 
value  added  by  the  corporate  sector  between  profit 
and  the  remuneration  of  labour,  having  been  deter-
mined  by  this  same  market  mechanism,  cannot  be 
assumed  to be  further  influenced  (to  the  detriment 
of profits) by part of labour's remuneration taking the 
form  of  deferred  wages  (pensions). 
3.  The  conclusion  that  financing  retirement  benefits 
by capitalization rather than by current transfers (re-
partition)  is  a  powerful  generator  of  saving  does 
not,  in  itself,  imply  any  specific  conclusion  with  re-
(I)  George  Katona,  Private  Pensions  and  Individual  Savings, 
Monograph  40,  Survey  Research  Center,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich., 
1965. 
Phillip Cagan, The Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Sav-
ing:  Evidence from a Sample Survey, New York, NBER, 1965. 
e)  Although the Report of the President's Committee on Cor-
porate Pension Funds recommended that the Internal Revenue 
Code  be  amended  to  require  the  vesting  of  one-half  of 
accrued  rights  after  15  years  and  full  vesting  after  20  years 
of service with the same  employer.  Cf.  President's Committee 
on  Corporate  Pension  Funds  and  Other  Private  Retirement 
and  Welfare  Programs,  Public  Policy  and  Private  Pension 
Programs (Washington, D.C.:  US  Government Printing Office, 
January  1965). 
e)  Cf.  Ministry  of  Labour  White  Paper on  "Preservation of 
Pension  Rights ", April  1966. gard  to  effects  on  the  capital  market.  Identifying 
specific  effects  calls  for  further  analysis. 
Under  a  regime  of  repartition,  by  definition  no  re-
sources  are  channeled  through  the  capital  market 
(except to the extent that reserves are  being  accumu-
lated,  i.e.  that  the  system  is  a  mixed  one  with  a 
certain  element  of  funding).  The  (probably  minor) 
negative  effects  of  the  system  on  aggregate  saving 
will,  ceteris  paribus,  reduce  the  supply  of  capital  to 
the  market.  The  adverse  impact  is  likely  to  be 
distributed over all  the submarkets which  are  fed  by 
personal saving (housing, savings deposits, investment 
in  unincorporated  businesses  and,  though  probably 
to  a  small  extent  only,  securities). 
If, in a given national economy,  an  overnight change 
were  conceivable  from  repartition  to  capitalization, 
the total effect would be of almost cataclysmic propor-
tions.  In  a  funded  system,  the  ratio  between  cur-
rent  pension  disbursements  and  fund  assets  may  be 
in the range 1 : 10  to 1 :40.  Within this broad range, 
the  actual  figure  depends  on  a  number  of  complex 
factors  (the  age-distribution  of  the  participants,  the 
choice  between  advance  and  terminal  funding,  the 
degree to which past-service liabilities have been accep-
ted at the start of the scheme,  the interest rate used 
in the actuarial calculus etc. etc.), and has a tendency 
to  fall  as  the  fund  approaches  "maturity".  Some 
examples of prevailing ratios will illustrate the orders 
of magnitude involved. 
In Holland  in  1965,  the  current  pension  disburse-
ments  of  pension  funds  of  private  enterprises  and 
branches  of  industry  were  Fl 278  million  and  their· 
mathematical  reserves  Fl  10.4  billion,  - a  ratio  of 
1:37.  (Inclusion  of  death  and  widow's  benefits  on 
the  one  hand,  assets  over  and  above  mathematical 
reserves  on  the  other,  would  not  have  significantly 
changed  the  ratio).  In  Germany,  the  pension  dis-
bursements of 199 major private pension funds  (Pen-
sionskassen) under Federal supervision in 1966 were 
DM 4 3  7 million backed by  assets  of DM 9.3  billion, 
- a  ratio  of  1 :21.  For  nonsupervised  pension 
schemes of private enterprises funded by balancesheet 
provisions,  1965  disbursements  were  estimated  at 
DM  950  million  and total provisions  (Pensionsriick-
ste1lungen) at DM 20.1 billion e), - a ratio of 1 :21. 
In the  United States, an  estimate (2)  for  1966 found 
a  ratio  of  1 :29  between pension  disbursements  and 
fund  assets,  while  the figures  projected by the same 
source  for  1981  imply a ratio of  1: 19.  This  is  still 
a  rather  high  ratio  for  such  a  distant  date  when 
existing schemes will be far more "mature" than they 
are  today. 
Applying  a  ratio  of  only  1 : 15  to  the  20  French 
regimes  complementaires grouped in ARRCO operat-
ing  on  the  repartition  principle,  which  had  pension 
disbursements  of  FF  2153  million  in  1966,  they 
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"should have  had" reserve assets  of  FF 32.3  billion, 
i.e.  FF 27.2  billion more  than  they  actually  held  at 
end-1966.  A higher ratio, more  in line with current 
Dutch  or  German  practice  and  more  appropriate 
to  the  relative  "youth"  of  the  schemes  grouped  in 
ARRCO,  would  result  in  the  shortfall  of  FF  27 
billion  becoming  as  much  as  FF  40  billion.  This 
figure is put forward here not so much to demonstrate 
the  practical  difficulty  of  an  overnight  change  from 
"pay  as  you  go"  to  a reasonable  degree  of  funding, 
- there is  no way  in which  additional savings  run-
ning  into tens  of  billions  of francs  could be created 
almost  from  one  day  to  the  next  to  make  up  for 
what has been omitted over many years - but rather 
to  point  out  the  magnitude  of  the  opportunity 
that is  missed when at the outset the option is  taken 
in  favour  of repartition. 
From  the point of  view  of  the capital markets,  and 
apart from all other considerations of security, equity 
as  between  generations,  cost  and  efficiency,  funding 
is clearly a "higher", more developed form of old-age 
provision than repartition.  However, even within the 
system of funding,  there are from  this point of view 
"lower" and "higher" variants. 
The "lowest" form  of  funding  is  the constitution of 
fund  reserves  by  way  of  provisions  in  the  balance-
sheet  of  the  employer  enterprise.  The  major  part 
of  pension  reserves  in  Germany  (Pensionsriickstel-
lungen) and of severance or retirement benefit reserves 
in  Italy (fondi  di  licenziamento)  are  simple  balance-
sheet entries.  Under this method of funding, the em-
ployer  "lends"  each  year's  contribution  to  himself, 
the  reserve  becoming  a  liability  of  the  enterprise; 
there  is  no  segregation  of  a  corresponding  amount 
of  the  enterprise's  assets,  nor  do  pension  reserve 
liabilities  enjoy  any  priority in  the event of liquida-
tion  of  the  enterprise  (unlike  arrears  of wages,  and 
unlike  secured  debts).  Transfers  to  the  pension  re-
serve  seem  to  fulfil  the  same  role  as  other  forms 
of self-financing.  This, indeed, is regarded as the main 
attraction of  this  method:  "the money  stays  within 
the company"  and, other things  being equal, reduces 
its need to raise costly outside finance.  Whether this 
advantage  is  quite  as  real  as  the  partisans  of  the 
system believe is debatable and will be discussed else-
where in this  study. 
In the context of the present chapter, it is  sufficient 
to point out that with this method of pension fund-
ing,  both  the  supply  and  the  demand  side  of  the 
(I) Dr. Dr. Ernst Heissmann, Wiesbaden, "Die Aufwendungen 
fiir Betriebliche Altersversorgung in der Bundesrepublik ", Der 
Betrieb,  7  October  1966.  Estimated  by  Heissmann-h op.  cit., 
based  on  Statistisches  Bundesamt,  Fachserie  L,  Keihe  6: 
Einkommen- und  Vermogensteuern,  1962,  1966. 
(2)  Daniel  M.  Holland,  "Private  Pension  Funds:  Projected 
Growth ", p.  56,  National Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  Co-
lumbia  University  Press,  New  York,  1966. capital  market  is  diminished  by  a  presumably  equal 
amount.  Alternatively, we might say that if German 
and Italian enterprises,  instead of practising the bal-
ance  sheet provision method,  set up segregated pen-
sion  funds  as  enterprises  in  the  USA,  the  U.K., 
Holland  and  to  some  extent  in  Belgium  do,  they 
would find  outside finance  more necessary and at the 
same  time  easier  to  raise,  as  the  whole  capital  mar-
ket would become considerably broader.  Total saving 
and investment would not change, but its distribution 
would,  i.e.  the  allocative  mechanism  of  the  capital 
market  would  act  upon  a  large  part of total  saving 
which  at  present  escapes  it. 
All  the  more  developed  forms  of  capitalization, 
whether a fund within a single enterprise, a branch of 
industry or an  occupation,  or through life  insurance 
companies,  feed  their  net  cash  flow  into  the  capital 
market.  Whether  the  allocative  mechanism  of  the 
market is  allowed to distribute these funds efficiently 
depends  on  the  restrictions  placed  upon  the  invest-
ment powers of the type  of fund in question. 
Private unregulated funds  are restricted only by their 
own  statutes  and  by  the  investment  conceptions  of 
their  governing  body.  (The  latter  sometimes  tends 
to take  a mistaken view of what is  prudent, - em-
ployee  representatives  in  the  government  or  man-
agement of the fund are particularly apt to adopt non-
professional  and  disadvantageous  investment  rules 
and  policies  due  to  a false  understanding of what is 
conservative, orthodox and prudent). 
Private  funds  regulated  and  supervised  by  a  state 
authority  (as  is  the  case  in  Germany,  Holland  and 
under certain conditions also  in Belgium)  are  usually 
subjected  to certain  rules  on their investment power 
imposed  by  the  authority.  These  rules  and  in  par-
ticular their effect on the role of pension funds in the 
capital  market will  be discussed  again  in Chapter II 
and  IV.  In  the  present  chapter,  only  some  very 
general  observations  will  be  made: 
a)  In  the  EEC  countries  where  such  regulation  is 
important in practice, (i.e.  in Germany, Belgium and 
Holland),  what is  being  regulated is  the  fund  itself, 
(e.g.  how much  of  what type  of investment may  be 
put  into it).  In  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  (except  for  certain  provisions  designed  to 
ensure that the fund does not become a captive source 
of  capital  for  the  employer  sponsoring  the  fund),  it 
is  the conduct and  powers of the trustee of the fund 
that is  being regulated (e.g.  what he may  or may not 
do in  investing trust monies). 
b) Regulation circumscribing the type and proportions 
(structure) of pension fund  investments tends  simply 
to take pension funds as analogous in their nature with 
the  technical  reserves  of insurance companies  and  to 
apply  the  same  rules  to  them e).  With the notable 
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exception  of  Holland  where  the  Verzekeringskamer 
leaves a wide degree of discretion in the choice of in-
vestments, these regulations severely restrict the liberty 
of  uninsured  (self  -administered)  pension  funds  to 
choose  the  investments  which  they  themselves  deem 
the most suitable for their purposes.  In the UK and 
the US,  only insured pension funds fall  under insur-
ance  company  regulations,  not because  they are  pen-
sion  funds  (whose liabilities depend on the length of 
human  life)  but because  reserves  held  by  insurance 
companies  with respect  to pension  contracts  are  not 
segregated  from  their  other  reserve  assets,  and  the 
regulations  apply  to  the  totality  of  their  technical 
reserves.  In  the  UK,  this  is  of  no  great  practical 
importance, because insurance companies have almost 
complete  liberty  in  the  choice  of  their  investments. 
In the US,  insurance companies are generally prohib-
ited  from  investing  more  than  a  small  percentage 
of their  reserves  in  equities  (common  stocks).  This 
having  proved  a  serious  handicap  to  the  growth  of 
insured pension funds, in recent years more and more 
States  have  amended  their  regulations,  conceding  to 
insurance  companies  the  right  to  segregate  pension 
fund  reserve  assets  from  other  reserve  assets  and 
invest  the former  partly  or wholly  in  equities  if so 
desired  by  the  employer  sponsoring  the  pension 
plan (2).  (Over  30  States  now  authorize  insurance 
companies to segregate pension fund assets from other 
assets).  This  strong movement  reflects  a  recognition 
that pension  fund  assets  should  not be  subjected  to 
the  same  rules  as  life  insurance  companies'  other 
assets. 
c)  Subjecting  pension  fund  investment  to  the  insur-
ance  company  investment  rules  imposes  upon  the 
former  (regardless  of  whether  the  pension  fund  is 
insured or uninsured) a strong bias in favour of fixed-
interest  securities.  Future  insurance  liabilities  being 
expressed in fixed  nominal  amounts  of money,  fixed 
interest securities redeemable at a fixed  nominal value 
are  deemed  especially  suitable for  covering  these lia-
bilities.  Moreover,  the  author  of  these  regulations 
is  the State whose own recourse to the capital market 
is  facilitated  by  channeling  demand  in  the  direction 
of  state  bonds.  Again  with  the  laudable  exception 
of  Holland,  these  regulations  in  our  opinion  have 
done  and  continue  to  do  considerable  harm  to  the 
situation  and  development  of  pension  funds  in  the 
EEC  countries. 
(I)  The  Belgian  Law  of June  25,  1930,  which  subjects  to its 
provisions  all  enterprises  " which  make  undertakings  whose 
performance depends  on  the  length of human life "  is  a good 
illustration  of  the  philosophy  of  regarding  a pension  fund  as 
falling  under  the  category  of  life  insurance.  Belgian  pension 
funds  confined  to the personnel of a single enterprise and  set 
up in  a  certain  legal  form  are,  however,  for  the  time  being, 
exempt from  insurance company regulations. 
(2)  ].  C.  Bowling, "Separate Accounts -The Quiet Revolution 
in  Pension  Funding", The  C.L.U.  Journal,  Summer  1965. Even  if  it were  admitted that  the  objectives  of life 
insurance  are  best met by investment in bonds  (and 
this question is  not within the scope  of our report), 
the same  argument could not apply  to pension funds 
whose future liabilities are  more  and more geared to 
final  pre-retirement  wages,  i.e.  are  not  fixed  but 
variable  sums  depending  on  future  wage  and  price 
changes, i.e. on "real", non-monetary variables of the 
economic  system.  By  obliging  them  to  invest  all  or 
most  of  their  reserves  in  monetary  assets,  not  only 
is  their contribution  to  the  capital  market  biased  in 
a  particular  direction,  but it  is  likely  to  be  reduced 
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overall  - for  the  fixed-interest  bias  imposed  upon 
pension  funds  will  militate  in  favour  of  unfunded 
schemes  (repartition  as  in F  ranee)  or of  funding  via 
balance-sheet  provisions  (as  in  Germany  where  the 
employer  corporation's  real  assets  provide  some  in-
direct cover against future changes in monetary values, 
though this  protection finds  no  automatic expression 
in the nominal balance-sheet value of the accumulated 
pension  provision).  The  result  in either  eventuality 
(non-funding, or funding in the form of balance-sheet 
provisions  instead  of  separate  funds)  is  a  weaken-
ing  and/  or narrowing of  the capital market. CHAPTER  II 
Pension  Funds  and  their  Assets  - The  Present  Status 
The present status of  pension funds  in  the countries 
of the  EEC is  extraordinarily difficult  to describe  in 
a  uniform  way.  As  interest in the  subject  has  until 
recently been mainly oriented towards its social policy 
aspects, the economic and the more narrowly financial 
aspects are poorly or not at all documented. Statistics 
on assets  held,  on income  from  contributions and on 
the  yield  on  assets,  benefit  disbursements,  numbers 
and  age  structure  of  contributors,  non-contributing 
members  and  beneficiaries,  etc.  are in most countries 
not fully available, or available only for certain classes 
of  funds,  and/  or  with  respect  to  some  time  series 
only  and  not  to others.  For two  of  the  EEC  coun-
tries, namely Belgium and Luxemburg, we have found 
no  statistics  whatever  on  non-insured  funds  (while 
insured  funds  are  apparently  treated  together  with 
all other insurance company assets  and are not segre-
gated).  In countries where national statistics are syst-
ematically collected,  the coverage  is  usually so differ-
ent  as  to  render  international  comparisons,  if not 
invalid,  at least of only indicative value. 
Moreover,  the  legal  and  fiscal  framework  within 
which  pension  funds  are  set  up  and  operate  is,  as 
is  to be expected, far from homogenous from country 
to country,  and there are  profound conceptual differ-
ences  which  hinder  comparability  as  between  one 
EEC  country  and  another  as  well  as  with  non-EEC 
countries  whose  more  advanced  development  in  the 
matter  of  pension  funds  would  render  such  compar-
isons  particularly  instructive. 
The  present  chapter,  which  will  briefly  describe  the 
legal and tax framework and the orders of magnitudes 
of  fund  assets  prevailing  in  a  number  of  countries 
in  and  outside  the EEC in  the order of their degree 
of  development,  is  not  intended  to  be  exhaustive. 
Its purpose is mainly to provide a scheme of reference 
for the legal and tax policy recommendations of Chap-
ter  IV.  and  a  starting  point  for  the  quantitative 
forecasts  which  are  set  out  in  Chapter  III.  and  its 
Appendix. 
1.  In terms of assets  accumulated to provide comple-
mentary pensions (or "superannuation benefits") over 
and  above  the  State  old-age  pension,  the  United 
Kingdom  is  probably  the  most  advanced  country. 
Provided  that  a  given  pension  plan  is  approved  by 
the  fiscal  authority  (the  Inland  Revenue),  the  emp-
loyer's  contribution  to the  fund  is  tax-deductible  up 
to the limit of actuarially certified requirements.  The 
interest  rate  to  be  used  in  the  actuarial  calculus  is 
not  prescribed.  The  employer's  contribution  is  not 
deemed  to  be  a  part  of  the  taxable  income  of  the 
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employee.  The  employee's  contribution  to  pension 
schemes  up  to  15%  of  pensionable  salary  is  under 
certain  conditions  deductible  from  his  taxable 
income (I).  The  income  of  the  fund  and  its  capital 
gains  are  entirely  tax-free  (provided  its  "in-and-out 
trading"  and  underwriting  activities,  if any,  remain 
within  "reasonable"  bounds;  in  case  of  regular  and 
large-scale  participation  in  underwriting,  the  fund's 
underwriting commissions may be subject to tax) and 
it can  reclaim  any  withholding  tax  from  UK-source 
income.  Investment  of pension  fund  monies  in  the 
securities  of  or  in  loans  to  the  employer  is  highly 
unusual. 
With the introduction of graduated (earnings-related) 
State  pensions  with  the  objective  that  the  State 
scheme  should  eventually  provide  for  average  pen-
sions equal to 50% of pre-retirement earnings ("half-
pay on retirement"), private pension plans now have 
the  option  of  letting  their  contribution  rates  and 
their  pension  benefits  vary  inversely  with  changes 
in  the  State  scheme,  i.e.  the  State  scheme  and  the 
private  complementary  scheme  can  be  merged  in an 
integrated plan. 
Uninsured  pension  funds  in  the  UK  rely  heavily  on 
professional  investment  advice  and  in  many  if not 
the majority of cases let their investments be managed 
on  a  discretionary  basis  by  an  independent  profes-
sional trustee or manager.  (The manager is  not neces-
sarily  the  trustee).  This  reliance  on  professional 
expertise is reflected in the breakdown of their invest-
ments.  In the last four  year  (1963-1966),  new (pri-
vate) pension fund investments averaged£ 255 million 
p.a.,  of  which  only  £ 23  million  or  9%  went  into 
central,  local  and foreign  government  securities.  An 
average  of  £ 196  million  a  year  or  77%  went  into 
British  and  foreign  company  securities,  of which  by 
far the greater part into ordinary shares, and a further 
£ 20  million  or  8%  into  real  estate.  Equity-type 
investments  whose  yield  is  not  perfectly  predictable 
but  is  likely  (as  is  their  capital  value)  to  t:nore  or 
less  keep  pace  with  future  price  and  wage  changes, 
thus constituted over three-quarters  of  recent British 
pension  fund  investment.  If any  change  can  be  ex-
pected in  this  pattern, it is  likely  to be in  the direc-
tion  of  rising  percentage  of  real  estate,  (as  a  result 
of  the  1965  reform  of corporate  taxation);  over  the 
( 
1
)  Based  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Taxation Treatment of Provisions for  Retirement (Cmd.  9063, 
1954),  British  tax  legislation  since  1956  allows  self-employed 
persons  to deduct  from  their  taxable  income  up to 10% p.a. 
of  total  income  to  be  paid  into  a  trust  created  to  provide 
pensions  for  people  " engaged  in  the  same  occupation ". last  year,  already  several  mutual  investment  funds 
have  been  formed  in  Britain  for  the  sole  purpose 
of investing pension fund money in real estate, spread-
ing  the  risk  and  providing  knowhow  for  property 
development and management. 
An  instructive  case  study  of  successful  defence  of 
future pensions  against  the risk of gradual monetary 
depreciation  is  a certain  pension  fund,  sponsored by 
a  major  British  company  and  its  subsidiaries.  The 
book value  of the fund  is  approx.  £ 70  million;  of 
this  sum,  ca.  80%  is  in  ordinary  shares,  ca.  16% 
in  real  estate,  1.5%  in  fixed-interest  securities  and 
2.5%  in  short-term  deposits.  The  average  yield  of 
the total fund at book value is as much as 13%,-an 
astonishingly high figure  at first sight, which however 
shows that the attention paid by some pension funds 
and their supervisory organs to the (often quite low) 
initial yield of ordinary shares at the time of purchase 
is  almost  entirely  misplaced;  the  relevant magnitude 
to  consider  for  long-term  investment  to  meet  long-
term  pension  liabilities  is  not  the  initial  yield  as 
such,  but  its  relationship  to  its  own  probable  rate 
of  increase  in  the  future.  The  principal  portfolio 
manager of the pension fund in question regards (and 
the composition of his  portfolio bears witness  to his 
views)  investment  in fixed-interest  securities  on  the 
grounds  that  "their  yield  is  high  and  predictable 
and  their capital value is  assured  in  nominal  money 
terms at the time of redemption", as  "gambling with 
the  real  value  of our  pensioners'  money",  and  as  a 
sign  of  avoidance  of responsibility. 
2.  In the United States, the provision of complemen-
tary pensions over and above the compulsory Federal 
Old Age,  Survivor and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
is  nearly as  highly developed  as  in  the United King-
dom;  however,  in numerous  cases  it takes  the form 
of a pension plan combined with a so-called deferred 
profit-sharing  plan,  or  may  be  organized  exclusively 
in  the  latter  form.  This  allows  greater  fiscal  flexi-
bility for the employer but the distinction for our pur-
poses  is  not important  and  in  our statistics  pension 
funds  will include  deferred  profit-sharing funds. 
At book values  at  end-1966,  total private uninsured 
("trusteed"  or  "self-administered")  pension  fund  as-
sets were $ 64.5 billion, private insured pension fund 
reserves  $  29.4  billion,  while  the  civil  service,  state 
and local government, OASDI and other public funds 
totalled  $  80.7  billion.  Uninsured  private  funds, 
which  constitute  the  area  of  our  special  interest  in 
this report, were the fastest-growing component of the 
total;  insured plans,  despite  the  concessions  granted 
them  in  recent  years  (tax-exemption  of  investment 
income  and freedom  of investment of segregated  re-
serves)  showed  relatively  less  growth. 
Assets  of  uninsured  private funds  by  book  value  at 
the end of  1966 were invested as  to only 4% in US 
government securities.  A further 52% were invested 
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in  corporate  bonds  and  loans  (of  which  only  1.5% 
in bonds  and loans  of  the employer),  mortgages  and 
other non-equity  types  of assets  exposed  to the  risk 
of monetary depreciation.  (Insured plans were 80% 
invested  in  such  assets).  44%  of  the  total  were 
invested in ordinary shares.  In terms of new invest-
ment, however, the proportion of ordinary shares was 
higher;  61% in 1966.  The justification for the grad-
ual shift in pension fund  investment towards equity-
type capital is well-illustrated by market value figures. 
Of the end-1966 assets,  the market value of the pen-
sion  fund's  ordinary  shares  was  $  37.7  billion  or 
133% of book value,  while  the  market  value  of  all 
other assets  was  $  3  3 billion or about 91% of book 
value (1).  (Book  value  normally  equals  cost). 
A pension plan must be "qualified" (approved by the 
Commissioner  of  Internal Revenue)  to enjoy  certain 
tax  privileges.  A  simple  balance-sheet  provision  or 
reserve  does  not qualify,  i.e.  allocations  to  it would 
not be tax-deductible; moreover, the Internal Revenue 
may  prohibit  investment  of  pension  fund  monies  in 
the  employer's  business e).  If the  plan  is  qualified, 
the  employer's  contribution to  it is  deductible up to 
the limit of 5% of the participants' annual remunera-
tion plus an appropriately spread portion of unfunded 
past-service liabilities; in addition, 15% of the partic-
ipants'  annual  remuneration  may  be  contributed  by 
the  employer  tax-free  to  a  deferred  profit-sharing 
plan.  Carry-over is  permitted (
3
).  Consolidation of  a 
private complementary pension plan with the OASDI 
system  is  also  specifically  permitted;  for  instance, 
while the OASDI currently provides average pensions 
equal  to 53.5% of average  earnings,  if  a given  com-
pany's  pension  plan  provides  for  supplementing  the 
OASDI pension with a private pension up to 75% of 
pre-retirement earnings, a more rapid rise in earnings 
than in  OASDI benefits  would  authorize  and  oblige 
the  company  to  step  up  its  contributions  so  as  to 
fund  its  resulting  extra  pension  liabilities,  (and  vice 
versa if OASDI benefits  rose  faster  than earnings). 
The  majority  of  American  uninsured  pension  funds 
are  managed  on a discretionary basis  by  professional 
trustees, usually  by  trust departments  of  banks.  An 
interesting  new  trend  is  the  division  of  the  fund 
among  two  or more  trustees  ("split-trusteed funds") 
whose  competitive  performance  (in  terms  of  growth 
of  income  and  market  value  of  the  fund)  is  being 
constantly compared.  One of the largest US  corpora-
tions  splits its pension fund among  half-a-dozen  trus-
tees, and allocates the new net cash flow  among them 
(')  Data from  US  Securities  and Exchange Commission,  Wash-
ington, Release  No.  2219,  July  1967. 
(2)  This practice is  also discouraged by the SEC, see  The Wall 
Street Journal, April 21,  1966,  p.  6. 
e)  In Germany,  carry-over  i5  specifically  prohibited  (Nachhol-
verbot). according  to  a formula  whereby  the best investment 
management  performance  is  rewarded  by  the  alloca-
tion of a more than proportional share of new money 
to  the successful  trustee. 
3.  The degree of development of pension funds, their 
freedom  of  operation  and  their  contribution  to  the 
capital  market  in  Holland  is  second  only  to  Britain 
among  European  countries.  One  of  the  historical 
reasons  for  this,  (though by  no means  the only  one) 
is  that like in the U.K.  until the recent introduction 
of  the  graduated  State  pension  scheme,  the  State 
pension  scheme  in  Holland  is  a  flat-rate  one,  not 
related  to  earnings,  being  designed  more  to  assure 
some  minimum  subsistence  level  in  old  age  than  a 
retirement  income  geared  to  the  accustomed  living 
standards of a participant. 
Apart  from  the  public  sector  whose  pension  funds 
(Fl.  10.1  billion  of  assets  at  end-1966)  fall  outside 
the scope of this study, there are three types of fund 
in  Holland:  private  occupational  funds  for  entire 
branches  of  industry  (59  such  funds),  private  funds 
confined  to  one  enterprise  (about  1600  such  funds) 
and  so-called  savings  funds.  The occupational indus-
try-wide funds are set up under an agreement between 
the  employer  and  employee  organizations,  and  can 
be  declared  compulsory  for  all  enterprises  in  that 
industry by  the Minister  of Social  Affairs  under the 
relevant Act of  1949.  Private single-enterprise funds 
(often set  up in  the  form  of  a  foundation),  savings 
funds  (which  are  quantitatively  not  very  important) 
as  well  as  occupational  industry-wide funds  must be 
approved under the Pension and Savings Act of 1952 
and are subject to the supervision of the Verzekerings-
kamer.  Employer contributions to pension funds  are 
fully tax-deductible up to the limit of actuarial require-
ments  (and  under  certain  circumstances,  provided 
they are paid irrevocably, also in anticipation of such 
requirements);  the  employer's  contribution  is  not 
regarded  as  taxable  income  for  the  employee;  the 
employee  contribution is  deductible from  the latter's 
personal  income  tax  (up  to  Fl.  5000  p.a.).  The 
pension  fund  itself  is  free  from  Dutch  income  and 
capital gains tax, and may reclaim any Dutch withhold-
ing  tax.  The  supervision  of  pension  fund  finances 
by the Verzekeringskamer is  carried out in an enlight-
ened  manner:  the  investment  must be "sound", but 
no  prior  approval  is  required.  The  fund  may  not 
invest more  than  10%  of  its  assets  in the  securities 
of or loans  to  the employer.  In all  other respects  it 
has  virtually complete freedom  to invest as  it sees  fit 
both in  Holland and abroad (  1 ). 
At  end-1965,  single-enterprise  pension  funds  held 
assets  (at  book  values)  of  Fl.  6.8  billion,  of  which 
40%  was  invested  in  securities e),  34.5%  in  direct 
loans,  11% in real estate and 9% in  mortgages;  the 
average yield on all assets was 4.86% (after 4.64% in 
1964 and 4.59% in 1963 ).  Their new investments in 
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1965 amounted to Fl. 607 million, of which 40% went 
into direct loans, 24% into securities,  15% into real 
property and 11% into mortgages.  Pension  fu~d~ of 
branches of industry held total assets of Fl. 5.2 bllhon, 
the  increment  in  1965  having  been  Fl.  557  million. 
The breakdown of the total investment portfolio and 
of  new  investments  during  the  year  was  slightly 
different  from  that of  single-enterprise  funds,  direct 
loans  and  real  property  representing  a  higher  and 
securities a lower proportion of the total.  The average 
yield on total assets was virtually identical (  4.8% vs. 
4.86%  for  single-enterprise  funds). 
In Holland  it seems  less  usual  than in the  UK  and 
the  US  to  hand  over  the  management  of a  pension 
fund on a discretionary basis to a professional trustee, 
the  majority  of the funds  managing  their own  port-
folio  though obtaining investment advice  from  banks 
or other professional  sources. 
A case  study in the evolution of investment policy is 
provided by one of the largest Dutch single:et;-terpri~e 
funds.  With a book value  of over Fl.  1 bllhon,  th1s 
fund  was  until  recent  years  invested  as  to  25%  in 
real estate, 12% in Dutch and 3% in foreign ordinary 
shares  and  60%  in  Dutch  fixed-interest  securities, 
direct loans and mortgages.  As the company's pension 
plan  is  related  to  earnings  in  the  immediate  pre-
retirement period, each general wage increase caused 
a shortfall between the present value of future pension 
liabilities  and  the  value  of  the  investments  accu-
mulated  from  past  contributions,  and  the  resulting 
actuarial  deficit  had  to be made  up  by  the company 
through massive supplementary contributions (running 
into  tens  of  millions  of  guilders  in  each  of  the last 
three  years).  It  was  thus  realized  that  protection 
against  such  extra  liabilities,  caused  by  the  general 
rise  of  wages  and  prices,  can  only  be  obtained  by 
putting greater emphasis on investments whose value 
and  yield  follow  the  real  rather  than  the  m?~etary 
variables of the economy.  The target composttlon of 
the  total  portfolio  is  now  30%  (instead  of  25%) 
in  real  estate,  30%  (instead  of  15%)  in  ordinary 
shares  and  40%  (instead  of 60%) in  fixed  interest. 
Moreover,  within  the  ordinary  share  portfolio,  the 
proportion  of  non-Dutch  stocks  is  being  increased 
from  one-fifth  to  nearly  one-half,  in  pursuit  of  a 
policy  of  rigorous  selectivity  and  of  buying  the best 
dividend growth prospects in whichever country they 
may  be  found,  although  all  the  fund's  pension 
liabilities are or will arise in Holland itself. 
(I)  Except  that  direct  investment  abroad,  e.g.  in  property, 
direct loans or unquoted securities, is  subject to exchange con-
trol  approval,  - but  this  is  a  general  rule  e~forced by  the 
Nederlandsche Bank and is not confined to penston funds. 
(2)  No  breakdown  between  government  and  corporate  secur-
ities  or  between  fixed-interest  securities  and  ordinary  shares 
appears  to  be  available. 4.  The legal  and  fiscal  framework  of complementary 
pension  plans  in  Germany  is  of  considerable  com-
plexity.  The graduated (earnings-related) State scheme 
(Soziale  Rentenversicherung) is  partly capitalized and 
is  partly  based  on  current  repartition  (Umlagever-
fahren);  it is  widely  considered  to  be  entering into 
a  period  of  substantial  deficit  (disinvestment  of 
existing  reserves)  as  the  temporary  favourable  age-
distribution  between  contributors  and  pensioners, 
caused by the large number of premature male deaths 
in  1939-1945, is  restored to normal.  At present, the 
system  theoretically  provides  for  a  pension  of 60% 
of earnings after 40 years of contributions; in practice, 
this  currently  tends  to work out at  4  5-50%  of last 
pre-retirement earnings for lower income and 20-25% 
for  higher-income  contributors.  The  role  of  comple-
mentary  plans  in  bringing  total  pensions  to  an  ade-
quate percentage of last pre-retirement income (75% 
is  considered  as  the  desirable  standard,  and  is  the 
fixed  objective  of  the  seven  public  pension  funds 
[ offentlich-rechtliche  Versorgungskassen]  set  up  for 
the non-staff  [Nichtbeamtete]  employees  of railways, 
post,  municipalities  and  nationalized  enterprises),  is 
thus likely to maintain or increase its importance. 
Complementary pension funds  may  take one of three 
principal  legal  forms: 
i)  Provisions  in  the  balance-sheet  of  the  employer 
enterprise  (Pensionsriickstellungen).  An  employer  is 
not legally obliged to fund his pension liabilities, but 
most  in fact  find  it prudent to  do so.  Dotations  to 
provisions  are  tax  -deductible  if  the  pension  is  a 
contractual obligation and if its funding is  calculated 
according  to  certain  rather  strictly  defined  methods; 
the  interest  rate  to  be  used  in  the  actuarial  calculus 
is  fixed  by tax law at 5.5%, and under-provision in a 
given fiscal  year cannot be made good in a subsequent 
year  (Nachholverbot).  Funds in the form  of balance-
sheet provisions must be  non-contributory. 
Many  German  enterprises  regard  balance-sheet  pro-
visions  for  pensions  as  a  tax-privileged  form  of  self-
financing  which,  although  non-contributory,  is  there-
fore  more  advantageous  for  the  employer  than  a 
separate fund (  Pensionskasse or Unterstiitzungskasse ). 
This  view  is  debatable.  The fund  constituted in  the 
form  of  a balance-sheet  provision  has  no  investment 
income properly speaking; in a general sense, however, 
its income is  the yield accruing to the enterprise from 
the investments on the asset-side of the balance sheet 
which  the  pension  provisions  on  the  liabilities  side 
have helped  to "self-finance".  This income is  subject 
to  all  the  various  taxes  (Ertragsteuer,  Korperschaft-
steuer,  Vermogensteuer)  to  which  the  rest  of  the 
employer's  income  and  assets  are  subject.  Thus  it  is 
only  the  after-tax  income  (equal  to  perhaps  45-50% 
of  pre-tax,  depending  on  the  distribution  policy  of 
the  enterprise  and  on  its  capital  tax  position)  gen-
erated by  the  investment  of  pension  fund  provisions 
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which  remains  available  to  the  employer  for  paying 
current  pensions  or continuing  to  fund  future  ones. 
The alternative to self-financing via balance-sheet pro-
visions  ("borrowing the pension fund") is  borrowing 
from  some  outside  source.  The  interest  charge  on 
such borrowing is,  of course, fully  tax-deductible, i.e. 
it is  offset against the taxable income from the enter-
prise's assets.  Under such circumstances, the pension 
fund is  an  independent tax-free entity, whose income 
is  fully available, tax-free, for the payment of current 
pensions  or  the  continued  funding  of  future  ones. 
This, in turn, diminishes  the cost to the employer of 
providing pensions.  If the tax-saving and tax-increas-
ing  factors  inherent  in  the  two  alternative  methods 
are balanced against each other, it is doubtful whether 
the  balance-sheet  provision  method  of  funding  is 
cheaper  than  the  separate  fund  method (1 ).  It  is 
incontestable that a captive internal source of finance 
(pension  provisions)  is  more  convenient  than depen-
dence on the capital market or on the banking system 
(borrowing),  particularly  when  the  enterprise  in 
question is  already  substantially indebted.  However, 
heavy  indebtedness  to  their  own  future  pensioners 
(" Sozialverschuldung")  is  also  causing  concern  to 
certain forward-looking enterprises as  well as  to neu-
tral  observers,  particularly  since  the  latter  type  of 
debt is unsecured and enjoys no priority upon liquida-
tion or bankruptcy. 
Balance-sheet  provisions,  estimated  to  amount  to 
about DM 20 billion, have however other substantial 
advantages in Germany over other methods of pension 
funding,  such  as  freedom  from  supervision,  no  em-
ployee  representation,  no  taxation of  the  employer's 
contribution  as  if it was  part of the  taxable  income 
of the  employee,  and  perhaps  above  all  no necessity 
to invest pension funds in fixed-interest assets vulner-
able  to  inflation.  For  these  reasons,  under  present 
laws  and regulations they would very likely continue 
as  the  largest  pension  funding  medium;  although  in 
certain German financial  circles  it is  believed that as 
balance-sheet  provisions  constitute  an  unorthodox 
method of pension fund financing,  present regulations 
are  not likely  to  remain  in  force  for  ever. 
ii)  Pension funds (  Pensionskassen) set up in the form 
of  a  mutual  assurance  association.  There  are  at 
present about 250 such funds, some occupational ones 
for  entire  branches  of  industry  (building,  banking, 
chemical  industry,  flour  milling  industry,  consumer 
co-operatives)  and  for  certain  professions,  others  for 
( 
1
)  The precise balance of advantage will be determined by the 
degree of imperfection of the capital market, the marginal rate 
of interest at which the individual employer can borrow funds 
from  it,  the  (after-tax)  rate  of  return  at  which  it can  invest 
the  borrowed  funds  in  its  own  enterprise  and  the  (tax-free), 
yield  which  can  be  obtained  on  the  investment  of  pension 
fund  assets  outside  the  enterpri5e. the  employees  of single  enterprises.  The 190 largest 
funds  are under Federal, the small ones (with annual 
contributions of  under  DM  75 000) under  Land  su· 
pervision.  These funds may, but need not be, contrib-
utory;  in  any  event,  employee  representatives  must 
effectively  take  part in  their  management.  The  em-
ployer  contribution  is  tax-deductible  if  made  on  a 
(strictly  defined)  actuarial  basis;  the  rate of interest 
to  be  used  in  calculating  funding  requirements  is 
prescribed at  3.5%.  The employer's contribution in 
excess  of DM 312 p.a.  for  an  employee  is  added to 
the taxable income of the employee.  On the average, 
70-75% of the contributions paid into pension funds 
come  from  employers  and  25-30%  from  employees. 
The  Bundesaufsichtsamt  fiir  das  Versicherungs- und 
Bausparwesen  supervises  the  investments  of  pension 
funds on the same principles as  those of life insurance 
companies.  In practice,  this  prevents  pension funds 
from having more  than  10% of their assets  at book 
value (the lower of original cost or market value)  in 
ordinary shares and from investing more than 10% of 
new  money  in  ordinary  shares  in  any  given  year. 
Moreover,  only  ordinary  shares  accepted  as  suitable 
for inclusion in mathematical reserves (Deckungstock-
fahigkeit)  can  be  purchased,  and  the  criteria  and 
practice  of  the  supervisory  authority  in  this  regard 
are rather controversial, (a relatively high initial yield 
is  usually required, though the initial yield is  of only 
limited  relevance  to  long-term  liabilities).  Finally, 
the 10% rule at book value hinders active and flexible 
management  of  the  ordinary  share  portfolio,  for  a 
given investment sold at more than book value cannot 
be  fully  replaced by  a new one within the permitted 
10%. 
These investment restrictions make  this  type  of pen-
sion  fund  a  less  than  perfect  medium  for  funding 
pensions related to earnings in the last pre-retirement 
period.  Nevertheless,  although  in  an  era  of  rising 
prices  and  wages  the  trend  is  undoubtedly  towards 
the  granting  of  such  earnings-related  pensions,  the 
development of pension funds  in  the form of mutual 
insurance  associations  has  been vigorous  in the past; 
at  present  they  hold  total  assets  of  DM 9.31  billion 
and  their  continued  growth  seems  assured  primarily 
because  of  the  obstacles  hindering  the  adoption  of 
the  third  type of funding  medium,  that of  the "pro-
vident funds"  (Unterstiitzungskassen). 
iii)  There are over 10 000 "provident funds" (Unter-
stiitzungskassen),  the  great  majority  of  them  rather 
small  (although  it  would  be  legal  for  several  enter-
prises to group together and found a group fund, but 
in  practice  this  is  seldom  done),  set  up  as  separate 
legal  entities on behalf of the  employees of an  enter-
prise  (and  their  dependents)  to  provide  pensions 
(and/  or  other  benefits).  There  is  no  supervisory 
authority  for  such  funds,  and  they  are  completely 
free  in  their  investment  policy.  No  statistics  are 
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available  on  their  investments.  Many  of  the  small 
funds  simply  lend  their  assets  back  to  the  sponsor 
enterprise, but some of the larger ones invest in both 
fixed-interest securities, ordinary shares and property. 
Like  for  the funds  in  category  (ii),  their  investment 
income  is  tax-free,  nor  are  they  subject  to  capital 
gains  tax. 
These  funds  would  be  eminently  suitable  for  capi-
talizing future pensions and managing the correspond-
ing  assets,  were  it not  for  a  severe  fiscal  limitation 
on their size.  The employer's contribution to future 
pensions is  a tax-deductible expense only up to  1.5% 
p.a. (and in certain cases  an  additional 0.5% p.a.) of 
the total wages and salaries;  and the total size of the 
fund  is  limited  to  the  capitalized  value  of  current 
pension  disbursements  plus  30%  (and  an  additional 
15% for non-pension benefits) of the average  annual 
payroll  of  the  sponsor  enterprise  in  the  preceding 
three  years.  It is  readily  apparent  that  an  annual 
contribution of  1.5%  and  a fund ceiling  of  30%  of 
the payroll can capitalize only the most modest future 
pensions  which  could,  even with the most brilliantly 
successful investment of the fund's assets, only finance 
a small marginal supplement to the basic State old-age 
pension.  Providing pensions  through such  a medium 
represents  little  more  than  a  gesture  on  the  part of 
the employer towards his employee. 
Total assets  of such funds  in  1965 were estimated at 
DM 4.5  billion;  the growth of their assets  has  been 
a little less  fast  than that of the two other types  of 
fund,  but still  remarkable.  Many  enterprises  which 
have only  recently  adopted a complementary pension 
plan  for  their  employees  have  chosen  this  form, 
having judged balance-sheet provisions financially  too 
unorthodox  and  un-conservative,  and  pension  funds 
in  the  form  of  a  mutual  assurance  association  too 
hamstrung in the matter of investment; but within a 
relatively  short  span  of  years,  their provident  funds 
will  run  up  against  the  30%  ceiling,  will  have  to 
stay frozen  at  that level and they will have to revert 
to one of the other funding media or adopt an insured 
pension plan on top of the one financed by the provi-
dent fund. 
In  discussing  the  alleged  financial  attraction  of  the 
balance-sheet  provision  method of  funding,  we  have 
stressed  that  separate  pension  funds  (both  Pensions-
kassen and Unterstiitzungskassen) enjoy complete tax 
exemption.  This is  correct in the sense that they are 
not liable  to any  tax;  however, unlike pension funds 
in  Holland  (as  well  as  in  the  UK  and  the  USA), 
German pension  funds  do  not have  the  privilege  of 
reclaiming  withholding  taxes  (coupon  tax,  Kapi-
talertragsteuer)  and  as  they  have  no  tax  liabilities 
against  which  withholding  taxes  could  be  credited, 
their  investment  income  from  ordinary  shares  and 
certain bonds is  automatically reduced by 25%.  They 
are  thus  discouraged  from  contributing  their  funds to this section of the capital market e); this seems  to 
be  an  unintended  accidental  by-product  of  German 
tax legislation. 
To sum  up in a concrete (though rather exceptional) 
example  the various  legal  and fiscal  peculiarities  and 
handicaps  afflicting  the  possible  types  of  German 
pension fund,  we will relate a case  history which we 
found  striking  and  regard  as  a  unique  illustration. 
The  fund  in  question  is  medium-sized,  with  a  book 
value  of  about  DM  40  million,  an  annual  net  cash 
flow  of about DM 5  million, and is  sponsored by an 
industrial  company  employing  a  high  proportion  of 
young unskilled female labour.  The fund is  set up in 
the form  of  a balance-sheet  provision (Pensionsriick-
stellung),  because  it  is  non-contributory,  but  above 
all  because  the  management  is  convinced  that  the 
severe  restrictions  imposed on the investment of  the 
assets  of a proper pension fund  (Pensjonskasse)  may 
render  the  future  cost  of  servicing  earnings-related 
pensions  intolerably  high.  A  provident  fund  (Un-
tersti.itzungskasse) would not serve its purpose because 
of  the  low  rate  of  tax-deductible  contributions  and 
the  low  ceiling  imposed  on  its  size.  However,  the 
management also considers a simple balance-sheet pro-
vision ( Pensionsri.ickstellung) as an unsolid method of 
financing which exposes pensioners to an unjustifiable 
risk.  Therefore  the  assets corresponding  to the pro-
vision  are  segregated  ( Sondervermogen),  irrevocably 
handed over to a trustee, and invested by an indepen-
dent manager (a  bank).  Nearly  100% of the fund is 
invested in ordinary shares,  of which  about  60%  in 
German and 40% in foreign  shares.  Since  the segre-
gated  account  is,  in  the  legal  form  of  an  intra-
enterprise balance-sheet provision, the property of the 
enterprise and not of a separately constituted pension 
fund, its investment income is  fully  taxed as  if it was 
the  income  of  the company  itself,  and  in  addition  a 
part  of  foreign  withholding  taxes  which  cannot  be 
offset  against German tax liabilities, are entirely lost. 
Despite these complications and serious tax disadvan-
tages,  the  company  considers  its  chosen  funding 
method  as  the  least  bad  of  the  permissible  alter-
natives,  and  it feels  compensated for  its  fiscal  losses 
by  the  gradually  rising  dividend  income  from  the 
fund's investments. 
5)  In Italy,  the  State  old-age  pension  is  graduated, 
i.e. related to a certain extent to the lifetime earnings 
of  the  pensioner;  the  system  is  relatively  advanced 
and  is  being  further  developed  following  the Act  of 
July 21,  1965, with the ultimate objective of provid-
ing employees  with a pension equal to 80% of their 
last three pre-retirement years'  average earnings  after 
40  years  of  contributions.  Consequently,  the  scope 
and need for private complementary pensions is  more 
limited than, for instance, in a country with a different 
and  less  ambitious  State old-age  security  system  like 
Holland.  However,  the  main  State  old-age  pension 
plan (the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale) 
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operates  on  a  modified  repartition  principle  (its  re-
serve assets at Lit 550 billion in 1962 were less than 
one-third of the year's current pension disbursements, 
and  its  net saving or reserve  accumulation  was  only 
Lit  121  billion,  although  this  latter rose  to  Lit  428 
billion  by  1964 ).  The public funds  administered by 
the  Ministero  del  Tesoro  (the  IPAMT)  were  appar-
ently  more  adequately,  though  presumably  not  fully 
capitalized, (pension disbursements of Lit 57.2 billion 
in  1962  being  backed  by  reserve  assets  of  Lit  598 
billion; the annual accumulation in 1962 was Lit 69.8 
billion and rose  to Lit  103 billion by  1964 ). 
The distinguishing feature of the Italian private com-
plementary  system  is  that it is  designed  in  the  first 
place  to  provide  security  against  dismissal  from 
employment;  the  fund  constituted  for  this  purpose 
by  an  employer  appears  to  have  a  double  character 
and  serves  as  a pension fund upon the retirement of 
the employee.  Moreover,  provision  of an  indemnity 
against dismissal  and upon retirement is  compulsory, 
- this  again  distinguishes  the  Italian  system  from 
private  complementary  pension  systems  in  other 
countries  which  are  either based  on private  contract 
or are  ex  gratia. 
Italian data on private pension plans do  not seem  to 
be complete.  Some pioneering statistical research has 
been  done  by  financial  institutions e),  by  the Banca 
d'Italia  and  by  academic  sources (3)  on  which  the 
present report partly relies.  Total assets of all private 
plans included in our data (based on a sample of the 
Italian  corporate  sector  which  covers  two-thirds  of 
all  companies  with a nominal  capital  of over  Lit  50 
million), as  well as  the nationalized electrical industry 
(ENEL), in 1964 (the last year for which details have 
been  worked  out)  were  Lit  1 701  billion,  of  which 
Lit 1 130 billion relating to industrial and commercial 
companies  and  Lit  571  billion  to  banks  and  other 
financial  institutions.  In  the  latter  group  Lit  178 
billion  were  accounted  for  by  separate  autonomous 
funds, while in the industrial and commercial company 
sector  autonomous funds  totalled probably  not more 
than Lit 80 billion, virtually all constituted by Italian 
(') If they wish  to invest in securities  subject  to withholding 
tax,  they can  do so  without loss  of yield  by  buying  German 
mutual  fund  units,  dividends  on which  are  paid  gross.  This 
removes  the  tax  handicap,  but also  the  freedom  of  the  fund 
to choose;  for  the securities underlying the mutual fund  units 
are, of course, chosen by the latter. The choice of investments 
by  German  mutual  funds,  and  particularly  their  distribution 
policy  (partial  or  even  full  payout  of  realized  capital  gains) 
is  not necessarily  ideal for  a pension  fund,  for  which present 
income is  not more valuable than income in the distant future, 
its  preferences  for  income  at various  periods  of time  depend-
ing on  the  time  structure of its liabilities  (engagements). 
e>  Cf.:  La  Finanza delle Assicurazioni  Sociali  in  Italia, (1919-
1962),  Mediobanca,  Milano,  1964. 
e>  Cf.:  Prof.  A.  Confalonieri, "I Fondi  di  Quiescenza ", Mi-
lano,  1966. subsidiaries  of foreign  companies.  The rest,  85%  of 
total assets,  took  the  form  of provisions  in  the  bal-
ance-sheet  of  the  employer  (Fondi  di  Licenziamento 
e di  Anzianita).  The  mechanism  of  these  provisions 
is closely analogous to those of the German Pensions-
riickstellungen;  they are  constituted tax-free  on actu-
arial principles, enjoy no special priority upon liquida-
tion of the enterprise,  and provide a source of "self-
financing"  for it.  Their dependence on (and volatility 
with respect to) changes  in wages  and  salaries, how-
ever, is  even  more marked than that of the German 
Pensionsriickstellungen,  for  they  are  necessarily  and 
compulsorily based on the employee's last salary level 
(rather than, as  is  partly the case  in other countries, 
on an average of past and current wages and salaries). 
All  considerations  set  out earlier in this  report with 
regard  to the  debatable  financial  advantages  of  this 
type  of  self-financing,  its  constricting  effect  on  the 
capital  market  and  on  its  ability  to  allocate  capital 
resources in a competitive manner, and to the conten-
tious nature of heavy corporate indebtedness vis-a-vis 
future pensioners, apply with equal force to the Italian 
funds  set up in the form  of balance-sheet provisions. 
6.  No global data at all  have been found  relative  to 
Belgian  complementary  pension  funds,  although  we 
understand  that  the  Ministere  de  la  Prevoyance  So-
dale  and  the  Ministere  des  Classes  Moyennes  are 
studying  the  possibility  of  organizing  the  collection 
of  relevant  statistics.  We  are  thus  obliged  to limit 
our report to some descriptive comments on the legal 
and  fiscal  framework  within  which  private  funds 
might operate. 
In  principle,  any  Belgian  institution  providing  for 
future  pension  benefits  ought  to fall  under  the  Act 
of  June  25,  1930  regulating  insurance  companies; 
under  Article  I  of  this  law,  however,  "institutions 
established  within  private  enterprises  and  to  which 
only  the  personnel  of  such  enterprises  belong"  are 
exempt.  In practice, such institutions for the purpose 
of collecting employers' and employees' contributions, 
investing the accumulated funds  and paying pensions 
must, in order for  the employer's contribution to be 
tax-deductible, be independent of the enterprise  and 
are often constituted in the legal form of an indepen-
dent  non-profit  making  association  and  hence  not 
within  the enterprise.  For this  reason,  their exemp-
tion from the insurance company regulations has been 
contested, but the competent Belgian authorities have 
so  far  not conceded  the  arguments  of  the  insurance 
industry,  and  pension  funds  in  the  form  of  ASBL's 
have been tolerated.  It is  understood, however, that 
new legislation which might bring them under regula-
tion  is  being  studied  by  the  Ministry  of  Economic 
Affairs. 
While a pension fund per se would not be a recognized 
tax-free  legal  entity  in  Belgium,  and  might  be  sub-
jected  to  full  corporate  taxation,  even  an  ASBL, 
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whose  exclusive  statutory purpose  is  to  provide  for 
the pensions of its members, is not wholly tax-exempt 
either.  In the first place, its investment income from 
either  Belgian  or  foreign  securities  is  subject  to 
Belgian  withholding  tax  at  20%  on  dividends  and 
l 5%  on  interest,  which  cannot  be  reclaimed;  nor 
can  an  ASBL  reclaim  the  real  estate  tax  on  its  real 
estate investment income.  In addition, an ASBL pays 
a capital tax of 0.17% p.a.  on its assets  and may  be 
subject  to capital gains  tax on  sales  of  real  property 
owned  by  it.  Turnover  of  its  securities  portfolio 
(significant  and frequent  switching from  one security 
into  another)  may  make  it liable  to full  corporation 
tax.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tax  treatment  of  a 
pension plan established in  the form  of  an  ASBL  is 
liberal in the sense  that no restrictions are placed on 
the method of the actuarial calculus of the employer's 
contribution;  the  employee's  contribution  is  deduct-
ible  from  his  taxable  income  and  the  employer's 
contribution made  on his  behalf is  not (not even  in 
part as  in Germany) considered as  an addition to his 
personal  taxable  income.  An  ASBL,  moreover,  may 
not lend its funds to the sponsoring enterprise without 
endangering  its  legal  status.  Its  investments  are 
otherwise not restricted by law except that real estate 
owned by it must be "for its own use" (e.g.  it must 
house the office of the ASBL). 
This relative freedom of an ASBL  to invest as  it sees 
fit  (and  to  delegate  investment  powers  to  a  third 
party, e.g.  to a professional management company or 
bank)  as  long  as  it escapes  the  insurance  company 
regulations, is  in marked contrast to the  situation of 
a  pension  plan  which  does  fall  under  these  regula-
tions.  Under  the latter (1),  not more  than  15%  of 
its assets  may  be invested in Belgian ordinary shares 
and  not  more  than  20%  in  non-Belgian  securities, 
each of the latter having to be individually approved 
by  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs;  not less  than 
15%  must  be  invested  in  Belgian  state  or  state-
guaranteed, provincial or communal obligations.  How-
ever, as  much as  65% may be invested in real estate. 
These regulations are nearly as  severe as  the. German 
ones, and are certainly not apt to encourage the flow 
of contractual  savings  to  the  securities  market;  they 
also  discriminate  against  one  sub-market,  that  for 
ordinary shares. 
Although the legal and fiscal  environment is  far from 
ideal for  their development, it seems  that in the last 
decade  and especially  in the last  two or three  years 
a  large  number  of  Belgian  enterprises  (the  majority 
of  them  subsidiaries  of  foreign  companies)  have 
formed  pension  funds,  usually  in  the  form  of  an 
ASBL,  their incentive to do so having been the stabi-
lization  of  their  personnel  (reduction  of  labour 
turnover). 
e>  Royal  decree  of June  17,  1931. 7.  Complementary  pension  funds  in  the  sense  used 
in  this  report  are  virtually  non-existent  in  France. 
The  assets  of  the  pre-war  "mutuelles ",  invested  in 
fixed-interest  securities,  have  been  practically  wiped 
out by  the  war- and  post-war  inflation.  Rather  than 
shoulder  the  task  of  rebuilding  them while  also  pro-
viding  the  current  pensions  which  they  had  b~en 
supposed to support (i.e. rather. than make one ac.uve 
generation  pay  both  the  p~nswns  of  the .  previOus 
generation  and build up  capital  to pay for  Its  own), 
France  after  the  war,  through  an  example-setting 
decision of the Patronat and the labour unions, opted 
for  the  repartition  system.  This  decision  was  made 
all  the  more  tempting  as  there  was  a  widespread 
though  ill-founded  belief  that it is  the  capitalization 
system  as  such,  and  not  the  way . the  .capital  was 
invested,  which  was  vulnerable  to  mflauon;  French 
public  opinion  was  acutely  inflation-conscious  and 
consequently  regarded  the  advance  f';In~ing. of  pe~­
sions  as  a  near-certain  method  of  dissipatmg  then 
real  value. 
As  pension  funds  in  our  sense  are  now  a  n~gligible 
quantity,  the legal  and fiscal  rules  under which  they 
might  operate  are  ill-defined.  It seems  that  such  a 
fund would first  have to secure the agreement of the 
Ministry  of  Labour,  which  would  probably  require 
that the  pension plan be non-contributory,  the  fund 
be  independent  of  the  sponsor  company,  be  owned 
and co-managed by the personnel, and its investments 
be  at  least  50%  in  government  obligations.  The 
Ministry  of  Finance  would  allow  the  employ~rs~s 
contribution  to  be  tax-deductible  expense,  but  It  Is 
doubtful  if  it  would  grant  tax  exemption  to  the 
pension  fund  itself;  the  latter.  m~y be  subje~ted to 
both corporate income  tax  on Its  mvestment  mcome 
and to capital gains  tax on realized gains.  However, 
these are merely  tentative indications, as  there seems 
to be no standard practice and case law in the matter. 
It  is  not  intended  to  imply  that  because  pension 
funds are not developed in France, there is  no contri-
bution  to  total  saving  as  a  result  of  complementary 
pension plans.  Repartition systems  do  make  ~ .dire~t 
contribution  to  saving  as  long  as  the  repartltlon  Is 
incomplete,  i.e.  as  long  as  they  continue  to add  to 
their  reserves (1 ).  In  France  these  reserves  are  cer-
tainly rather modest compared to national.income, to 
the  high  degree  of  coverage  (the  proportiOn  of  em-
ployed population covered by a complementary system) 
and  to  the  number  of  beneficiaries.  They  bear  no 
comparison  with  the  reserves  which  would.  be  re-
garded as  normal  in  a  system  based. on fundmg  ~the 
ARRCO group of schemes in 1966 disbursed pensiOns 
of FF 2 15 3  million  and  held  reserves  of  FF 5 111 
million  a  ratio  of  abour  1 :2.4  ).  For  a  repartition 
system: however,  this  reserve  level is  not  negligibl~. 
It was  made  possible  by  the  rather favourable  r~tlo 
currently prevailing between the num?er of  c~ntnbu­
tors and of pensioners, and the restramt exercised by 
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the  management  of  the  systems  in  not  taking  full 
advantage of the favourable  ratio by proceeding to a 
full  distribution  of  current  contributions.  Even  so, 
the  annual  rate  of  reserve  accumulation  has  been 
falling since  1963 e); critics of the French repartition 
system  assert  that the  distribution of benefits  should 
have  been  far  more  restrained  in  the  past  in  order 
to take full  account  of  the  foreseeable  worsening of 
the ratio between the number of contributors and the 
number of pensioners  they must support. 
The  critics  of  the  current  and  foreseeable  financial 
situation of the French complementary schemes, how-
ever,  oversimplify  the  issue.  A  repartition  system 
does not (and indeed should not, for it is  intrinsically 
incapable  to)  undertake  to  provide  a  certain  future 
pension to present contributors, and cannot by defini-
tion  get  into  financial  difficulties  in  trying  to  meet 
undertakings it has not really entered into.  The con-
tributor in  a repartition scheme acquires  a right to a 
certain number of "points".  What his future pension 
will be cannot be  foretold  today.  It will depend on 
the  monetary  value  assigned  to  a  "point"  by  the 
commission  managing  the  system  when  he  will  be 
drawing  a  pension,  and on  the  average  level  of the 
wages  and  salaries  of  the future  contributors  to  the 
system.  It may  or may  not be correct  to accuse  the 
commissions  that  this  value  has  been  fixed  too  gen-
erously  in  the  past.  It may  or may  not  be  just  to 
accuse  that by steadily raising the assigned value of a 
"point"  in  step  with  rising  wages  and  salari~s,  ~he 
managing commissions  created  a deep-rooted IllusiOn 
among both contributors and pensioners that the level 
of  pensions  is  forever  firmly  linked  to  the  level  of 
earnings  of  the  active  contributors,  (i.e,  in  the  last 
analysis,  that  in  a  repartition  system  pensioners  are 
automatically protected against inflation and automat-
ically  share in the rise  of productivity).  Maybe  such 
an  illusion  has  in fact  been  created;  and  there  may 
be a certain moral pressure on the French complemen-
tary system not to deceive the illusion, or at least not 
too  harshly.  But it should be clear  that  no French 
repartition scheme  is  under any  contractual or other 
legal  obligation  to  run  down  its  reser":es  ~r  temp~­
rarily get into debt in order to spare an IllusiOn, for It 
is  always free  to reduce the value it assi~ns each year 
to a pension "point", or at least not to mcrease It as 
the  earnings  of  the  active  participants  increase.  By 
doing  so,  it  can  avoid  any  adverse  impact  upon  its 
reserves of a given demographic change in the popula-
tion covered by it. 
(I)  Strictly speakincr  a repartiticn system involving the creation 
of  reserves  is  not"'~ pure,  but a  " qualified"  or  " modified" 
repartition system.  .  . 
(2)  For  instance  ARRCO  added  FF  943  mdhon  to  reserves 
in  1963,  probably FF 505  million  in  1967  and  is  unlikely  to 
reach  FF 300  million  in  1968. The role  of the repartition system  in contributing  to 
saving  in  France  is  therefore  not  necessarily  pre-
judged;  by  a collective  annual  decision,  it could  not 
only  continue  to  accumulate  reserves  in  the  future, 
but  even  step  up  its  rate  of  reserve  accumulation. 
However,  it is  clear that in  practice it is  unlikely to 
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lean  too  far  in  this  direction  and  disappoint  too 
gravely  its  pensioners  and  its  contributors  nearing 
retirement  age.  This  "social"  assumption,  and  the 
resulting sharp but transitory fall in its rate of reserve 
accumulation, is  implicit in the asset growth forecasts 
put forward in  Chapter III. CHAPTER  III 
Scope  for  Growth  of  Pension  Funds 
The  present chapter is  intended  as  a compact  frame 
of  reference  for  policy  decisions.  Its  immediate 
objective  is  to  project  the  development  of  private, 
non-insured  pension  funds  to  1980  in  the  Common 
Market, assuming no change in the existing fiscal  and 
regulatory  environment.  In  line  with  its  intended 
use, however, the analysis stops short of constructing 
a rigorous  model of pension fund growth.  It focuses 
instead on (a) providing a picture of the actual situa-
tion  in  statistical  terms  in  a  no doubt poorly  docu-
mented  area,  (b)  giving  an  appreciation  for  trends 
and long-term growth potential, (c) supplying enough 
detail  on  the  various  determinants  of  pension  fund 
growth,  as  well  as  on the main  relationships  under-
lying  it, to permit  ready  calculation of the quantita-
tive  effects  of  given  policy  changes.  Only  the high-
lights  of  the  analysis  are  presented  in  the  ensuing 
discussion. 
1.  Statistics  and  Estimates 
As remarked earlier in Chapter II, statistics on pension 
funds are scarce and suffer from lack of comparability 
among countries.  Except for Holland, no EEC coun-
try publishes comprehensive data on the pension fund 
particulars  needed  for  assessing  their  growth  pros-
pects,  i.e.,  membership,  pensioners,  fund  accounts. 
Although  in  consequence,  a  substantial  part of  the 
research  effort  was  spent  on  assembling  facts,  the 
historical  series  on  most  types  of  complementary 
pension  schemes  had  to  be  pieced  together  from 
estimates  based  on  scattered  "benchmark"  data, 
results  of small  samples  or simply  the experience  of 
particular companies.  While this set of estimates, set 
out in Appendix B ending  the present report, seems 
consistent  and  plausible  enough  for  purposes  of  the 
task at hand, the figures  should not be construed, let 
alone  used  as  statistical facts.  The series  shown  for 
Belgium,  a country without any  information relating 
to private, non-insured pension schemes, are especially 
prone  to  error;  their inclusion  in the ensuing  tables 
serves mainly to permit calculation of EEC totals. 
2.  Scope  of Analysis 
Aside from  the differences just noted in the coverage 
and  reliability  of  statistics,  there  is  wide  variation 
amongst  EEC countries  in terms  of  the  relative  im-
portance  of  particular  types  of pension  schemes,  as 
well as in the general development of the (non-insured) 
pension  fund  movement.  The "target"  of this  anal-
ysis,  to  be  exact,  is  that  segment  of  private,  non-
insured, complementary schemes  which are  set up as 
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autonomous  legal  entities  and  keep  on  accumulating 
(and investing) funds  to  back  future  pension obliga-
tions.  Such  funds,  however,  cannot  be  treated  in 
isolation.  To assess their "scope for growth" requires 
some  attention to be paid to other forms  of private 
complementary  schemes e)  (insured  or  non-insured, 
funded  or  non-funded).  To  form  an  idea  of  the 
plausible size of future complementary benefits, trends 
in (legal) social security systems call for investigation. 
Finally,  as  their importance  to  the capital  market is 
comparable  to  that  of  private  funds,  certain  large 
public pension funds (i.e., in Germany,  Italy and the 
Netherlands)  deserve  at  least  token  consideration. 
The  relative  importance  of  the  main  categories  of 
complementary  pension  schemes  at  present  is  illus-
trated  by  the  figures  overleaf  (referring  to  total 
fund  reserves  in  1966, expressed in  %  of GNP for 
the EEC and a number of "reference" countries). 
The figures call for three observations.  First, although 
private complementary schemes are still less important 
in  the  Common  Market  as  a  whole  (about  7%  of 
GNP) than either in the U.S.  (12.7%) or in the U.K. 
( 16.8% ),  the  variation  within  the  EEC  is  striking. 
The  "weight"  of  pension  funds  in  the  Netherlands 
( 19-20%) actually exceeds that of probably any coun-
try in the world, while fund reserves in France (" re-
partition system") are  evidently  of  negligible  impor-
tance to capital markets.  Secondly,  self-administered, 
funded schemes (the term "autonomous" adopted for 
the tables) are far less popular form of complementary 
pension plans  (again  excepting  Holland) than in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, owing largely to the unfavour-
able  fiscal  and  restrictive  regulatory  framework  re-
viewed  in  some  detail  in  the  preceding  chapter. 
Thirdly,  since  all  evidence  points  to  the  relatively 
limited  role  played  by insured  schemes  in the EEC 
(albeit  considerably  larger  in  terms  of  membership 
than  in  terms  of guaranteed  benefits),  they  may  be 
safely excluded from consideration in assessing future 
growth.  In the U.S. and the U.K., by contrast, insured 
schemes stand in active competition with non-insured 
pension  plans. 
3.  Basic  Assumptions 
Rather  than  attempting  to  predict  the  most  likely 
course of development, the projections set out in this 
chapter are based on a network of assumptions, partly 
(
1
)  Providing appreciation for  the impact of given policy modi-
fications  also  calls  for  projections  of  alternative  pension 
arrangements. Private  non-insured  schemes 
I 
I 
Autonomous 
Other 
Funds (1) 
~------~--------- -
Germany  2.8  4.7 
France  - (7)  -
Italy  .9-1.1  6.6 
Netherlands  17.8  -
Belgium/Luxembourg (*)  3.7 
I 
---
1----
E  EC,  total  (by  comparison:)  2.6  I  3.0 
u.s.  8.5  -
U.K. 
I  9.4  -
Sweden  I,  (11.2)  (6)  -
I  I 
* Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Balance sheet  entry schemes. 
( 2)  2.1  °{0 ,  if individually contracted pension schemes are  included. 
( 8)  IPAMT only. 
( 4)  State and Local,  Civil Service and Railroad Retirement  Plans. 
(")  National Pension Fund. 
( 6)  Excluding France. 
(1)  - means 'Nil' or  insignificant  figure. 
( 8)  •• means 'figures not available';  'no estimates'. 
imposed by  the purpose of the  exercise  itself,  partly 
chosen for convenience. 
The  foremost  assumption,  to  repeat,  concerns  the 
institutional  environment  of  pension  funds.  It is 
explicitly  assumed  that  all  aspects  of  government 
policy bearing on pension funds (tax legislation, regu-
lation  of  funding  practices,  investment  of  reserves, 
supervisory  procedure,  etc.)  will  remain  as  they  are 
today. 
Since  the  approach  adopted  relies  heavily  on  rela-
tionships  (ratio  analysis),  both  amongst  the  major 
statistical  measures  of  pension  fund  growth  and 
between pension schemes and socio-economic develop-
ment,  the  projections  require  a  number  of  other 
explicit  assumptions  with regard  to  the  latter.  The 
principal  ones  are  demographic  trends  (number  and 
age  structure of the population, activity rates, labour 
force  and  private non-agricultural  employment),  gen-
eral economic trends (GNP, savings,  and investment, 
price increases) and the future development of social 
security  systems  (pensioners,  average  old  age  and 
survivor  benefits,  etc.).  These  assumptions  are  set 
out in tables  1, 5, below, and tables A-3,  A-5  of the 
appendix (
1
).  Again,  the  main  emphasis  was  placed 
on  securing  internal consistency  among  the variables 
listed  rather  than  aiming  at  reliable  (supported) 
projections  of economic  growth. 
In  addition  to  the  explicit  assumptions  taken  into 
consideration,  the  projections  assume  implicitly  that 
funding  practices  and  other  funding  variables  will 
I 
Partly 
Total 
Public  Insured  Social 
Funded  Funds  Plans  Security 
-
2.0 
-
-
-
.7 
-
-
-
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7.5  2.1  .4-.5  (2)  6.3 
2.0  ..  - ..  (8) 
I  7.6  2.6  (3)  .2-.3  4.6 
17.8  13.4  1.5-2  .. 
3.7  2-3  2-3  9.6 
I 
- -
6.2  3.8 (6)  .7  (6)  .. 
8.5  8.1  (4)  4.2  2.8 
9.4  5.9  7.4  .. 
- 11.2 (6)  - .. 
i 
I 
also remain by and large unchanged.  Thus we assumed, 
for  instance,  that  eligibility  requirements  (age,  se-
niority),  actuarial  methods,  retirement  age  (  65  for 
men,  60  for  women),  the proportion  of  dependants 
and survivors to pensioners etc., will not be modified 
appreciably  during  our projection  period. 
4.  Conceptual Framework 
The method of approach represents a departure from 
previous  studies  on  the  subject  (notably  by  D.  M. 
Holland,  P.  P.  Harbrecht, for  the U.  S.),  by  virtue 
of  a  shift  of  emphasis  among  the  main  statistical 
determinants of pension fund growth.  While the re-
ference  works  cited  tend  to  "build up"  projections 
of pension fund  assets  from  the  relevant  accounting 
flows  (contributions,  investment  earnings,  benefits), 
this  paper  concentrates  directly  on  the  behaviour 
of  the  relationship  between  the  size  of  assets  per 
covered  worker  (or  beneficiary) e).  Once  the  rate 
( 
1
)  This  relationship,  which  was  found  to  possess  a  number 
of  stable, hence predictable, characteristics both on theoretical 
(actuarial)  and  empirical  grounds,  will  be  referred  to  as  the 
" k-multiple"  for  short  throughout  the  chapter.  The  corre-
sponding French  expression  employed  in the Appendix  tables 
is  " rapport RP  A/PM ", standing for " Reserves  Par Affilie "I 
" Prestation Moyenne "  (i.e., Assets per Member/  Average Ben-
efits).  Further comments  on p.  32. 
(2)  Appendix  A  attached  to  this  report  (cf.,  p.  47  for  con-
tents)  also  presents  historical  series  on  the  major  reference 
variables (demographic, economic and social security) projected. of  membership  penetration  is  established  it  suffices 
to make  an  assumption on the future  growth of the 
average benefit to yield projections of fund assets for 
any given scheme. 
This  concept  of  the internal  "dynamics"  of  pension 
funds  is  based  on  the  prevailing  fund  management 
practice of continuous attempts to maintain the fund 
at a level deemed necessary (or prescribed legally) to 
cover existing and anticipated benefit flows.  Persistent 
over- or under-capitalization  is  corrected  by  passing 
up or stepping up contributions. 
In  summary,  instead  of  making  separate,  and  of 
necessity unrelated assumptions on contributions and 
benefits,  the  present  analysis  relates  fund  assets  di-
rectly  to  membership  and  to  the  average  benefit. 
The  number  of  beneficiaries  may  be estimated  as  a 
lagged  function  of  covered  workers,  derived  from 
past experience. 
The  primary  variables,  i.e.,  series  and  relationships 
required  for  the proposed analysis  are  thus  three  in 
number: 
- number of workers covered (studied and projected 
in  relation  to  private  non-agricultural  employment, 
hence  PNA); 
- benefit  per pensioner  (in  relation  to average  net 
wage  and  the  movement  of  old-age  benefits  under 
social security);  and 
- fund  assets  per  covered  worker  (in  relation  to 
average  benefits,  growth  of average benefits,  and the 
ratio  between  beneficiaries  and  covered  workers). 
The  ratio  between  fund  assets  per  member  and 
average  benefits  ("the k-multiple") is  also  dependent 
on  the  age  composition  of  membership,  discounting 
rates  and  return on investments,  but these  variables 
may be assumed to change relatively slowly over time. 
A  number of  secondary  variables  will be  considered 
and projected mainly  to allow assessment or illustra-
tion  of  the  future  importance  of  complementary 
pension  schemes  to  the  various  EEC  economies 
(comparisons  with  GNP,  savings,  investments)  and 
to  the financial  markets  (investments,  assets  of  self-
administered  funded  plans  compared  to  security  is-
sues).  Examples  of  such  variables  are  contributions 
and  net  investment  earnings.  The  emphasis  of  the 
financial  implications of the pension fund movement, 
furthermore,  requires  separate  treatment  of  self-
administered  (autonomous)  and  balance  sheet  entry 
schemes  on the one hand, funded and partly funded 
(repartition) schemes on the other. 
The  projections  and  their  major  underlying  assump-
tions  are  presented  in  a  series  of  tables,  with  a 
minimum  of  text  commentary on them.  Each  table 
shows  separate  estimates  for  the  EEC  on  the  three 
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major  classes  of  private,  non-insured  complementary 
schemes:  "autonomous") "total funded" (with balance 
sheet  entry  schemes  comprising  the  difference),  and 
"repartition" systems (i.e., France).  They also present 
comparable  trend  values  on  U.K.  and  U.S.  funds, 
albeit  the  latter  includes  insured  plans.  The  main 
public  funds  (Germany,  Italy  and  Holland)  are 
projected  by  crude  methods  omitting  several  steps 
of  derivation;  these  funds  are  consequently  not 
shown in all  tables. 
5.  Projections  of Membership 
The first  set of assumptions, relating to private, non-
agricultural employment, is  shown in table 1 on page 
28.  The only comment in order is  that, since PNA is 
defined to exclude all public sector employment, (and 
derived  statistically  by  substracting  wage  and  salary 
earners  of  transport  and  communications  to yield  a 
reasonable  "ceiling" to growth of private fund mem-
bership),  it  understates  actual  PNA  in  most  EEC 
countries,  especially  by  comparison  to the  U.S.  and 
U.K.  figures).  The retired proportion, i.e., ex-private 
non-agricultural  workers,  is  even  more  understated 
for similar technical reasons.  The latter are considered 
as  reference  series,  not  as  an  ultimate  limit  to  the 
number  of  pensioners,  which  are  projected  in  re-
lation to the active membership of their own pension 
schemes. 
Table  2  presents  the  growth  of  private  non-insured 
fund  membership  (except  for  the  U.S.)  relative  to 
PNA.  While  restrictive  legislation  does  not  appear 
to interfere with the growth characteristics  (S-curve) 
of  total membership,  it does  tend  to act  as  a brake 
on  the  rate  of  development  of  self-administered, 
funded  plans,  particularly  in  Germany. 
It is  assumed  that an  effective  "ceiling"  to member 
penetration is  constituted, well under  100%, by  the 
inclusion  of  young  workers  in  PNA,  the  existence 
of  eligibility  requirements  varying  by  country,  tem-
porary and immigrant labour, and to a lesser extent, 
by existing social  security arrangements and the legal 
framework.  As  these  factors  vary  considerably  by 
country,  our  assumptions  on  ceilings  also  differ  hy 
large margins.  In France (cf., table 3 below), Holland 
and  Germany  ( 80  and  7  5%  respectively),  the  con-
ditions  favour  membership  growth,  except  for  the 
German  "provident  funds"  which  suffer  from  the 
limitation  of  tax  deductibility  of  contributions  to 
1.5%  of  the wage  bill.  In both Italy  and  Belgium 
(  40%  and  45% ),  the  spread  of  private  comple-
mentary  schemes  is  compromised  by  the  existence 
of  highly  developed,  wage  related  social  insurance 
schemes.  The  imposition  of  ceilings  on  reference 
incomes,  however,  still  leaves  room  for  expansion 
of complementary  schemes  among  the  higher-income 
groups.  The  U.S.  projections  of  this  chapter  are taken directly from D.M. Holland e),  whose assump-
tion  is  a  6 7%  ceiling  to  member  penetration.  The 
obstacle  in  the  U.K.  is  the  popularity  of  insured 
schemes,  especially  for  small  firms,  which  tends  to 
limit non-insured private fund membership to around 
40% of PNA. 
Table  3  below  shows  the  implications  of  our  pen-
etration assumptions  for  number of workers  covered 
by country and main type of fund. 
The  number  of  beneficiaries  corresponding  to  our 
membership  projections  (cf.,  table  4)  exceeds  the 
reference  series,  i.e.,  the  "retired  PNA",  not  only 
because  of  the  understatement  just  referred  to,  but 
also because "beneficiaries" still include a) dependants 
and  survivors  of  ex-workers  entitled  to  retirement 
benefits  (adjustments  notwithstanding),  and  b)  ex-
workers  of  limited  pension  rights  owing  to  short 
spans  of  service,  which  in turn  tend  to depress  the 
average  benefit considerably below the pensions  stip-
ulated  by  most  complementary  schemes  at  the  end 
of a  full  career. 
The  latter  phenomenon  also  leads  to  a  dispropor-
tionately  large  number  of pensioners  (cf.,  Appendix 
table B - 11) in the early stages of fund development 
in most  countries,  including  the  U.S. 
6.  Projections  of Benefits 
The  main  considerations  underlying  our  projections 
of the average  pension  amount are  the development 
of wages and salaries per employee (net of employers' 
contribution  to  social  security)  and  the  likely  evo-
lution of  retirement  benefits  under  the  legal  system 
of social insurance.  Our assumptions concerning these 
factors  are  set  out  in  tables  5  and  6  respectively. 
The  projections  of  the  average  net  wage  are  con-
sistent  with our productivity and price  rise  assump-
tions  (cf.,  Appendix  A),  and  take  into  account  the 
(generally rising) share of employers' social insurance 
costs,  implied  by  stated  social  policy  objectives  on 
the one hand,  and  the deficitary tendencies  of social 
insurance systems evident in most countries reviewed 
on  the  other.  One  of  the  reasons  for  the  current 
difficulties  of  social  security in  virtually all  countries 
is  of  course  the  commitment  of  most  governments 
to keep  on boosting old-age  benefits  as  a  percent of 
reference  salaries,  aggravated  by  the  adverse  shifts 
underway in the age  composition of populations. 
As  indicated  in  table  7,  complementary  retirement 
benefits in consequence are expected to drop slightly 
relative to money wages  and salaries  in Italy as  well 
as  in  the  States  and  the  U.K.  In  Germany,  we 
attribute  the  persistent  regressiveness  of  the  aver-
age  "benefit  formula"  more  to  the  legislative  ob-
structions  facing  private  pension  schemes,  in  par-
ticular  provident  funds,  than  to  the  projected  im-
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provement  of social  security  plans.  In  the Benelux 
countries,  the  regressive  character  of  social  security 
pension arrangements favours continued augmentation 
of complementary benefits  related to incomes  during 
peak-earning  periods.  Finally,  despite  the  optimistk 
objectives  of  complementary  pension  schemes  in 
France,  which  provide  the  bulk  of  retirement  in-
comes  for cadres for  instance,  growth of the average 
benefit  formula  in  that  country  is  restricted  by  the 
financial  discipline  imposed  from  the  flattening  out 
of  membership  growth and from  the  reduced  possi-
bilities  of  stepping  up  contributors'  rates  without 
new legislation.  Our assumption  was  that the aver-
age  reserve/benefit  ratio  of  French  complementary 
systems  will  not  be  allowed  to  dip  below  1.0  (vs. 
2.2  in  1966).  That  ratio  is  bound  to  be  reached 
before  197  5. 
The  results  of  the  foregoing  prognostications  are 
summarized  in  table  8  below.  Their  outstanding 
feature  is  that,  despite  pressures  to  the  contrary, 
the  rate  of  increase  of  average  benefits  is  expected 
to  slow  during  the  projection  period  in  all  EEC 
countries,  except  Holland,  where  a  marked  accel-
eration  seems  to  be  implied  by  the  relevant  deter-
minants. 
7.  Projections  of Fund  Assets 
The  derivation  of  fund  assets  required  by  average 
pensions  projected  above  is  the  final  and  certainly 
the  most  crucial  step  of  the  analysis.  It  calls  for 
understanding  (in  the  actuarial  sense)  of a  complex 
relationship:  the ratio between average fund reserves 
and  average  benefits  (our  "k-multiple" ).  For  lack 
of space, we must confine the description to the main 
·findings  of  our  analysis,  which  included  a  series  of 
sensitivity tests. 
The  four  main  influences  operating  on  the  "k-mul-
tiple" are  1 ) the age structure of membership;  2) the 
discounting  rate  and/  or  rate  of  return  on  invested 
assets;  3) the beneficiary:  active  member ratio;  and 
4) the rate  of increase  of  average  benefit  payments. 
While,  as  we  said  earlier,  the  first  two  may  be 
neglected  over  time  owing  to  their relative  stability 
(short-term interest rate fluctuations  are not relevant 
to  the problem,  owing  to the  long  lags  incurred in 
the  adjustment  of  reserves  to  benefits)  they  are, 
nevertheless,  important  in  explaining  international 
(or  inter-fund)  differences  in  the  "k-multiple ",  to 
(I)  "Private  Pension  Funds:  Projected  Growth",  NBER, 
1966,  " assumption  A25  C3 ".  We  modified  only  his  assump-
tion  on  average  benefit  by  1980  ($  1,350)  to  $  2,150.  This 
figure  was  already $ 1,150 in  1965.  In consequence, our projec-
tion  of  fund  assets  reaches  $  335  billion,  compared  to Hol-
land's  $  205  billion  (or  " maximum  assumption "  of  $  234 
billion). TABLE 1 
Trends  in  private  non-agricultural  employment  (PNA)  (1) 
(million  persons) 
1960  1965  1970  1975 
I 
1980 
-
Active 
Germany  16.6  17.8  18.1  18.7  19.7 
France  9.0  10.2  12.4  13.8  15.2 
Italy  7.9  8.1  9.9  10.7  11.7 
Netherlands  2.6  3.1  3.4  3.7  3.8 
Belgium-Luxembourg  1.8  2.0  2.25  2.3  2.35 
EEC,  total  37.9  41.3  46.0  49.2  52.7 
u.s.  45.8  50.4  56.0  61.3  67.2 
U.K.  18.8  20.2  20.5  20.6  21.4 
Retired 
Germany  1.63  2.00  2.3  2.55  2.55 
France  1.08  1.22  1.6  1.9  2.0 
Italy  .66  .77  1.0  1.2  1.4 
Netherlands  .30  .34  .35  .4  .45 
Belgium-Luxembourg  .26  .31  .35  .4  .4 
EEC, total  3.92  4.63  5.6  6.45  6.7 
u.s.  5.21  5.99 
I 
6.5  7.1  7.7 
U.K.  2.60  2.99  3.1  3.3  3.4 
( 1)  For the sources of historical data in this and the following tables,  the reader is referred  to the Appendix (cf.,  list of Appendix tables,  p. 67). 
TABLE 2 
Projections  of membership  penetration 
(Workers  covered  by private,  non-insured,  funded  plans  as  % of private  non-agricultural employment) 
1960  1965  1970  1975 
I 
1980 
Germany  - autonomous (1)  (3)  16  17.5  19.5  21  22 
- total  44.5  51.5  57  61  64 
Italy  - autonomous  1.5  2  3  4  5 
- total  (3)  18.5  23.5  28  32  35 
Netherlands  - autonomous (2)  (3)  53.9  56.1  61  65  69 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*)  15  20  26  31  35 
EC Countries - autonomous  12  13  14  15  16 
- total  27.5  32  34  36.5  38.5 
u.s.  - autonomous (4)  46.5  50.5  58  60.5  61.5 
U.K.  - autonomous  14  18  24  29  33 
(*) Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  In addition to Pensionskassen,  include Unterstiitzungskassen,  tne penetration rate of which is limited by existing legislation  to the  neighbourhood of 9.5% 
by 1980,  from 7.5 %  in  1965. 
(2)  Including both i11dustry  wide  and  company funds. 
CS>  Workers of public enterprises iDcluded  in  the data form  a  negligible  portion  of the  totals. 
(')  Including  insured plans and deferred  profit sharing schemes. 
28 TABLE 3 
Covered  workers  by  country  and  main  type  of  fund  (1) 
(millions) 
I 
1960  1965 
Private,  non-insured, funded  schemes 
Germany  - autonomous  2.66  3.12 
- total  7.4  9.2 
Italy  - autonomous  .12  .16 
- total  1.45  1.9 
Netherlands  (autonomous)  1.43  1.72 
Belgium - Luxembourg  (*)  .25  .4 
EEC countries  - autonomous  4.5  5.4 
- total  10.5  13.2 
U.S. (autonomous)  21.2  25.6 
U.K. (autonomous)  2.6  3.6 
All private,  non-iusured  schemes  itt  EEC (3)  16.7  23.4 
Partly-funded private  and  public  schemes 
Germany  - public  1.5  1.7 
France  - repartition (2)  6.2  10.1 
Netherlands  - public  ..  .49 
(*)  Rough estimates to permit  computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Projections:  Table 1 by Table  2 for private funded schemes: 
As% of total  non-agricultural  employment for France  (from 74% in 1965  to 100% in  1980). 
As  constant or slowly rising %  of public sector employment for public funds. 
(2)  Covers  employees of private and  public enterprises  and small  numbers of self-employed. 
(8)  Including France (repartition). 
Germany  - autonomous 
- total 
Italy  - autonomous 
- total 
Netherlands  (autonomous) 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
E  EC countries (3)  - autonomous 
- total 
France  (repartition) 
u.s. 
U.K. 
(*)  Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
TABLE 4 
Projections  of beneficiaries 
Million  persons (1) 
1965  1970  I 
1. 
.46  .65 
1.40  2.1 
.04  .09 
.22  .35 
.32  .4 
.06  .09 
.88  1.23 
2.0  2.95 
1.6  2.7 
2.7  3.9 
.6  1.1 
1970  1975  1980 
3.52  3.92  4.3 
10.3  11.4  12.6 
.30  .43  .6 
2.75  3.4  4.1 
2.05  2.4  2.65 
.6  .7  .85 
6.5  7.0  8.4 
15.7  17.9  20.2 
32.5  37.1  41.4 
4.9  6.0  7.1 
29.2  34.4  39.7 
1.9  2.1  2.3 
13.5  16.5  19.5 
.55  .6  .7 
As %  of retired private 
non-agricultural  population 
1980  1965  1970  1980 
1.05  23  28  41 
3.0  70  90  120 
.16  5  9  11.5 
.6  28  35  45 
.6  94  110  145 
.16  20  27  40 
1.97  26  31  42 
4.4  59  74  94 
3.9  69  (2)  100 (2)  125 
7.5  45  60  97 
1.8  20  35  53 
(1)  Ideally  retired  workers only; in practice data suspect  of including  relatives,  survivors, other than  old-age pensioners. 
(I)  % of total  " retired "  population. 
(")  Excluding France  from  beneficiaries  and retired  non-agricultural  population. 
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(2) TABLE 5 
Projections  of net  (1)  yearly  wages  and  salaries 
per  (non-agricultural)  employee 
Thousands of National Currency (2) 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980 
-----------1----------1-----
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
u.s. 
U.K. 
6.04 
8.9 
.74 
5.65 
87.7 
5.25 
.67 
9.2 
12.9 
1.29 
8.5 
121 
6.2 
0.87 
12.8 
18 
1.9 
11.3 
164 
7.8 
1.11 
(1)  Compensation, excluding social security contributions by employers. 
(I) Except Italy: millions. 
TABLE 6 
State  pension  benefits  as 
0
/ 0  of 
average  non-agricultural  wages  and  salaries  (1) 
TABLE 7 
Projections  of benefit formulae 
17.8 
25.2 
2.8 
15 
218 
10 
1.4 
25 
34.5 
4.15 
20 
295 
12.5 
1.85 
(Average  complementary benefit  as  % of average  money wages  and salaries (1) 
-------------------------;-------,--------,---------------,--------
Germany  - autonomous 
- all  funds 
Italy  - autonomous 
- all  funds 
Netherlands  (autonomous) 
Belgium - Luxembourg (*) 
France  (repartition) 
u.s. 
U.K. 
------------------
(*)  Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Net of employers' social  insurance contributions. 
1960 
15 
13.5 
54 
28 
13.4 
20 
22.5 
19 
31 
30 
1965 
13.5 
12 
60 
35 
11.1 
22 
22 
18.5 
29 
1970 
12 
12 
56 
33 
11 
24 
23 
18 
30 
1975 
11 
11 
52 
30 
12 
26 
24 
1980 
10 
10 
48 
28 
15 
27 
25 
17.5  17 
-3-1  __ j  ___  32--
--------------------- -----------------TABLE 8 
Projections  of complementary  benefit flows 
I  Average  benefit (1) 
I 
Total benefit payments (1)  (thousands of national 
(billions of national  currency)  currency) (") 
~--------~-----------------------------1----------~-------
Private  funded  schemes 
Germany  - autonomous 
- total 
Italy  - autonomous 
- total 
Netherlands  - autonomous 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
u.s. 
U.K. 
Partly:fimded  public  and  private  schemes 
France  (repartition) 
Germany  - public (4) 
Netherlands  - public (4) 
(*)  Rough estimates  to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Beneficiaries (from Table 4)  times average  benefit. 
1965 
.55 
1.60 
30 
100 
.30 
1.6 
3.1 
.15 
4.5 
.5 
.8 
1970 
.95 
3.2 
95 
230 
.50 
3.6 
5.5 
.37 
11 
.9 
1.2 
1975 
1.7 
5.0 
180 
400 
.90 
7.0 
10 
.65 
20 
1.4 
2.2 
1980 
2.8 
7.5 
250 
700 
1.8 
12.8 
16 
1.1 
33.5 
2.1 
3.5 
1965 
1.3 
1.13 
770 
450 
.94 
27 
1.15 
.25 
2.81 
.98 
5.2 
1980 
2.7 
2.5 
2000 
1160 
3.0 
80 
2.15 
.59 
8.6 
3.0 
12.0 
(~)  Projected by applying average benefit formulae (Table  7)  to average  wages and salaries (Table 5).  For public funds,  proportionality assumed between pen-
Sions  and  wages. 
( 3)  See  Appendix Table B-11  for  % growth rates implied by five-year period. 
( 4)  Beneficiaries  (including  relatives  and  survivors),  projected  on  the following  percentages  of membership: 
Germany  30% (1965)  31% (1970)  34% (1975)  36% (1980) 
Netherlands: 33% (1965)  37% (1970)  40% (1975)  42% (1980) 
-----------------------------
TABLE 9 
Trends  in  the  k-multiple,  all funded  schemes 
I 
1960  1970  1975  1980  1965  I 
-----l---------~-----------1------------l-----------
Private,  non-insured 
Germany  - autonomous 
- total 
Italy  - autonomous 
- total 
Netherlands - autonomous 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
U.S.  (including  insured)  (1) 
U.K. 
Public funds 
Germany 
Netherlands 
u.s. ( 2) 
U.K. (3) 
---~-----------------
(*)  Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(')  See footnote  to p.  27. 
3.3 
2.6 
3.7 
3.7 
6.7 
2.0 
2.4 
3.8 
4.2 
3 
2.7 
1.5 
-----·- ---~  -
3.6  4.0  4.3  4.5 
3.2  4.2  4.5  4.8 
3.1  3.5  3.8  4.1 
3.1  3.5  3.8  3.8 
7.4  7.5  7.8  8.3 
2.5  2.7  3.0  3.5 
2.9  3.3  3.6  3.8 
3.5  3.6  3.8  4 
5.7  5.5  6.0  6.5 
3.4  4  4.5  5 
2.7  J 
2.7  2.9  2.9 
1.8  2  2.3  2.5 
(2)  State and local  government funds implied by projections of D.  M.  Holland  (cf.,  Private  Pension  Funds,  pp.  131,  135),  implied  by  "assumption  A16C8 " 
adopted. 
( 8)  All  public  authorities,  i.e.,  including  a  number of current  transfer  schemes  (hence  low multiples). 
31 TABLE 10 
Assets  of private  non-insured  pension funds 
(End of Year) 
Germany  - autonomous 
- total 
Italy  - autonomous 
- total 
Netherlands - autonomous 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
EEC ($)  - autonomous 
- total (excluding  France) 
- total (with France) 
U.S.  (including  insured) 
U.K. 
(*)  Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Thousand billions and  millions respectively in Italy. 
(I) At 1968  exchange rates. 
I 
1960 
7.6 
15.2 
.18 
1.11 
7.28 
9.0 
4.4 
7.8 
8.3 
52.0 
2.1 
both  of  which  the  latter  is  inversely  related.  The 
effect of the proportion of retired to active members 
is  also  relatively  gradual,  but  it  constitutes  a  per-
sistent  upward  influence. 
By  far  the  most  important  determinant  of  the  "k-
multiple"  is  the rate  of  growth  of average  benefits, 
or if  earnings-related,  of  average  money  wages.  A 
change  in  the latter, for  example  from  5%  to  7% 
p.a.  would ceteris  paribus  push up the "k-multiple" 
from  4  to 5.  Under  stable  growth  conditions,  age 
structure,  etc.,  the  "k-multiple"  should  remain  con-
stant.  It might  be of interest  to  note  that if these 
conditions  were to approximate  those  projected,  for 
say, Germany during the coming decade, with private 
pension  schemes  "maturing"  at  an  assumed  bene-
ficiary:  active  member  ratio  of  30%,  the  "k-mul-
tiple"  should  "theoretically"  level  out  at  around 
4-4.5 (1 ).  The evolution of the relatively mature, and 
certainly much better documented U.S.  pension fund 
movement provides ("statistical") confirmation of the 
foregoing,  essentially  theoretical,  findings. 
Table  9,  on  the  preceding  page,  exposes  the  recent 
experience (subject to distortion by estimating errors) 
of  the  countries  and  complementary  schemes  here 
reviewed, as well as the implications for "k-multiples" 
of the relevant developments assumed for each.  Table 
10  translates  these  assumptions  into  projections  of 
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Assets/Member 
Billions  of National  Currency (1)  (Thousands 
of currency) (1) 
1965 
I 
1970  1975  1980  1965  1980 
12.9  20.5  33  51.5  4.15  11.3 
33.0  66.5  101  151  3.60  12.0 
.39  1.1  2.4  4.9  2.4  8.2 
2.63  6.5  10.9  18.1  1.40  4.4 
12.0  19.3  34  66  7.0  24.9 
26.5  64  119  238  I  67  280 
\ 
7.75  13.5  23.8  43.8  i  1.44  5.2 
16.4  33.6  54.2  90.9  1.24  4.5 
18.2  36.3  58  97.6  - -
85.4  150  234  335  3.33  8.1 
3.3  5.9  10  16  .88  2.3 
---------------~--
fund  assets  by main  type  of private funded  scheme. 
Table  11  shows  the parallel evolution of the French 
repartition  system,  the  major  public  funds  in  the 
EEC, the U.S.  and the U.K. 
As  a  rule,  assets  per insured worker  are  higher  for 
public than for private pension funds, because of the 
total or partial substitution by the former  for  social 
security  benefits  paid under the legal  system  to  pri-
vate  employees.  The  low  figure  obtained  for  the 
funds  of  British  public  authorities  reflects  the  fact 
that many of these schemes operate on the repartition 
principle. 
8.  Main  Conclusions  and  Implications 
The results of the foregoing  analysis  are summarized 
in  Table  10.  Assuming  no  change  in  present  fiscal 
and regulatory conditions (and demographic and eco-
nomic  change  along  the  lines  indicated  in  the  text 
tables),  total  assets  of  all  private,  complementary 
schemes  are,  nevertheless,  projected  to reach  almost 
$ 100 billion in the Common Market by 1980, some 
(I)  Under  the stated  assumptions,  this  value  is  equivalent  to 
an  asset :  benefit ratio of between 13 : 1 and  15 : 1. TABLE 11 
Assets  of partly funded  private  a11d  public  plans 
(End  of Year) 
-- --
Assets/Member 
Billions of National Currency (1)  Thousands 
of Currency (1} 
1960  1965 
I 
1970  1975  1980  1965  1980 
----
Germany  3.7  8.3  14  25  40  5  15.6 
France  2.4  9.1  13  19  33  .9  1.7 
Italy  1.1  3  6  12  22  (2)  (2) 
Netherlands  4.4  8.7  13  25  40  17.7  60 
u.s.  19.7  31.1  48.8  74.6  112.5 
I 
4.38  9.25 
U.K.  1.3  1.9  2.9  4.2  5.5 
I 
.5  1.20 
(1)  Thousand billions  and millions respectively in Italy. 
(2)  Assumed to grow by 14% p.a.  over 1965-1980 at declining rates of growth; projected rate based on past relationship of reserve growth to increase in public 
wages and salaries. 
TABLE 12 
Growth  of private  non-insured  pension funds  in  EEC coutttries 
Private  Funded  Plans 
Germany  - autonomous 
- total 
Italy  - autonomous 
- total 
Netherlands - autonomous 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
EEC  - autonomous 
- total 
All Private,  Non-Insured  Schemes  in  EEC (2) 
Partly-Funded  Private  and  Public  Plans 
Germany  - public 
France  - repartition 
Italy  - public 
Netherlands  - public 
EEC  - total 
(*)  Rough  estimates  to  permit  computation  of EEC  totals. 
Average Growth of Fund Assets  I  Fund Assets 
__  (%  p.a~)  (1)  as  % of GNP  _ 
1960/65  1965/70  1970/75  1  1975/80  1965  1980 
-------------~-------------
11.2  9.7  10.0  9.3  2.9  3.7 
16.8  15  8.8  8.4  7.3  11.3 
16.4  23.1  17  15.4  1.1  3.7 
18.8  19.5  10.9  10.7  7.6  13.7 
10.5  9.9  12  14.2  17.3  33.9 
24  19.5  14  14  3  10 
12  11.8  12.1  13  2.6  4.4 
16  15.5  10.2  10.7  5.5  9.2 
17.1  14.8  9.9  10.8  6.1  9.9 
17.5  11  12.4  9.9  2.4  2.9 
30.5  7.4  7.9  11.7  2  2 
22.3  14.9  14.4  12.9  8.4  16.6 
14.7  8.4  14  9.9  12.6  20.6 
20.5  11.6  13.4  11.7  3.7  6.4 
----~-~-----~~-- ----------
(')  Small variations in average growth rates ( < 1 %) from  period to period, arise  from  rounding of underlying absolute figures;  hence  not to be  takm  a~ in-
dicators of accelerating or slowing growth. 
( 2)  Including France (repartition). 
33 5.5  times  their  1965  level.  Of  this  total,  pension 
funds in the strict sense of the word, i.e., the reserves 
of  which  are  a  potential  source  of  funds  for  the 
capital  markets,  are  expected  to  account  for  about 
$ 45  billion (up from $ 8 billion in 1965), a relatively 
modest  quantity  if  compared  to  the  corresponding 
U.S.  total of some  $ 335 billion or even U.K.  private 
pensions fund assets of $ 60 billion (including insured 
plans  for  both countries),  expected  by  1980. 
As  indicated in Table  12 (p.  33 ),  the rate of growth 
in  fund  reserves  is  slowing  during  the  projection 
period for  all  countries except Holland.  The acceler-
ation  for  the  last  mentioned  is  partly  the  result 
of  the  combination  of  assumptions  adopted,  partic-
ularly  on  money  wages  and  (legal)  old-age  benefits, 
but  it  also  serves  as  an  indicator  of  the  scope  for 
pension  fund  growth  in  a  fiscal  and  legal  environ-
ment free  of  obstructions.  The last  two columns  of 
Table  12  show fund  assets  as  a percent of GNP for 
all  non-insured  complementary  schemes  in  the  Com-
mon  Market,  in  1965  and  1980.  Including  the 
public  funds,  such  schemes  should  reach  about  16% 
of  the  combined  GNP  of  EEC  countries  by  1980, 
as  against  10%  in  1965.  The  corresponding  pro-
portions  are  23%  for  the  U.S.  (from  17.7%),  and 
41%  for  the  U.K.  (from  22% ).  The  sharp  diver-
gences  within  the  Common  Market  are  brought  out 
by  a  comparison  of  all  complementary  pension  re-
serves  in Holland (projected  to  reach  54% of GNP) 
and  France  (to  remain  around  2%  of  GNP). 
The importance of  pension funds  as  sources  of long-
term  investment  funds  is  demonstrated in  Table  13, 
which  compares  the  net  cash  flow  of  private  and 
public complementary schemes  to (actual  and projec-
ted) (1)  fixed  investment.  The funds  of balance sheet 
arrangements  are  of  course  invested  directly  by  the 
companies  generating  them,  bypassing  the  capital 
markets.  The net  investments  of  autonomous  funds 
which  typically  pass  through  the  capital  market 
are  set out in Table  14. 
Assuming  that  current  composition  of  reserves  by 
type  of asset  would  prevail  in  1980 (a),  net  invest-
ments in securities by self-administered schemes would 
account  by  1980  for  only  1.2%  of  new  security 
issues  in  Germany,  1.9%  in  Italy,  though  for  as 
much  as  40%  in  the  Netherlands.  The  current 
contributions of private pension funds to the securities 
markets  of  Germany  and  Italy  are  a  mere  fraction 
of a  percent. 
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The  role  of private complementary  pension  plans  in 
net  personal  savings  is  illustrated  by  the  figures  set 
out in  Table  15. 
The  projections  appearing  in  this  chapter  of course 
permit  any  combination  of  assumptions,  should  it 
become of interest what effect a modification in policy 
might  have  on  the  development  of  pension  funds. 
In  executing  the  present  study,  we  found  that  the 
fiscal  and  other  legal  restrictions  in  existence  today 
in  most  EEC  countries  exercise  a  braking  influence 
not  so  much  on  the  growth  of  membership,  but 
rather  on  potential  development  of  benefits,  partic-
ularly  in  Germany  (and  probably  in  Belgium).  The 
extreme  example  is  clearly  that  of  the  German 
"provident  funds",  which  are  legally  required  to 
keep reserves under 30% of payroll (somewhat higher 
in  practice)  and  are  denied  tax  exemption  on  con-
tributions in excess  of  1.5% of the insured worker's 
salary.  It is  also  true of balance  sheet  entry funds, 
which  have  no  fiscal  stimulus  to  raise  benefits,  nor 
an  "assist"  to  their  contributions  (employees  are 
legally forbidden to contribute) from investment earn-
ings. 
In our calculations, a change  over-night  of the exist-
ing  tax  and  regulatory  environment  to,  say,  Dutch 
conditions,  could  potentially  lead  to  an  increase  of 
fund  assets  over  our  projected  figures  for  1980: 
by  about  25%  in  Italy,  50-60%  in  Germany  and 
Belgium,  i.e.,  potential  augmentation  by  some  33% 
for  the  Common  Market  as  a  whole.  Should  the 
French  system  be  replaced  over-night  by  a  funded 
scheme,  it would of course  mean  a 2.5  fold  increase 
in  1980  fund  reserves  of  EEC  countries.  The  im-
plications  of  such  a  move  for  the  capital  markets 
would no  doubt be even  more staggering.  Assuming 
a liberalization of the legislative set up and complete 
availability  of  balance  sheet  entry  funds  for  invest-
ment outside the company, the potential flow of funds 
to  the  capital  market  from  pension  schemes,  could 
exceed our projected amounts 5-6  times for  the EEC 
(some  3  times  for  Italy,  5-6  times  for  Germany and 
17-20  times  for  France). 
(1)  In  line  with  our  general  approach,  we  made  an  attempt 
to  render  our projections  of  fixed  investment consistent  with 
our  assumptions  on  productivity  growth  and  price  increases. 
The projections of new issues  of securities are  obviously even 
more conjectural,  obtained simply through an  extrapolation of 
past  relationships  to  plant  and  equipment  expenditures  in 
money  terms. 
(a)  i.e.,  if  funds  continued  to  invest  a constant proportion  of 
their net cash flow  in assets  (direct loans, property) other than 
securities. TABLE 13 
Net  cash-:fiow  (1)  by funded  and  partly funded  plans 
Billions of National  Currency (")  % of fixed 
Investment 
-"-------------------
1960 
Private  Funded  Plans 
Germany  2.3 
Italy  .2 
Netherlands  .  7 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
EEC (3)  - total  1.1 
i 
All Private, Non-Ins11red Schemes in EEC Countries(2)(3)(4)  I  1.3 
Partly  Funded  Private  and  Public  Pla11s 
Germany  - public 
France  - repartition 
Italy  - public 
Netherlands  - public 
- total 
(*)  Rough <..stimates  to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Revenues less disbursements:  imputed for  balance  sheet  entries. 
( 2)  Thousand billions in Italy. 
( 3)  S  billion at 1968  exchange rates. 
(4)  Including France (repartition). 
! 
.7 
1.1 
.3 
.9 
1965 
3.5 
.3 
1.2 
4.5 
1.8 
2.1 
1 
1.3 
.4 
1.1 
1.4 
TABLE 14 
1970 
6.5 
.8 
1.7 
7.7 
3.5 
3.6 
1.4 
.4 
.8 
.9 
2 
Net  investments  by  autonomous  (1)  plans 
---- -"------~--" 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
EEC (3) 
u.s. 
U.K.  (l') 
- ---~~-"-~----
(*)  Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Self-administered. 
( 2)  Thousand billions in Italy. 
(8)  S billions at  1968  exchange rates. 
( 4}  Private fixed investment only. 
( 6)  Private  uninsured  plans only. 
1965 
.75 
.04 
1.2 
4.5 
.69 
8.2 
.31 
I -----
Billions of National 
Currency (2) 
1970  1980 
l 
1.7  4 
.17  .55 
1.7  6.4  ! 
7.7  24 
1.32  4.15 
13  22 
.90  1.5 
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1975 
I 
1980  1965  1980 
-~~-I  ------
I 
I 
7  10.5  2.9  2.8 
1  1.4  4.5  4.7 
3.5  6.4  7.1  12 
11  24  2.5  4.1 
4.5  7.1  2.6  2.8 
4.8  7.8  3  3 
2.4  3.3  .8  .9 
1.6  3.5  1.3  .8 
1.4  2.3  6  7.7 
2.8  3.2  6.5  5.9 
4  6.1  2  2.4 
------~  -- --- ---- - --------
% of Fixed  %of New 
Investment  Security Issues 
I 
1965  1980  1965  1980 
I 
~"--"----'-----
.6  1.1  4.3  6.7 
.4  1.8  1.3  5.5 
7.1  12  75  125 
2.5  4.1  8.3  13.7 
1  1.6  5.8  9 
6.9 (4)  6.5 (4)  20.1  19 
5  8.5  12.4  21.5 
I TABLE 15 
Contributions  to  all  private  complementary  plans 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium-Luxembourg (*) 
EEC ($) 
u.s. 
U.K.  (2) 
(*)  Rough estimates to permit computation of EEC totals. 
(1)  Except Italy thousand billions. 
(
2
)  Non-Insured only. 
Billions  of National  Currency (1) 
1960  1965  1970  1975 
2.3  4.4  8.6  11 
2.4  6.1  11.7  21.6 
.2  .39  .99  1.34 
..  .67  1.3  2.6 
..  3.6  8.1  12.5 
..  3.2  6.7  10.3 
5.5  7.4  11  15.3 
.19  .33  .47  .9 
TABLE 16 
Other  implications  of the  projections 
Private  Non-Insured Funds 
Germany  - autonomous 
- total 
Italy  - autonomous 
- total 
Netherlands- autonomous 
U.S.  (including  insured) 
U.K. 
Public  Funds 
Germany 
Netherlands 
1965 
24:1 
21:1 
13:1 
26:1 
40:1 
28:1 
22:1 
19:1 
10:1 
Assets:  Benefits 
1970 
22:1 
21:1 
14:1 
28:1 
39:1 
27:1 
16:1 
16:1 
11:1 
1980 
18:1 
20:1 
19:1 
26:1 
37:1 
21:1 
15:1 
19:1 
11:1 
1965 
5.6 
16.5 
6.6 
4.5 
10.5 
7.9 
4.1 
----~------'----------'-----'--------
36 
% of Personal 
Saving 
1980  1965 
16.8  10.4 
37  20.3 
2  11.9 
4.9  9.9 
23.4  4.7 
16.8  12.7 
21.3  29.7 
1.5  23.3 
Average  Contributions 
as  % average wages  and 
salaries 
1970 
6.6 
18.9 
5.6 
4.4 
8.6 
5.6 
2.6 
1980 
13 
26 
12 
26 
8.5 
17 
29.5 
46 
1980 
5.3 
11.8 
9.2 
4.2 
11.4 
5 
3.3 CHAPTER IV 
Possible reforms to foster the security and  growth  of pension  funds 
and  their  contribution  to  capital  markets 
a) Chapter III. has  demonstrated the orders of mag· 
nitude  which  pension  funds  in  the  various  EEC 
countries  are  likely  to  attain  in  future  years  under 
the  assumption  that laws  and  regulations  pertaining 
to  them  remain  broadly  unchanged.  It  is  only 
reasonable  to point out, however, that certain "rules 
of the game"  which,  for  all  their imperfection,  may 
be tolerable today with the total resources of private 
complementary uninsured pension funds in EEC coun-
tries  being  of  the  order  of  $ 20  billion  and  6.2% 
of  their  1966  gross  national  product,  could  become 
unacceptable  and  inappropriate  once  they  have 
reached,  as  we  believe  they  are  likely  to  do  by 
1980,  almost  $ 100  billion  and  10%  of  the  area's 
gross national product.  In the latter situation, certain 
anomalies  (especially  the  heavy  indebtedness  of  en-
terprises  to their own  pension  funds,  and  the  large 
proportion  of  pension  fund  saving  which  bypasses 
the  capital  market  altogether)  which  represent  no 
more  than  latent  dangers  today  may  well  become 
serious  disadvantages.  Certain  reforms  should  be 
urgently considered before  matters go  too far  in the 
present direction. 
b)  Chapter  II.  has  shown  that  the  degree  of  de-
velopment  of  complementary  pension  funds,  their 
contribution  to  saving  and  to  capital  markets  is 
uneven  from  country  to  country,  and  Chapter  III. 
furnished  few  grounds  for  holding  that  the  retard 
of  some  countries  relative  to  others  is  likely  to  be 
significantly diminished within the period over which 
our forecasts  extend.  Throughout our report, but in 
particular in Chapter II., it has become apparent that 
the legal  framework,  the  supervisory regulations  and 
tax  rules  are  also  significantly  unlike  from  country 
to country, and that in some countries they constitute 
serious  obstacles  and  disincentives  to the  growth of 
pension  funds  and/  or  to the  efficient  investment  of 
their  resources.  Member  governments  would  have 
every reason  critically  to  examine  such of their own 
rules  which  may  seem  to  handicap  their  country 
relative  to  other  countries,  and  give  consideration 
to their potential reforms with a view to accelerating 
pension  fund  growth  and  improving  their  func-
tioning. 
The  reform  proposals  put  forward  in  the  present 
chapter,  aimed  at  the  broad  objectives  set  out  in 
a)  and  b)  above,  are  intended  to  serve  as  a  basis 
for  further  consideration  by  the  competent  author· 
ities. 
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1.  The  buildup  of  pension  funds  in  the  form  of 
balance-sheet provision (in Germany and Italy) should 
not be allowed to go  much further/  fund accumulation 
should be made to flow  to separate  funding  vehicles. 
It is  not  intended  to  propose  the  compulsory  dis-
solution  of  the  existing  balance-sheet  provisions  of 
enterprises  and  their  actual  disbursement  into  the 
hands  of  autonomous  pension  funds.  This  would 
be  a  harsh  measure,  causing  a  great  and  perhaps 
unbearable  financial  upheaval  as  resources  were 
suddenly  redistributed.  But  either as  from  a certain 
date, or by degrees  as  from  staggered dates,  the tax-
deductibility  of  employers'  contributions  should  be 
removed  if these  contributions  are  effected  in  the 
form of balance-sheet provisions or reserves (I).  They 
should  be  tax-deductible  only  if  effectively  trans-
ferred  to  the  control  of  an  independent  fund  (pref-
erably  a  trust fund)  set  up  and  operating under  the 
relevant rules of the country concerned or, by recipro-
cal agreement, under the  rules  of another country. 
Such  a  reform  would  have  two  major  effects.  The 
first  concerns  the security of the monies  intended to 
ensure the fulfilment of pension promises, or promises 
of indemnity in the  event of dismissal  (as  in  Italy). 
Under  present  circumstances,  both the  continuity  of 
employment  and  the  fulfilment  of  post-employment 
promises  depends  on  the  continuing  prosperity  and 
solvency of the employer enterprise.  This constitutes 
a  concentration  of  two  risks,  and  the  double  risk 
is  borne by  the  type  of  economic  agent  often  least 
well  equipped  to  cope  with  it,  namely  dependent 
employees  (or  their  survivors).  Moreover,  a pension 
provision  represents  an  unsecured debt of  the enter-
prise  and  in  the  event  of  its  insolvency,  the  claims 
of other classes of creditors (mortgagees, banks, hold-
ers  of senior  securities)  may  have  to  be  met  before 
those  possessing  pension  or  indemnity  rights. 
This  is  an  unsatisfactory  situation;  the  proposed  re-
form,  by  stopping  the  further  swelling  of  balance-
sheet provisions,  would leave  it unchanged  in  terms 
of  absolute  values,  but  the  relative  weight  of  the 
(1)  The  fiscal  principle  underlying  this proposal  is  clearly  set 
out in  the US  Internal Revenue  Service  Code  which  requires 
the  funds  to  be  outside  the  employer's  control  to  be  tax-
deductible.  Even  more  stringent  rules  are  contained  in  IRC 
503  (c).  Similar rules  apply in the UK,  Holland and Belgium, 
although  their  interpretation  in  Belgium  is  apparently  not 
uniform  from  one  enterprise  to  another  and  some  funds  are 
set up in the form  of balance-sheet provisions. whole  problem  would  gradually  diminish  over  time 
as,  in  addition  to  their  old  provisions,  enterprises 
built up new,  separate  funds  outside  their own con-
trol,  and  as  general  economic  growth  decreased  the 
relative extent of their "social indebtedness"  to their 
employees. 
The  second  major  effect  would  (in  a  rather  loose 
sense)  impinge  upon  "self-financing".  Allocations  to 
pension  provisions  of  enterprises  are  under  present 
circumstances  automatically  employed  to  finance  an 
equivalent increase in their general assets.  This would 
cease to be the case. 
In this  context,  some  attention  should  first  be  paid 
to  a  conceptual  confusion.  There  are  widespread 
complaints  that  the  "self-financing  capacity"  of  en-
terprises  in  the  EEC  is  inadequate;  anything  that 
would further weaken it would be regarded as  highly 
contentious.  But  "self-financing  capacity"  should  be 
properly understood as  a concept parallel to earnings 
capacity,  i.e.  relating  to  depreciation  and  (retained) 
net  profit.  It  should  not  comprise  the  capacity  of 
the  enterprise  to  borrow  the  deferred  wages  of  its 
employees.  It  is  not  disputed  that  such  a  captive 
source  of  finance  is  useful  and  convenient  to  the 
enterprise;  but it should  not be  confused  with self-
financing  stricto  sensu,  for  the  latter  certainly  does 
not  mean  an  increase  in  liabilities  to  third  parties 
-which pension provisions indubitably are.  Cutting 
off  this  captive  source  of finance  would not directly 
affect the ability of enterprises to maintain or increase 
their  real  net  asset  value,  for  this  depends  on  their 
earning capacity;  but it should change  the manner of 
financing  increases  in  their  gross  assets.  There  are 
quite  strong  a  priori  reasons  for  asserting  that  such 
a  change,  while  possibly  unwelcome  to  each  enter-
prise  taken  in  isolation,  would  in  effect  have  a 
beneficial  effect  on  the  corporate  sector  as  a  whole 
and  on  economic  efficiency  in  general. 
As  has  been  pointed  out  elsewhere  in  this  report, 
pension  funds  set  up  in  the  form  of  balance-sheet 
provisions  pro  tanto  diminish  both  the  need  of en-
terprises  to  have  recourse  to  the capital  market  and 
the ability of the capital market to meet their needs. 
Dotations  to  such  funds  bypass  the  market  and 
altogether escape  its  control.  Control by  the capital 
market  is  part  of  the  resource-allocating  mechanism 
of  the  latter,  where  enterprises  compete  for  funds 
in terms of their credit standing and in terms of the 
prospective  yield  they  offer.  The  present  report  is 
not  the  place  for  entering  into  controversies  about 
the  efficiency  of  the  capital  market  as  a  resource-
allocating mechanism, suitable for directing the avail-
able  flow  of  savings  into  employment  most  likely 
to  produce  the  highest  yield  to  the  economy  as  a 
whole.  No  doubt  the  capital  market  as  it functions 
in practice can be criticized on several counts, (includ-
ing  those  of  imperfect  information  and  imperfect 
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foresight)  and  the  conceivable  discrepancy  between 
social  and  private  yield  and  creditworthiness  may 
have  to  be  borne  in  mind  when  judging  its  role. 
Suffice  it  to  say  here  that if the  policy  objective  is 
to broaden the capital market, the diversion of current 
dotation to internal pension funds from  the employer 
enterprise  to  the  market  would  be  a  particularly 
powerful  means  of  achieving  it.  (As  of  1966,  such 
a  measure  would  have  increased  the  flow  of  funds 
from  German  enterprises  to  the  capital  market  by 
DM  2.2  billion  and  that  from  Italian  ones  by  Lit 
230 billion;  by  1980, the corresponding annual flows 
will  probably  have  reached  DM  5.3  billion  and  Lit 
700  billion). 
Moreover, since the automatic investment of funds in 
the  enterprise  itself  (where  they  arise  in  the  form 
of deferred wages),  is  a more nearly random  method 
of  allocating  investible  resources  than  the  capital 
market where  some  competition,  however imperfect, 
does play a redistributive role, broadening the capital 
market  in  the  way  discussed  here  would  certainly 
represent some improvement in the pattern of invest-
ment. 
Needless  to  say,  some  enterprises  would  hardly  be 
able  to  have  recourse  to the  capital  market  in  their 
own  right,  however  much  its  supply  side  may  have 
been broadened, and would have to call in the aid of 
expert financial  intermediaries  (which  is  no  different 
from  what is  already happening today in these coun-
tries on a smaller  scale,  and what is  current practice 
on a larger  scale  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries).  Others, 
while  large  and  sufficiently  well-known  to  command 
access  to  the  capital  market,  may  not  be  able  to 
replace  borrowing  from  their  captive  pension  fund 
by  borrowing from  the market if  their balance-sheet 
was  already  heavily  geared  with  debt:  they  might 
have  to  raise  the funds  they  need  partly  or wholly 
in  the  form  of  new  equity  capital,  which  would 
perhaps not be an altogether unwelcome development 
to  those  concerned  about  the  debt-equity  ratio  in 
some  segments of European industry. 
As  to  the  improvement  in  standards  of  company 
information,  it  is  not  disputed  that  despite  recent 
progress  in  disclosure  requirements, e.g.  in Germany 
and  France,  more  should be  accomplished  to render 
the  capital  markets  of most  EEC  countries  a  really 
comfortable  place  for  pension  funds  freely  to  invest 
in,  without undue  discrimination  in  favour  of  those 
sub-markets  (government  securities,  real  property) 
where  information  is  either  not  needed  or  readily 
obtainable.  It is,  however,  equally  indisputable that 
the  emergence  of  professionally  managed  pension 
funds  as  perhaps the most powerful class of potential 
investors  in  securities,  and  the increased need of the 
corporate  sector  to  rely  on  them  for  equity  and 
fixed-interest  funds,  would  constitute  a  strong  stim-
ulus  to  fuller  disclosure  of  company  information and  to  the  development  of  investment  advisory 
skills (1 );  American and British experience is  sufficient 
demonstration of what the forceful  presence of insti-
tutional investors can accomplish in this respect. 
2.  The legal  form  of pension funds should be simpli-
fied  and  their specific  status  recognized 
It seems  anomalous  that  in  order  to  be  legally  re-
cognized,  independent pension funds  in various  EEC 
countries  should  have  to  adopt  the  legal  form  of  a 
foundation, a non-profit association, a limited liability 
company  (GmbH),  a  mutual  assurance  society  or  a 
registered  association.  The  multitude  of  alternative 
legal  forms  among  which  a  pension  fund  has  to 
choose,  trying to find  the one least ill  adapted to its 
particular  circumstances  and  purposes,  is  proof  that 
(with  the  possible  exception  of Holland),  legislation 
in  the  EEC  countries  has  not  yet  made  a  serious 
attempt  at  recognizing  pension  funds  as  fulfilling  a 
unique and very specific  function  which is  essentially 
different  from  that  of  a  charitable  foundation,  an 
insurance company, a special sort of investment trust, 
a  philanthropic  club  or  anything  else.  As  long  as 
pension  funds  have  to  put  on  the  legal  disguise  of 
being something else (2), there will be confusion both 
in the minds of their sponsors and participants and in 
that  of  the  fiscal  authorities;  the  functioning  of 
pension funds will be, perhaps unintentionally, biased 
compared  to what it would be if they  could  simply 
be themselves  before  the law. 
The  field  research  conducted  as  part  of  the  present 
study has  found  that  the  lack  of  legal  clarity  as  to 
the status of pension funds  acts  as  an (albeit minor) 
deterrent for some employers (notably for subsidiaries 
of  foreign  companies  in  France,  Belgium  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  in  Germany  and  Italy)  to  set  up  in-
dependent  funded  pension  plans.  An  additional  de-
terrent  for  companies  with  subsidiaries  or branches 
in several  EEC countries  is  the heterogenous  nature 
from  country  to  country  of  such  pension  fund  leg-
islation  as  exists.  This  makes  multi-country  pension 
plans  difficult  to  operate  and  hinders  the  transfer 
of  employees  from  one  subsidiary  or  branch  to 
another. 
To remedy these shortcomings which stand in the way 
of  a  free  and  rapid  development  of  funded  pension 
plans,  national governments  should give  serious  con-
sideration  to developing  their  third-party  trust laws. 
The  highly  developed  case  law  relating  to  trustees 
in the UK  and  the USA  has  probably been  a  factor 
of some  importance in establishing confidence  in  the 
system of uninsured funded pension plans and allow-
ing  their  fast  growth  to  date  to  be  accomplished 
without  either  illiberally  strict  regulations  or  par-
ticular  abuses  and  mishaps.  This  aspect  seems  im-
portant to us  not  only in  view  of  the  need  to  have 
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a  safe  receptacle  for  funds  (whether  or  not  set  up 
as  a separate legal  entity) which  is  neither controlled 
by  the  employer  nor  by  present  employees  or  pen-
sioners,  nor by  a  joint  body  of  these  groups  within 
which  conflicts  of  interest  may  arise,  - but also  in 
view  of  the  great  potential  power  pension  funds 
could  wield  on  capital  markets e). 
It is  clearly  useless  to  expect  pension  funds  to  have 
universal recourse to third party trustees, and abandon 
the  practice  of  employer,  employee  or  joint  control, 
when  the  functions,  responsibilities  and  powers  of 
the trustee are either virtually unknown and undefined 
by  practical  legal  usage,  or  defined  in  law  in  such 
a way that, for  instance, in the event of  the trustee's 
bankruptcy  the  assets  he  held in  trust may  be com-
mingled  with  his  beneficially  owned  assets,  - as 
may  happen  under  e.g.  German  trust  law. 
It would,  moreover,  be  desirable  that  the  develop-
ment  of  the  trustee  function  in  the  EEC  countries 
should take place  along convergent and not divergent 
lines, for  any  very  marked lack of uniformity in this 
respect could eventually prove to be a built-in obstacle 
to  the  unification  of  capital  markets (
4
)  (over  and 
above the serious obstacles which exist in any case). 
3.  Where a  repartition  system is  in  force,  the  insti-
tutional framework should at least not exclude funded 
pension  plans. 
Once the great mass of employers and employees has, 
as  in  France,  opted  for  a  repartition  system  for 
financing  complementary  pensions,  it  seems  impos-
sible,  without  doing  grave  injustice  to a  whole  gen-
eration,  to  change  over  in  any  radical  way  to  the 
system  of  capitalization.  Repartition  is  and  seems 
C)  Cf.  below,  5  a). 
e)  Even  in  a  case  like  that  of  the  German  Pensionskassen, 
where  the  name  is  not  disguised,  the legal  form  must be:  it 
is  that  of a  mutual  assurance  society. 
C)  The not always  purely hypothetical case  of a pension fund 
sponsored  by  an  employer  engaged  in  a  particular  branch  of 
industry  exercising,  through  its  share-buying  and  lending 
power,  an  influence  over  a  competitor  in  the  same  industry 
should  not  be  overlooked  in  this  context;  although  in  fair-
ness  to European  non-trusteed  pension  funds  (i.e.  controlled 
by  employer  and  employee  representatives),  they  often  scru-
pulously  refrain  from  investing  in  or  lending  to  companies 
in their own industry so  as  to  avoid any temptation of abuse 
of influence. 
(
4
)  For instance, if the trust law of one country left the invest-
ment powers of pension fund trustees undefined or gave  them 
wide  and  flexible  powers,  while  that  of  another  severely 
restricted  them,  international  capital  movements  for  pension 
fund  account  could  not be  expected  to be  reciprocal  or self-
compensating  in  the  long  run.  Under  such  circumstances, 
national governments  may be inclined  to regulate or handicap 
them  by,  for  instance,  illiberal  withholding  tax  or  double 
tax  treatment,  which  would  have  adverse  effects  on  the 
mobility of both pension fund and other types  of capital. destined to remain  a fait  accompli  which  cannot fail 
to  leave  a  permanent  stamp  on  the  structure  of 
French  capital  formation  and  on  the  capital  market 
of  the  country;  for  even  if  repartition  systems  can 
(by  not always  fully  meeting  the hopes  and expecta-
tions  of pensioners)  continue  to  accumulate  reserves 
(which  we  believe  will  prove  to  be  the  case),  this 
cannot possibly attain the dimensions of accumulation 
under  capitalization. 
Some  minor  and  marginal  progress,  however,  would 
probably be possible even in France in the direction 
of fostering saving through pension funding.  Pension 
"rights" (to use the terminology of capitalized pension 
plans  and  rights)  are  under  the  repartition  system 
"vested"  in the  employee  in  the  sense  that he  does 
not normally lose any part of them when moving from 
one  employer  to  another.  Contributing  to  a  French 
regime  complementaire  thus  completely fails  to  fulfil 
one  of  the  employer's  objectives,  namely  to  reduce 
labour turnover and encourage long-service employees. 
A  limited  number  of  employers  for  whom  this  is, 
for  one  reason  or  another,  an  important  objective, 
may  choose  to  introduce  some  system  of  deferred 
fidelity premiums.  If such post-employment premium 
payments  were  not  tax-deductible  by  the  employer 
while provision for their advance capitalization (fund-
ing)  were,  they  would  as  a  matter  of  course  take 
on  the  character  of  pension  funds  (whatever  name 
came  to  be  given  to  them). 
The  legal  clarifications  and  reforms  referred  to  in 
2.  above  and  the  fiscal  ones  in  4.  below  would 
naturally  be  a  precondition  for  this  development  to 
begin in France;  in particular, the authorities should 
leave  it  to  the  free  agreement  of  the  employer  and 
his  employees  whether  a  capitalized  pension  plan, 
introduced in addition to the regime complementaire, 
should  be  contributory  or  not. 
No  spectacular  results  could  probably  be  expected 
from  such  a  permissive  policy,  but  no  matter  how 
modest,  it would  still  be  a  positive  contribution  to 
saving  and  would  marginally  strengthen  the  all  too 
feeble  role of the institutional investor on the French 
capital market. 
In the very  long  term,  such  funds  could conceivably 
prove  to  have  played  an  educational  role;  if  they 
were able to provide a surer pension, a given pension 
at  lower  cost  to  the  employer,  or  a  higher  pension 
at  a  given  cost  (this  would  depend  on  the  success 
or  otherwise  of  the  investment  policy  they  adopted 
for  their funds)  than the average  repartition scheme, 
French  business  and  public  opinion  might  be  grad-
ually  prepared  for  measures  permitting  individual 
enterprises  to  "contract  out"  of  their  regime  com-
plementaire and  set up a funded pension plan not to 
provide,  as  it  were,  a  supplement  to  the  comple-
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mentary  pension,  but  to  replace  the  one  based  on 
repartition  by  one  based  on capitalization. 
Such  "contracting  out"  would  be  a  very  touchy 
matter, as  it may  weaken the regime complementaire 
based  on  repartition  if  the  age  distribution  of  the 
employees  contracted  out  and  the  probable  rate  of 
growth of  their earnings  were  more  favourable  than 
that  of  the  employees  remaining  in  the  repartition 
regime.  The  conditions  of  contracting  out  would 
consequently  have  to  be  carefully  defined  and  the 
right  to contract out should only be granted if  these 
conditions  are  met. 
4.  The  tax  posztzon  of  pension  funds  should  be 
clarified and anomalies removed. 
Since  employers'  contributions  to  funded  pension 
plans  under  third-party  control  are  analogous  with 
the  payment  of  (deferred) wages,  there is  no  logical 
reason  why  any  particular  limit  should  be  placed 
on them from  the taxation point of view.  The fiscal 
authorities  do  not  normally  contest  the  debiting  of 
wages  to  the operating account  as  a legitimate  busi-
ness  expense;  it is  difficult  to see  why  they  should 
treat  employer  contributions  to  pension  funds  dif-
ferently.  Yet  to  our knowledge  Holland is  the  sole 
country  in  the  EEC  where  the  employer's  contri-
bution is  not limited in  some  manner  as  regards  its 
deductibility  for  tax  purposes.  (Contributions in ex-
cess  of  the  actuarially  determined  requirements  are 
permitted  if  they  are  irrevocable,  which  they  ne-
cessarily  are  if  paid  over  to  a  fund  outside  the 
employer's  control).  In  the  other  countries,  their 
tax-deductibility  is  limited  to  the  level  of  actuarial 
requirements,  and  the  tax  legislation  may  even  pre-
scribe  the interest rate (investment yield) the actuary 
must  use  in  determining  the  amount  of  the  con-
tribution (e.g.  in Germany at present  a minimum  of 
5.5%  for  pension  provision  in  the balance  sheet,  a 
maximum of 3.5% for mutual assurance associations). 
Even  more  curious  is  the  limitation  of deductibility 
to  a  fixed  maximum  percentage  of  the  pensionable 
wages  and  salaries  of  those  covered  by  the  plan 
(e.g.  to  1.5%  for  German  provident  funds  /  Un-
tersti.itzungskassen  /) (1).  In  our  view,  as  long  as 
(I) The US  tax code, which in other respects displays a proper 
understanding  of the  nature  of  pension  funds,  also  places  a 
5% limit on the employer's contribution, which of course may 
be  inadequate  and  may  lead  to  the  under-capitalization  of 
a  given  pension  plan.  In  practice,  however,  this  rule  need 
not  lead  to  any  harmful  consequences,  for  the  employer  is 
free  to provide a part of the pension in the form  of a " defer-
red  profit-sharing  plan ",  (essentially  the  same  as  a  pension 
plan), for  which he may  make tax-deductible contributions up 
to  an  additional  15%  of  the  wages  and  salaries  of  those 
covered  by  the  plan.  The  combined  total  of  5%  and  15% 
should normally be adequate to meet the capitalization require-
ments  of  any  reasonable  retirement  programme. the  tax  rules  of  a  country  permit  employers  to  pay 
wages  without limiting tax-deductibility,  they  should 
also  permit  them  to  pay  unlimited  contributions  to 
pension  funds.  Actuarial  requirements  should  be 
used as  a criterion by  the supervisory  authorities (to 
ensure  the  proper  capitalization,  i.e.  the  safety  of 
future  pensions),  but  not  by  the  fiscal  authorities 
(to  determine  whether  the  contribution  is  or  is  not 
tax-deductible). 
A  logical  corollary  of  regarding  employer  contribu-
tions  to  pension  funds  under  third-party  control  as 
deferred  wages  would  be  to  add  them  to  the  em-
ployee's  taxable  income  only  when  they  pass  into 
his  ownership,  - i.e.  when  the  accumulated  con-
tributions  are  vested  in  him  or  paid  out  to  him 
in instalments in  the form  of  a pension.  Exempting 
part but not all  of the employer's contribution from 
immediate  taxation  as  income  in  the  hands  of  the 
employee,  as  in  Holland  and  Germany,  may  to  a 
greater or lesser extent achieve  the same  objective in 
practice,  but seems  to contradict  the principle which 
seems  the  correct  and  equitable  one  to  us  with 
regard  to  deferred  accruals  of  income.  A  further 
corollary  of  the  principle  advocated  here  is  that 
pensions  should  be  taxed  at  ordinary  income  tax 
rates.  Apart  from  its  logical  consistency,  the  non-
taxation  of  employer's  contributions  in  the  hands 
of the employee  and  the taxation of pensions, would 
have  the  practical  merit  of  enhancing  the  incentive 
for  this  type  of contractual saving,  i.e.  strengthening 
the  propensity  of  employees  to  accept  a  growing 
proportion  of  the  total  wage  in  a  deferred  form 
(as  the  employer's  contribution  to  a  pension  plan) 
and  a  diminishing  proportion  in  the  form  of  take-
home  pay.  This  propensity  is,  of  course,  due  to 
progressive income  taxation and  to  the fact  that e)  a 
person  can  derive  a  sometimes  considerable  tax 
advantage by causing his wages  to be deferred to the 
post-retirement  period. 
Some  attention  should  be  devoted  to  clarifying  the 
tax  position  of  the  pension  fund  itself.  Apart  from 
some ambiguity in France (where some opinion holds 
that the income  of  a pension fund  may  be subjected 
to corporation  tax),  the  tax  codes  of  all  EEC coun-
tries  appear  explicitly  to  recognize  that  a  pension 
fund  should  be  a  tax-free  entity.  Yet  despite  the 
evident  intention  of  their  tax  codes,  pension  funds 
in some EEC countries do incur taxes on their invest-
ment  income.  In  particular,  they  pay  tax  on  all 
income  from  which  tax  is  withheld  at  source  and 
where  such  withholding  taxes  cannot  be  reclaimed 
in  cash,  but  only  offset  against  the  recipient's  tax 
liability (e.g.  the Kapitalertragsteuer in Germany, the 
precompte  mobilier  and  the  precompte  immobilier 
in Belgium,  and  the  credit d'impot  in  France  which 
a pension  fund,  having  in  principle  no  tax  liability, 
cannot  benefit  from). 
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The effect of these apparently unintended impositions 
is  not only  to  penalize  pension  fund  investments  in 
general,  but also  to distort the pattern of their con-
tribution  to  the  capital  market  in  favour  of  such 
investments (e.g.  private loans and promissory notes, 
Luxemburg-issued bonds) from which tax is not with-
held  at  source.  There  is  no  apparent  reason  why 
such  discrimination  should  be  thought  to  be  bene-
ficial  to  the  capital  market  as  a  whole  and  to  its 
efficiency  as  a  resource-allocative  mechanism. 
The  withholding  tax  has  considerable  merits  as  an 
easy  and  rapid  method of ensuring  the  collection  of 
advances  on  taxes  due.  It  should  not  degenerate 
into  an  impot forfaitaire,  the use  of which  absolves 
the  tax authorities from  the  task of determining the 
entire  tax liability of  a taxpayer  on the  basis  of his 
total  income,  and  from  policing  the  truthfulness  of 
tax  declarations  and  the  payment  of  amounts  due. 
If pension funds  have,  according  to the evident will 
of  the  tax  legislator,  no  tax  liabilities,  they  ought 
to get cash refunds of the withholding taxes deducted 
at source from  their investment income.  It is  totally 
inconsistent  on  the  oart  of  the  fiscal  authorities  to 
say both that pension. funds are not to be liable to tax 
and that they can only offset withholding taxes against 
their tax liability, but not reclaim  them. 
The above principle regarding withholding taxes with-
in  a  country  is  clear  and  probably  not  difficult  to 
accept.  A  much  more  controversial  problem  is  that 
of  taxes  withheld  in  another  country  from  interest 
and  dividends  originating  in  that  country.  To  the 
extent that pension funds  can invest tax-free in their 
own  country  but  must  suffer  withholding  taxes  on 
investment  income  from  abroad,  they  will  naturally 
discriminate against investment abroad e).  This prob-
lem  transcends  that of pension fund investment  and 
is  just  as  relevant  to all  portfolio investment  by  all 
other classes  of investors.  Limitations of double tax 
relief  and  non-refundability  of  foreign  withholding 
taxes is  one of the crucial obstacles to the unification 
of the capital markets of the Community.  It would, 
however,  fall  beyond  the  terms  of  reference  of  this 
report to do more than draw attention to this problem 
from the limited and partial point of view of pension 
fund  investment. 
(I)  Since  pensions  are usually  considerably less  than  100% of 
pre-retirement income  and  a person thus normally moves  into 
a lower  progressive  income  tax  bracket  when  he retires. 
(2)  Although,  as  some  of  our  case  studies  have  shown,  some 
pension  funds  are  so  convinced  of  the  advantages  of interna-
tional  selectivity,  risk-spreading  and  the  possibility  of  achiev-
ing superior growth of dividend income by going  freely  across 
national  frontiers,  that  they  will  accept  losses  of  current  re-
venue  through  irreclaimable  foreign  withholding  taxes. 5.  Pension  funds  are  not  insurance  companies  and 
should not be  regulated as  such. 
If an  employer  chooses  to  fund  his  future  pension 
liabilities  in  uninsured  form  rather  than  purchasing 
a group  annuity or some  similar  future  benefit  from 
an  insurance  company,  he  will  have  done  so  in 
recognition of the advantages of the former (of which 
a probably better cost-benefit ratio is only one) in the 
light of the specific  features  of his  particular pension 
plan.  The  principal  characteristic  (and  for  certain 
types  of  plan the  principal  advantage)  of an  insured 
pension plan is  that precisely pre-determined benefits 
can be guaranteed at a pre-determined cost.  In giving 
such  guarantees,  insurance  companies  face  no other 
uncertainty than the actuarially calculable risk relative 
to  life-expectancy,  a  risk  which  they  are  generally 
very  well  equipped  to  bear.  In countries  where  in-
surance company investment is  strictly regulated, the 
regulation is  aimed at making doubly sure  that fixed 
nominal sums of money will always be available when 
needed  to  meet  engagements  also  fixed  in  terms  of 
nominal  sums  of  money. 
However, the demand for  pensions  is  essentially  not 
a demand for certain sums of money in the future, but 
for  a  certain  standard  of  living  upon  retirement. 
Consequently, there is  a strong trend towards pension 
plans  under which  promised benefits  are  determined 
by  earnings  in  the  immediate  pre-retirement  period 
and possibly also  by cost-of-living  changes  even after 
retirement.  Pension liabilities  under such  a  plan de-
pend on  the  rate  of  rise  of the  general wage  level, 
on the rate of growth of the earnings of the individual 
participant relative  to the rise  of general wages,  and 
in  addition  on  monetary  stability  or instability  in  a 
broad  sense.  These  factors  are  not  insurable  risks 
in  the  narrow  meaning  of  the  word,  and  liabilities 
under them cannot be funded at a fixed  rate from the 
beginning  (from  the  entry  of  a  participant  into  the 
plan)  as  the  orthodox  insurance  approach  would 
demand.  Premiums  can  be  adjusted  to  them  after 
the  event, but as  under  the  orthodox regulations  all 
or most  previous  premiums  will  have  been  invested 
in  a  form  (fixed-interest  redeemable  securities,  e.g. 
bonds,  mortgages)  appropriate  to  a  fixed  liability, 
each  upward  adjustment  is  likely  to  be  extremely 
costly, - for  the need to be met in earnings-related 
"inflation-proof"  pension  plans  is  basically  alien  to 
the  type  of  risk which  the  strict  insurance  company 
regulations  were  designed  to  guarantee. 
It is  for this reason that sensing their insurmountable 
handicap vis-a-vis uninsured plans, American insurance 
companies  in  one  State  after  another  emancipated 
themselves  from  the prevailing narrow regulation  of 
their investments  as  regards  pension fund  insurance, 
obtaining  powers  to  put  as  much  as  100%  of  the 
fund in ordinary shares which have no predetermined 
value  at a  given  future  date.  One might  almost  say 
42 
that  the  most  compet1t1ve  insured  pension  plans 
offered by US  and British insurance companies  today 
have  very  little  insurance  content  left  in  them,  and 
resemble  more  and  more  an  uninsured pension fund 
(managed by the investment managers of an insurance 
company)  where  the  cost-benefit  relationship  is  not 
predetermined,  but is  a  function  of  investment  per-
formance. 
This  report  is  not  the  place  for  debating  whether 
regulations  which  oblige  insurance  companies  to  put 
a  high  percentage  of  their  technical  reserves  into 
bonds  and  prevent  them  from  putting  more  than  a 
small  percentage  into  variable-income  securities  are 
useful or not to safeguard the fulfilment  of insurable 
risks.  We do, however, strongly put forward the view 
that  the  funding  of  pensions  is  a  different  type  of 
activity  and  should  be  subject  to  a  quite  different 
type of regulation.  Below,  we  will indicate  some  of 
the  main  features  which  in  our  view  pension  fund 
regulation  and  supervision  should  contain: 
a)  Investment 
Pension  fund  regulations  should  in  no way  seek  to 
prescribe (except as  in (b) below) the type of invest-
ment which a pension fund may  make (fixed interest, 
preferred or ordinary shares, real estate, etc. etc.);  at 
most, they should impose certain quality standards e). 
They should, however, require that the fund be man-
aged  by  a  professional  manager  (who may  but need 
not be the same as  its trustee), and definite standards 
should  be  laid  down  as  to  the  qualifications  of  the 
manager  (if  the  manager were  a  legal  entity such  as 
as  a  bank  or  a  management  company,  it  should  be 
required  to  have  professionally  qualified  and  expe-
rienced  staff  commensurate  with  the  total  funds 
managed by it, etc.).  The manager should be required 
to  report  at  least  once  a  year  upon  the income  and 
capital value of the fund  to  the employer sponsoring 
the  fund  and  to  employees'  representatives.  To 
encourage competitive efforts on the part of managers, 
such reports should be accessible  to other employers. 
b) Conflict  of interest 
Pension  funds  should  be  prohibited  from  investing 
(or investing more than 5 or 10% of) their resources 
in  the  shares  of  and  loans  to  the  sponsor  employer 
(1)  Here,  the  British  Trustee  Investment  Act  of  1961  might 
serve as  a model in certain respects.  This Act is  applicable to 
those  pension  (and  other  trust)  funds  whose  trust  deeds  do 
not specifically give them wider powers. (Most British pension 
funds  do have  wider  powers,  giving  them  greater  investment 
flexibility  than  the  1961  Act).  Under  the  Act,  one-half  or 
on certain conditions three-quarters of a fund  may  be invested 
in  ordinary  shares  of  companies  with  a  minimum  paid-up 
nominal  capital  of  £ 1  million,  quoted  on a  recognized  stock 
exchange and having paid a dividend in each of the five  years 
preceding  the investment. company,  and  to  lend  to  or  purchase  more  than  a 
small percentage of the voting capital of an enterprise 
with which  their  sponsor  enterprise  can  be  deemed 
to  be  in  a  competitive  relationship. 
c)  Adequacy  of  contributions 
The  supervisory  authority  should  have  the  power 
periodically to ascertain (or require an actuarial certif-
icate  to  the  effect)  that  the  fund  is  not  undercapi-
talized,  having  regard  to  the  pension  promises  con-
tractually made by the employer and the rhythm and 
method  of  funding  adopted.  If undercapitalization 
is  found,  it should  be  reported to  the employer  and 
the  employee  representatives,  and  employees  should 
have the same rights in law with regard to a shortfall 
in the pension fund on account of employer's contri-
butions  as  with regard to arrears of wages  due. 
d) Disposition  of  surpluses 
Since actuaries very properly have a tendency to incor-
porate a low rate of interest in the funding programme 
(e.g.  underestimate  the  likely  future  growth of  divi-
dends or other income from the fund's existing invest-
ments  and  underestimate  the  yield  at  which  future 
contributions  to  the  fund  can  be  invested),  most 
funds are more likely to be found in actuarial surplus 
than undercapitalized.  The disposition of such  even-
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tual  surpluses  may  be  laid  down in  the  employment 
contract;  if  not,  regulation  would  be  desirable  to 
determine  in  advance  their  division,  viz.  (i)  to  be 
carried forward as a free reserve against contingencies, 
(ii)  to  the  employer,  permitting a  temporary  or per-
manent  reduction  of  employer's  contributions,  (iii) 
to employees,  improving future pensions  or reducing 
employees' contributions (if any),  and (iv) to existing 
pensioners, increasing pensions. 
Some  of  the  proposed  legal-administrative  and  tax 
reforms,  supervisory  rules  and  regulations  discussed 
in the present chapter do not,  at first  sight,  seem  to 
fit within the terms of reference of this report, namely 
the contribution of pension funds  to  capital markets 
and  the  means  of  enlarging  and  improving  it.  They 
seem  to  refer  more  to  simplicity  of  administration, 
to  the  safety  of  pensioners'  money  or  to logic  and 
equity in taxation, than to the flow of funds to capital 
markets.  We believe,  however,  that  all  these  mea-
sures, however indirect or roundabout they may seem, 
would have  their importance and relevance  in ensur-
ing  the smoother,  safer  and more rapid development 
of pension funds,  their proper deployment in invest-
ment  through  the  capital  markets,  and  safeguarding 
participants against the repetition of those past disap-
pointments  which  were  in  no  small  measure  respon-
sible  for  the  apparently  inadequate  present  flow  of 
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HISTORICAL  DATA  ON  POPULATION,  EMPLOYMENT  AND  INCOMES 
DONNEES  HISTORIQUES  SUR  LA  POPULATION, EMPLOI  ET  LES  REVENUES TABLE A-1 
Private  11on  agricultural  employment  - Emploi  prive  noll  agricolc 
--- ------------- --- ------- - ------------------1  I 
j_  I 
1955  I  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
ActivefActif (1) 
I 
1-1;:--
Deutschland  (s) 
I  12.92  16.61  16.96  17.25  17.39  17.57  I 
France 
I  8.30 
I  9.00  9.13  9.31  9.72  10.03  10.25  l 
I  tali a  6.18  7.88  8.14  8.28  8.41  8.40  8.06 
Nederland  2.35  2.64  2.72  2.76  2.83  2.91  3.20 
Belgique  1.70  1.78  1.83  1.89  1.92  1.96  2.00 
EEC  31.45  37.91  38.78  39.49  40.27  40.87  41.36 
u.s.  43.76  45.85  45.39  46.65  47.44  48.56  50.39 
U.K.  17.95  18.80  19.14  19.38  19.35  19.73  20.15 
RetiredfRetraites (2) 
Deutschland (3)  1.01  1.63  1.76  1.82  1.89  1.95  1.99 
France  0.88  1.08  1.10  1.13  1.17  1.20  1.22 
Italia  0.47  0.66  0.70  0.71  0.74  0.76  0.77 
Nederland  0.24  0.30  0.31  0.32  0.33  0.34  0.34 
Belgique  0.20  0.26  0.27  0.27  0.29  0.29  0.31 
EEC  2.80  3.92  4.14  4.25  4.42  4.54  4.63 
u.s.  4.03  5.21  5.32  5.50  5.65  5.81  5.99 
U.K.  2.36  2.60  2.67  2.74  2.82  2.91  2.99 
--------------------------------- ------- ----- -
(1)  Labour force  employed  in  private non-agricultural  establishments. 
(")  The sum of estimates of males over 65  and females  over 60 retired from private  t1on-agricultural  employment;  estimated  by applying employment parti-
cipation  rates  of highest active  age  group (45-65  for males;  45-60  for females)  to population of retirement age,  net of workers still  active. 
(
8
)  Excluding West Berlin  prior  to  1960. 
Sources:  OECD  Manpower_Sta~~t!_c~,  __ census  data  for  each  country and EEC General  Statistical Bulletin.  ---------~--------- _  _  _______  _ 
TABLE A-2 
Wages  _C}'__zcl__~~larj~s_per  etnplo1e~~1~!!__agri~!!_{~ural) - Revenues  et  traitcments  par  trauailleur  (!Ion  ~.gricole) 
1955  1960  I  I  1961 
1  1962  1963  1964  I  1965 
Compensation  qf Employees  per  EmployeefRblllmeratiott 
des  Salaries  et  Appointes  par  Travaille11r: 
Deutschland  (DM '000)  5.29  7.17  7.93  8.61  9.13  9.87  10.73 
France  (FF  '000)  6.87  10.98  12.05  13.22  14.54  15.70  16.47 
Italia  (Lit  '000)  743  912  982  1117  1317  1472  1596 
Nederland  (Fl  '000)  4.87  6.54  6.96  7.56  8.22  9.54  9.97 
Belgique  (BF  '000)  81.5  102.3  104.6  111.9  121.7  133.5  144.8 
u.s.  ($  '000)  4.51  5.45  5.57  5.80  5.97  6.22  6.45 
U.K.  (£)  537  694  738  768  807  858  906 
Wages  and  Salaries  per  Employee  (1)/Salaires  et  Traite-
ments  par  Travailleur 
Deutschland  (DM '000)  4.57  6.04  6.72  7.32  7.74  8.42  9.17 
France  (FF  '000)  8.89  9.66  10.5  11.5  12.4  12.9 
Italia  (Lit  '000)  626  742  800  902  1062  1171  1288 
Nederland  (Fl  '000)  5.66  5.99  I  6.56  7.02  8.11  8.50 
Belgique  (BF  '000)  71.8  87.7  89.4  95.7  103.7  113.1  121.4 
u.s.  ($  '000)  4.39  5.24  5.36  5.56  5.71  5.96  6.18 
U.K.  (£)  520  674  715  743  780  828  870 
Employers'  Co11tributions  to  Social  Security  as  Percent  <?{  . 
Employee  Compensation/Contributions  des  Employeurs  a 
Ia  Securite  Sociale  en  Pourcentage  de  Ia  Remutteratiou  des 
Salaries  et  Appoitltcs 
Deutschland  13.6  15.8  15.3  15.0  15.2  14.7  14.5 
France  19.0  19.8  20.3  20.7  20.9  21.5 
Italia  15.7  18.6  18.5  19.2  19.4  20.4  19.3 
Nederland  13.5  13.9  13.2  14.6  15.0  14.7 
Belgique  12.0  14.3  14.5  14.5  14.8  15.2  16.1 
u.s.  2.7  3.8  3.8  4.1  4.4  4.2  4.2 
U.K.  3.2  2.9  3.1  3.3  3.4  3.5  4.0 
---~~---- ---------
(')  Compensation less employers' contributions to Social  Security. 
Source:  EEC  General  Statistical  Bulletin,  National  Yearbooks,  OECD National Accounts Statistics  for  data  on compensation  and  employers'  contributions  to 
Social  Security.  See  Table A-1  for  sources  OJ1  employment,  here  including  government and public enterprise (government onlv in  U. S.). ___________ 
51 TABLE A-3 
Population  and  labour force  - Population  et  population  active 
Deutschland 
France 
Italia 
Nederland 
Belgique 
Deutschland 
France 
Italia 
Nederland 
Belgique 
Deutschland 
France 
It  alia 
Nederland 
Belgique 
Deutschland 
France 
Italia 
Nederland 
Belgique 
( 1)  Including migration. 
EEC 
EEC 
EEC 
EEC 
( 8)  Males  between  the ages  of 15  and  65;  females  15  to  60. 
( 1)  Civilian. 
1955  1960  1965  1970 
--------·-------·--
50.19 
43.43 
48.20 
I 
10.76 
8.87 
-----:-
161.4 
55.43 
45 58 
49.64 
11.49 
9.15 
171.4 
! 
I 
Population  (1) 
(millions) 
59.04 
4893 
51.59 
12.29 
9.46 
181.3 
-
60.22 
5095 
54.32 
13.12 
9.71 
188.3 
1975 
61.51 
5352 
56.40 
14.20 
9.94 
195.6 
I 
1980 
5 
1 
1 
62.39 
56.30 
8.44 
5.41 
0.00 
--
20  2.5 
Populatiotz  of working  age  - Population  d' age  actif (2) 
(millions) 
33.13  35.79  36.84  36.27  36.44  38.96 
26.45  27.14  29.16  30.26  31.58  33.59 
30.70  31.68  32.44  33.91  34.50  35.73 
6.40  6.76  7.36  7.80  8.28  8.83 
5.65  5.62  5.72  5.79  5.87  5.95 
------"-~-------
102.3  107.0  111.5  114.0  116.7  123.1 
------------
Labour force  - Population  active  (3) 
(millions) 
23.22  26.22  26.90 
19.01  18.88  19.69 
20.82  20.84  19.73 
3.85  4.07  4.63 
3.49  3.50  3.65 
70.4  ·~--~.;- 74.6 
Participation  rates 
(Labour force  as  % of population 
of working age) 
70.1  73.3  73.0 
71.9  69.6  67.5 
67.8  65.8  60.8 
60.2  60.2  62.9 
61.8  62.3  63.8 
26.98  27.52  28.42 
21.33  22.37  23.48 
20.54  20.65  21.25 
4.84  5.10  5.40 
3.80  3.92  4.00 
-~-----
77.5  79.56  82.55 
Taux  de  participation 
(%  de  la  population active 
dans  la  population d'age actif) 
74.4 
70.5 
60.6 
62.1 
65.6 
75.5 
70.8 
59.9 
61.6 
66.8  I 
72.9 
69.9 
59.5 
61.2 
67.2 
---------------1-----:  1--------·· 
1  68.8 
--~----
68.0  68.2  68.7  66.9  1  67.1 
---~---------
Sources:  OECD  Manpower  Statistics,  National  Year  books (census  data and  projections)  and  OECD Demographic Trends  1956-76;  1965-80  . 
. ----------···------ .  ----- --------------
52 TABLE A- 4 
Employed  labour  and  GNP - Population  active  occupee  et  PNB 
France  I  Dout.mbnd 
__  e> ___  ~----1--- -~ --------i 
ltalia  Nederland  Belgique 
Employed  Labour  Force/  1955  22.27  18.73  19.33  3.82  3.35 
Population  Active Occupee  (millions)  1960  25.95  18.64  20.00  4.02  3.38 
1965  26.75  19.42  19.01  4.60  3.59 
1970  26.8  21.1  20.0  4.80  3.74 
1975  27.3  22.1  20.2  5.06  3.86 
1980  28.2  23.3  20.9  5.36  3.94 
GNP per  Employed  Labour  Force/  (2)  1955  8.81  11.45  .818  8.82  149.4 
PNB par  Personne  Occupee  (2)  1960  11.02  14.52  1.041  10.25  167.8 
(1958  prices/prix  de  1958)  1965  13.58  18.09  1.426  11.62  202.1 
1970  16.9  22.5  1.86  13.42  240 
1975  21.1  28.1  2.43  15.72  285 
1980  26.3  35.0  3.18  18.41  339 
Real GNP/PNB Reel (3)  1955  198.6  214.3  15.83  33.70  499.9 
(1958  prices/prix  de  1958)  1960  286.3  270.7  20.83  41.16  566.4 
1965  363.2  351.2  27.12  52.80  725.2 
1970  452  474  37.2  64.5  896 
1975  576  621  49.3  79.6  1100 
1980  741  812  66.5  98.8  1335 
Nominal  GNP/PNB aux Prix Courants (3)  1955  180.8  171.9  14.62  29.75  454.5 
1960  296.6  296.2  20.99  42.35  565.8 
1965  449.6  464.7  35.57  68.99  847.4 
1970  641  720  55.9  96.6  1200 
1975  932  1082  85.3  136.7  1690 
1980  1375  1630  132.5  194.2  2360 
Average  Annual IncreasefTaux  d'Accroissement  (%  p.a.) 
Employed Labour Force/  1955/65  1.8  .4  ~.2  1.9  .7 
Population Active  Occupee  1965/80  .5  1.2  .6  1.0  .6 
GNP per Person Employed/  1955/65  4.4  4.7  5.7  2.8  3.1 
PNB par Personne  Occupee  1965/80  4.5  4.5  5.5  3.2  3.5 
Real  GNP/PNB Reel  1955/65  6.2  5.1  5.5  4.6  3.8 
1965/80  4.9  5.7  6.2  4.3  4.1 
Nominal GNP/PNB aux Prix Courants  1955/65  9.5  10.4  9.3  8.8  6.4 
1965/80  7.7  8.7  9.2  7.2  7.1 
(1)  Excluding W. Berlin prior to 1960. 
( 1)  Thousand units of national  currency,  except  Italy (million). 
(8)  Billion  units of national currency, except Italy (000 billion).  The conversion of  real GNP to nominal GNP during the pr~jection period is based on the assump.. 
tion that prices rise on the average by 2.8 % p.a. for all countries. 
Sources:  Of historical  data OECD Manpower Statistics, EEC General  Statistical Bulletin; of labour force  projections  OECD (including migration, see  table A-3) 
with EUROFINANCE  projections  of unemployment. 
53 TABLE A-5 
Main  trends  in  social  security 
Tendances  principales  de  securite  sociale 
1955  1960  1961 
DEUTSCHLAND (value figures in billions of  national 
currency) 
Contributing membership  (million)  23.0  26.0  26.2 
Pensioners  (million)  6.16  7.29  7.40 
(Pensioners  excluding survivors)  3.50  4.14  4.27 
Contributions - employer  11.2  22.1  24.1 
- total  22.6  42.6  48.9 
Benefits  - retirement  9.74  20.3  22.0 
- total  19.5  40.1  44.1 
Average  retirement benefits  (OOO's  DM)  1.58  2.78  2.97 
Reserves  (year-end)  11.4  16.2 
Contributing  membership  as  % of labour  force  99.0  99.0  99.0 
Average  retirement  benefits  as  % of average  wage  34.6  46.0  44.2 
FRANCE (chiffres  de  valeur en milliards  d'unites  de 
monnaie nationale) 
Cotisants  (million)  18.7  18.5  18.7 
Retraites  (million)  4.95  5.39  5.46 
Retraites a !'exclusion de survie  3.47  3.77  3.82 
Cotisations - des  employeurs  25.2  29.3 
- totales  35.0  40.8 
Prestations  - de vieillesse  9.75  10.8 
- totales  34.8  39.6 
Prestation moyenne de vieillesse  (FF  000)  1.81  1.98 
Reserves  (fm d'annee) 
Cotisants en % de la  population active  98.2  98.0  . 99.0 
Prestation moyenne en % du salaire  moyen  20.4  20.5 
-~----
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1962  1964  1965 
26.3  26.7  25.8  25.7 
7.54  7.68  7.89  8.10 
4.42  4.53  4.69  4.84 
26.1  28.3  30.1  32.8 
51.1  55.3  61.0  68.4 
23.6  25.8  30.1  32.8 
48.4  52.7  57.9  65.6 
3.13  3.36  3.59  3.95 
18.9  21.5  24.6  27.4 
98.9  100.0  96.7  95.4 
42.8  43.4  42.6  43.1 
18.9  19.3  19.5  19.7 
5.53  5.63  5.74  5.82 
3.87  3.94  4.02  4.07 
33.6  39.1  43.9  48.3 
47.0  54.2  61.6  67.8 
12.5  15.0  17.7  20.1 
46.0  53.8  61.5  68.2 
2.26  2.66  3.08  3.45 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
21.5  23.1  24.8  26.7 TABLE A-5 Slliff 
Main  trends  in  social  security 
Tendances  principales  de  securite  sociale 
-------- ---~-------,------~----,---------~.  ~---,  -·--------·- -
1955  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
ITALIA (Valeur  exprime en Lire  000  milliards) 
Contributing membership  (million) 
Pensioners  (million) 
(Pensioners  excluding  survivors) 
Contributions - employer 
- total 
Benefits  - retirement 
- total 
Average  retirement  benefits  (OOO's  Lit.) 
Reserves  (year-end) 
Contributing  membership  as  % of labour force 
Average retirement benefits  as  % of average  wage 
NEDERLAND (chiffres de valeur en milliards d'unites 
de  monnaie nationale) 
Cotisants (millions) 
Retraites  (millions) 
(Retraites a !'exclusion de  survie) 
Cotisations  - des  employeurs 
- totales 
Prestations  - de  vieillesse 
- totales 
Prestation  moyenne  de  vieillesse  (OOO's  Fl.) 
Reserves  (fm  d'annee) 
Cotisants  en % de  la  population active 
Prestation moyenne en % du salaire  moyen 
- -----1~---1----· 
20.8 
3.85 
2.89 
.94 
1.46 
.78 
1.24 
203 
100 
32.4 
3.85 
.82 
.56 
1.18 
2.68 
.42 
1.01 
.51 
100 
55 
20.8 
4.19 
3.14 
1.69 
2.57 
1.41 
2.24 
337 
1.32 
100 
45.4 
4.07 
.91 
.59 
2.69 
6.03 
2.11 
4.82 
2.32 
100 
41.0 
20.7 
4.28 
3.21 
1.87 
2.69 
1.53 
2.47 
357 
1.54 
100 
44.6 
4.12 
.93 
.60 
3.04 
6.95 
2.30 
5.18 
2.47 
100 
41.2 
20.4 
4.48 
3.36 
2.27 
3.22 
1.82 
2.90 
406 
1.86 
100 
45.0 
4.19 
.95 
.62 
3.18 
7.36 
2.60 
5.75 
2.74 
100 
41.8 
20.0 
4.51 
3.38 
2.81 
4.00 
2.28 
3.62 
506 
2.24 
100 
47.6 
4.27 
.97 
.63 
3.92 
8.84 
3.01 
7.19 
3.10 
100 
44.2 
. 
19.9 
4.55 
3.41 
3.28 
4.69 
2.40 
4.04 
527 
2.89 
100 
45.0 
4.35 
1.00 
.65 
4.81 
10.69 
3.71 
8.65 
3.71 
100 
45.7 
19.7 
4.63 
3.47 
3.26 
5.43 
3.18 
5.04 
687 
3.28 
100 
53.3 
4.63 
1.03 
.67 
5.35 
12.81 
4.85 
10.4 
4.71 
100 
55.4 TABLE A - 5 suite 
Main  trends  in  social  security 
Tendances  principales  de  securite  sociale 
--19~-5_1 __  19-60--1 --19_6_1 ----1""  1962 
I 
BELGIQUE  (value  figures  in  billion  of  national 
currency) 
Contributing membership (million)  1.91 
Pensioners  (million)  .31 
Pensioners  excluding  survivors  .17 
Contributions - employer  23.9 
- total  48.9 
Benefits  - retirement 
- total 
Average  retirement benefits  (OOO's  BF) 
Reserves  (year-end) 
Contributing  membership  as  % of labour force 
Average  retirement  benefits  as  0/0  of average  wage 
UNITED KINGDOM (chitfres de valeur en milliards 
d'unites  de  monnaie nationale) 
Cotisants  (millions) 
Retraites  (millions) 
Retraites a 1' exclusion  de survie 
Cotisations - des  employeurs 
- totales 
Prestations  - de  vieillesse 
- totales 
Prestation moyenne de  vieillesse  (£) 
Reserves  (fm  d'annee) 
Cotisants  en % de  la  population active 
Prestation moyenne  e11  % du salaire  moyen 
-----~- - ----- ---------
13.2 
47.3 
42.6 
63.3 
54.7 
59.3 
23.8 
4.63 
.27 
.74 
.42 
.69 
90.7 
100.0 
17.5 
56 
1.94 
.35 
.19 
37.3 
75.9 
20.8 
72.9 
59.4 
66.3 
55.4 
67.7 
24.5 
5.68 
.39 
1.05 
.68 
1.04 
119.7 
100.0 
17.8 
! 
I 
l
i.l 
1.99  2.04 
.35  .36 
.20  .20 
39.9  43.6 
80.2  86.8 
22.6 
76.6 
64.6 
69.9 
56.5 
72.3 
24.8 
5.79 
.46 
1.18 
.77 
1.18 
133.0 
99.9 
18.6 
25.5 
83.5 
70.8 
73.2 
57.1 
74.0 
24.9 
5.94 
.51 
1.30 
.82 
1.27 
138.0 
99.2 
18.6 
1963 
2.08 
.36 
.20 
49.2 
95.7 
26.3 
91.8 
73.1 
77.1 
57.9 
70.5 
25.0 
6.11 
.57 
1.43 
.93 
1.48 
152.2 
99.1 
19.5 
1964 
2.14 
.39 
.22 
57.0 
112.2 
28.7 
98.3 
73.6 
91.0 
59.1 
65.1 
25.2 
6.29 
.64 
1.58 
1.02 
1.56 
162.2 
99.5 
19.6 
1965 
2.17 
.39 
.22 
66.4 
129.8 
31.1 
120.8 
79.7 
100.0 
59.5 
65.7 
25.4 
6.49 
.78 
1.88 
1.20 
1.85 
184.9 
98.9 
21.3 MAIN TRENDS  IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
SOURCES  AND  METHODICAL NOTES 
1. Contributing membership:  Figures for Deutschland, 
France, Italia and Nederland were derived from data 
on  the  labour force  on  the  basis  of  information on 
the number of contributions for social  security avail-
able  for  one  or two  years  in national  sources.  For 
Belgique  and  the  United  Kingdom  continuous  series 
are  published  in  the  Statistical  Year  books  of  each 
country. 
2.  Pensioners:  Equals estimated total pensioners (in-
sured and their survivors) receiving national pensions 
i.e.,  excluding  disablement  pensions.  Data estimated 
on  the  basis  of  spot  year  figures  obtained  from  na-
tional sources, and the population over retirement age. 
The number of pensioners is larger than the estimated 
number of  retired owing to the inclusion of a) those 
in  receipt  of  a  pension  who  continue  to  work,  b) 
early retirements and c)  those in receipt of pensions 
who have  never worked (survivors).  "Survivors"  in 
Holland estimated simply as  35% of total pensioners. 
3.  Contributions  and  Benefits:  Principal  sources  -
EEC  "General Statistical Bulletin"  196  7  N°  11  and 
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"Social  Statistics"  196  7  No  5.  Total  contributions 
equal  receipts,  net  of  transfers  to  other  schemes. 
Data on disablement,  old age  and  survival  pensions 
have  been adjusted to exclude  disablement pensions. 
Italian retirement  benefits  refer  to pensions  paid by 
the three major public funds  operating in Italy. 
4.  Average Retirement Benefits and Average Wages: 
Average  retirement  benefits  calculated  by  dividing 
total retirement  benefits  by  total pensioners  (includ-
ing  survivors).  The  level  of  retirement  pensions  is 
normally  dependent  on  the  salary  in  the  final  years 
of employment;  therefore, the comparison with aver-
age wages and salaries (source Table A- 2), which are 
normally  lower  than wages  and  salaries  in  the  final 
years  of  employment,  overstates  the  importance  of 
retirement pensions. 
5.  Pensioners  as  %  of Retirement  Population:  Ob-
tained by dividing "retired population" (estimated as 
population no  longer  active  by  average  participation 
rate of labour force  in 45-60  age  bracket) into pen-
sioners without survivors. APPENDIX B 
COMPLEMENTARY  PENSION  SCHEMES 
HISTORICAL  DATA  AND  ESTIMATES  BY  COUNTRY-
NOTE OF CAUTION:  The larger  part of  the  data presented in  the  following  pages  represents  estimates  based  on  benchmark 
information,  small  slrnp]es  or simply  deduced from  theoretical relationships  and  the  experience  of  particular  funds.  While  the 
figures  have  been  checked  for  internal  consistency,  their  reliability is  obviously  subject to doubt.  Tables  B - 1,  3,  4,  7,  8,  9,  are 
based  largely  on  published  information.  The  estimates  of  Tables  B  - 2,  5,  6  and  10,  on  the  other  hand  SHOULD  BE  RE-
GARDED  AS  BROAD  ORDERS  OF MAGNITUDE  ONLY. 
58 APPENDIX B 
DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN APPENDIX B 
The following  terms  are  employed in a sense  compa-
rable  from  country  to  country.  Specific  departures 
of the statistics  shown from  the adopted terminology 
are  indicated  in  footnotes  to  the  tables. 
1.  Complementary  schemes  =  all  plans  promising  a 
retirement  pension  in  addition  to  old  age  benefits 
under  legal  insurance  schemes,  but  excluding  indi-
vidual insurance  plans.  Such  plans  may  be  "public" 
( =  set up for civil  servants and employees  of public 
enterprises)  or  "private"  ( =  for  private  wage  and 
salary  earners,  as  a  rule  excluding  agricultural  and 
family  workers). 
2. Current transfer schemes  =  also  known as  "repar-
tition", "non-funded". "pay-as-you-go"  schemes, com-
prise all  plans paying pension benefits out of current 
contributions,  hence  not  requiring  assets  to  back  fu-
ture  benefit  commitments.  Reserves  generally  cover 
half  to  two years  of  benefit  payments. 
3.  Balance  sheet  entry  schemes  =  also  known  as 
"severance funds"  in Italy, comprise all  funded plans 
with  legal  or  contractual  obligation  to  pay  pension 
or severance  benefits,  with the funding  appearing  as 
a  liability  of  the  firm,  with  or  without  segregation 
of  corresponding  reserves. 
4. Insured schemes  =  all (funded) group plans admin-
istered by  an  insurance company.  Reserves as  a rule 
not segregated from  total insurance funds. 
5.  Autonomous funds  =  all  self-administered funded 
plans,  as  a  rule  with  separate  legal  identity.  The 
investment of fund assets  may  or may  not be subject 
to  government  regulation  ("regulated"  or  "unregu-
lated").  They  include  public  and  private  pension 
funds  - the  latter being  of primary interest  to  the 
present  study. 
6.  Reserves  =  total  assets  of  pension  funds,  which 
may  or not be available for investment in the capital 
markets depending on the type of fund.  The reserves 
of balance  sheet  entry  plans,  with  rare  exceptions, 
represent  investment  in  the  company's  own  assets; 
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those  of  current  transfer  schemes,  in  short-term  or 
liquid  assets.  Long-term  investments  (real  estate, 
securities, etc.) constitute by distinction, the bulk of 
(autonomous) pension fund assets. 
7.  Investments  =  net purchases  of  assets  providing 
a return on investment (interest, dividends, rent).  In 
practice,  investment  statistics  denote  net  cash  flow 
( =  total  receipts  less  total  disbursement). 
8.  Net  accumulation  =  "net investment"  + capital 
gains  =  net addition to total fund reserves or assets 
during  year. 
9.  Net investment  earnings  earnings  on  invested 
assets  less  administrative  costs.  For current transfer 
schemes, administrative costs are shown net of invest-
ment earnings. 
10.  Covered workers  =  membership  of  complemen-
tary  schemes  whether  contributing  or  not  ( "contri-
butory"  or  "non-contributory"  schemes);  excluding 
dependants. 
11. Beneficiaries  = pension recipients,  excluding de-
pendants  or  (to  the  extent  possible)  survivors. 
12.  Contributions  =  by  employers,  employees  and, 
on occasion,  the  State. 
13.  Benefits  =  payment  of  all  pensions  under  com-
pulsory  schemes.  Average  benefits are  overstated  to 
the extent of inclusion of other than retirement pen-
sions,  or exclusion  of survivors  from  the data. 
14.  Key  ratios: 
Average  contribution  =  contributions  per  covered 
worker 
Average  benefit  =  benefits  per beneficiary 
Reserve:  benefit  ratio  =  reserves  per  benefit  pay-
ments 
Average  reserves  =  reserves  per  covered  worker 
The  "K-multiple"  =  average  reserves  per  average 
benefit TABLE  HEADINGS  (FRENCH/ENGLISH) 
Since  the  content  and  presentation  of  the  following  tables is fairly uniform, line and column headings are given 
in French only.  The English translation of the  titles appearing in Appendix B Tables are listed for convenience: 
Salaries  affilies 
Pensionnes 
Taux  d'affiliation 
Taux de retraite 
Pensionnes/  affilies 
Cotisations 
Revenues  nets  des  fonds  places 
Prestations 
In  ves tissemen  t 
Accroissement  net 
Reserves 
Reserves:  prestations 
Reserves par affilie 
Prestation  moyenne 
Rapport  RP  A/PM 
Cotisation  moyenne 
Prestation  moyenne  et 
Cotisation  moyenne  (en  %  du  salaire 
moyen non-agricole) 
Fonds  autonomes 
Fonds  sous  forme  d'inscription  au  bilan 
Fonds  de  licenciement 
=  covered workers 
=  beneficiaries 
covered  workers  as  %  of  private  non-agricultural  employment 
(EPN) 
beneficiaries  as  %  of  EPN 
=  beneficiaries  as  %  of  covered  workers 
contributions 
net  investment  earnings 
benefits 
net cash  flow 
net  accumulation  of reserves 
fund  assets 
asset:  benefit  ratio 
reserves  per covered worker 
average  benefit 
ratio  of  reserves  per  covered  worker  to  average  benefit  (the 
K-multiple) 
average  contribution 
average  benefits  and 
average  contribution as  %  of net wages  and salaries per employee 
self  -administered  funds 
balance sheet entry schemes 
severance  funds. 
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TABLE B-2 
Estimations (1)  des fonds  de  pensions  prives,  non  assures,  en  Allemagne 
---------------- ----------------------------~------------------~--------------------~------------------~--------------------
Salaries  affilies  (millions) 
Pensionnes  (millions) 
Taux d'affiliation  (en  % de  l'Emploi  Prive Non Agricole) 
Taux de  retraite (en % d'EPN retraites) 
Cotisations (DM milliards) 
Revenues  nets  des  fonds  places  (DM milliards) 
Prestations  (DM milliards) 
Accroissement  net (DM milliards)  (2) 
Reserves  des  fonds  (DM milliards,  fin  d'annee) 
Reserves : prestations 
Reserves  par affilie  (DM milliers) 
Prestation  moyenne (DM milliers) 
Rapport RP  A/PM (a) 
Cotisation moyenne (DM milliers) 
Prestation  moyenne 
en % du salaire  moyen non agricole 
Cotisation  moyenne 
I 
Pensionskassen 
Fonds de pension 
1957  1960 
.73  1.51 
.13  .23 
5.0  9.1 
10.5  I  14 
.22  .47 
.18 
.12 
.36 
3.20 
.24 
.23 
.64 
4.81 
1965 
1.77 
.29 
9.9 
14.5 
.72 
.44 
.39 
.75 
8.45 
I  27  =  1  21  : 1 
3.2 
1.0 
3.2 
22: 1 
4.8 
1.3 
3.7 
4.4 
.9 
4.9 
.30 
17 
6 
U nterstiitzungskassen 
Fonds de secours 
Pensionsriickstellungen 
Fonds sous forme 
d'inscription au bilan 
Total/Average 
Moyenne/Total 
--=-11%0  1 __  1_9_6_5 -1--19_5_7--1--19_6_0  __  1---19_6_5 __  , -1-9-57--1--1-9-60--1--1-9-65--
1.05 
.10 
7.2 
7.8 
.10 
1.15 
.12 
6.9 
7.4 
.20  I 
.13 
.30 
.08 
.35 
.05  I 
.25 
2.0 
40: 1 
1.9 
.5 
3.4 
.10 
14 
1.9 
I 
2.75 
34: 1 
2.4 
.7 
3.4 
•
I  .11 
15 
I  1.9 
1.35 
.17 
7.6 
8.5 
.24 
.26 
.16 
3.97 
.25 
27.4 
20 
.98 
.18 
4.74 
.40 
28.5 
24.5 
1.68 
.32 
.34  .80  1.36 
4.48  I  5.00  I  8.64 
28:1  28:1  27:1 
3.3 
.9 
3.5 
13 
2 
.18 
1.3 
.7 
1.9 
14 
5 
.25 
1.8 
.8 
2.2 
13 
6 
.35 
6.08 
.9 
34.0 
47 
3.44 
1.04 
2.40 
20.1 
19: 1 
3.3 
1.1 
3.0 
12 
6 
.57 
5.75 
.48 
39.5 
38 
1.30 
.38 
.35 
1.41 
110.20 
29: 1 
1.8 
.7 
2.4 
.23 
14.5 
4.5 
7.40 
.75 
44.5 
46 
2.28 
.541 
.63 
2.35 
15.20 
24: 1 
9.20 
1.40 
51.5 
70 
4.4 
.7 
1.6 
3.5 
33.0 
21  : 1 
2.1  3.6 
.8  1.1 
2.6  3.2 
I 
I 
.31  1  .48 
13.5 
5 
I  12 
I  5 
~
1)  Par EUROFINANCE: bases sur un grand nombre de sources,  y  compris des oeuvres publiees (voir tableau precedent, CEE: Regimes  Complementaires,  Annuaire Statistique),  coupures de presse et  opinions 
professionnelles. 
(")  Y  compris amortissement et variations  des  valeurs  de portefeuille. 
( 8)  Reserves  par Affilie/Prestation Moyenne. 
-------------- - ----------TABLE B-3 
Regimes  de  retraites  complementaires  en  France 
(en  millions  de  personnes  et milliards  de  francs,  sauf indication contraire) 
s  tatistiques  des fonds  de  I' ARRCO 
alaries  affilies  (fm  d'annee)  s 
p ensionnes  (fm  d'annee) 
s  urvivants  des  pensionnes  (fm  d'annee) 
otisations  c 
p restations 
c  outs  administratifs  (moins  les  interets) 
ccroissement net  A 
R  eserves  (fm  d'annee) 
E  stimations  de  tous  regimes  de  retraites  complementaires 
alaries  affilies  (fm  d'annee)  s 
p ensionnes  (fm  d'annee) 
aux d'affiliation en % de l'emploi total  non agricole  T 
p ensionnes  en % des  retraites 
otisations  c 
p restations 
c  outs administratifs (moins les  interets) 
ccroissement net  A 
R  eserves  (fm  d'annee) 
apport des  reservesfprestations  R 
c  otisation par affilie  (FF  000) 
p restation  par pensionne (FF  000) 
1961 
4.82 
.51 
i 
.23 
1.21 
.57 
.05 
.59 
1.23 
1960 
I  6.2 
I 
.6 
51.5 
i  26 
2.4 
1.2 
.1 
1.1 
I  2.4 
2.0 
I  .39 
I 
I 
2.00 
1962  1963 
I 
1964 
I 
I 
6.16  6.77  I  7.04 
I 
I  .65  .80  .95 
.29  .34  .41 
1.47  1.91  2.21 
I  .78  1.02  1.30 
I 
.06  .07  .05 
I 
.63  .94  .88 
1.86  2.82  3.70 
', 
1963  1964 
9.21  9.68 
I  1.12  1.32  I 
71  72.5 
48.5  57 
i 
I 
I 
4.50  5.22 
2.96  3.58 
.24  .20 
1.30  1.44 
6.37  7.82 
I 
2.1  2.2 
I 
!  .49  .54 
I  I  I 
I 
2.64  2.71 
I  I 
1965  1966 
7.39  7.54 
1.17  1.43 
.49  .59 
2.57  2.88 
1.70  2.15 
.08  .10 
.78  .63 
4.48  5.11 
1965 
10.1 
1.6 
74 
69 
6.1 
4.5 
.3 
1.3 
9.1 
2.0 
.60 
2.81 
Sources:  ARRCO (Association  des  Regimes  de  Retraites  Complementaires),  Ministere  du Travail,  coupures de presse,  et estimations d'EUROFINANCE. 
----------~--------------
63 TABLE B- 4 
Reserves  italiennes  de fonds  de  pension  et  investissements 
(billions  de  lire) 
Fonds  publique  (1) 
Revenues  de  cotisation 
Total 
Depenses  de  prestation 
Total 
Investissements  (2) 
Accroissement  net 
Reserves  (fin  d'annee) 
Valeurs  immobilieres 
Valeurs  mobilieres 
Prets a long terme 
Credits  et en caisse 
Total 
Fonds  prives 
Reserves  de  fonds  (fin  d'annee) 
Entreprises  industrielles  &  commerciales  (3) 
Institutions  fmancihes 
Fonds  de licenciement (4) 
Total 
(dont):  sous  forme  d'inscription  au  bilan 
Fonds  autonomes  (5) 
Accroissement  net des  reserves 
sous  forme d'inscription  au bilan 
Fonds  autonomes 
I  1958  I  1959  !  1960  I  1961  I  1962  I  1963  I  1964 
~-~'--1-1--,-~~-1 
I  ::~: 
1.18 
1.34 
.10 
.02 
.12 
.20 
.27 
.23 
1.33 
1.42 
1.31 
1.49 
.05 
-.07 
.13 
.21 
.30 
.12 
i 
I 
I 
1.81 
1.91 
1.41 
1.60 
.08 
.30 
.15 
.22 
.35 
.33 
1.81 
1.94 
1.53 
1.73 
.08 
.20 
.17 
2.22 
2.36 
1.82 
2.11 
.14 
.24 
.18 
.25  .33 
.39  .44 
.44  .53 
2.87  3.08 
2.99  3.25 
2.28  2.40 
2.61 
.13 
.38 
.21 
2.66 
.35 
.60 
.23 
.40  .63 
.47  .57 
.80  1.05 
---.-82-l-~.7~6-1- ~~-~-1.25 --1~.49--- ----1.8_8_  -~2~.4~8~ 
.44 
.24 
.25 
.93 
.79 
.12 
.48 
.27 
.28 
1.03 
.87 
.16 
.08 
.56 
.33 
.32 
1.21 
1.03 
.18 
.16 
.66 
.38 
.39 
1.42 
1.20 
.22 
.17 
.04 
I 
.80 
.43 
.47 
1.69 
1.43 
.26 
.23 
.04 
.96 
.50 
.56 
2.03 
1.71 
.32 
.28 
.06 
1.13 
.57 
.62 
2.32 
1.96 
.36 
.25 
.04 
I 
I  - -----------'---
1965 
3.56 
3.79 
3.18 
3.41 
.10 
.38 
.25 
.64 
.64 
1.43 
2.96 
1.28 
.66 
.69 
2.63 
2.24 
.39 
1966 
3.40 
3.58 
3.38 
3.70 
.22 
-.12 
.29 
.68 
.68 
1.09 
2.74 
1.40 
.75 
.76 
-2.92 
2.47 
0.45 
.28  .23 
.03  .06 
(I)  Comptes consolides  des  trois  grands fonds  publiques (reserves  en  1966):  INPS (Lit.  1215 miliards), IN  AIL (Lit.  553 milliards) et IPAMT (Lit. 975  milliards). 
l")  Placements a long terme. 
(")  350  grandes societes, E.N.E.L., et entreprises municipales. 
(
4
)  De 237 societes manufacturieres. 
(
6
)  Estimes  etre  deux  fois  les  fonds  autonomes  du  secteur  financier. 
Sources: A.  Coflfalonieri,  I  Fondi  di  Quiescenza,  _1966;  F.  Cesarini,  I  Fondi  di  Previaenza  nel  Settore  Bancario,  1965;  Banca  d'ltalia,  !STAT, Mediobanca. 
64 TABLE B-5 
Estimations (1)  de  tous  les fonds  de  pensions  prives  en  ltalie 
(en  milliards  de  lire,  sauf indication  contraire) 
~----------------------------
Fonds d'entreprise autonomes 
Fonds sous  forme 
d'inscriptions au bilan 
(y compris les fonds de licenciement) 
1960  1963  !  1965 
Total/Moyenne 
1960  1965 
1-----j----1 
Salaries  affilies  (milliers)  125  155  165  1325  11600  1 715  1450  1880 
Pensionnes (milliers)  18  28  38  112  132  182  130  220 
Taux d'affiliation (%)  1.5  2  2  17  19  21.5  18.5  23.5 
Taux des  retraites  (%)  2.5  4  5  17  18  23.5  19.5  28.5 
Cotisations  20  50  60  180  316  328  200  388 
Revenues  des  fonds  places  8  20  15  8  15 
Prestations  7  17  30  w  n  m  n  100 
Accroissement  net (2)  24  60  36  157  276  268  181  304 
Reserves  des  fonds  (fin  d'annee)  185  320  390  928  1 707  2 237  1113  2 627 
Reserves:prestations  26: 1  19  : 1  13: 1  46  : 1  46  : 1  32 : 1  41  : 1  26  : 1 
Reserves  par affilie  (Lit.  millions)  1.48  2.07  2.36  .70  1.07  1.31  .77  1.40 
Prestation moyenne  (Lit.  millions)  .40  .65  .77  .18  .28  .38  .21  .45 
Rapport RP  A/PM (3)  3.7  3.2  3.1  3.9  3.8  3.45  3.7  3.1 
Cotisation  moyenne  (Lit.  millions)  .16  .32  .36  .14  .20  .19  .14  .21 
Prestation moyennc 
l 
(en  % du  salaire  i  54  61  60  24  26  29.5  28  35 
moyen  non  agri- 1 
Cotisation moyenne  cole)  21.5  30  28  19  19  15  19  16.5 
-- ---~--- -----~-- ------~-- -------~-
- ___  I  ---------
(') Par EUROFINANCE: bases sur un grand nombre de sources, y  compris des oeuvres publiees (voir tableau B-1, CEE: Regimes Complementaires, Annuaire 
Statistique),  coupures  de presse  et  opinions  professionnelles. 
( 8)  Y  compris l'amortissement  et  variations  des  valeurs  de  portefeuille. 
( 8)  Reserves par Afiilie/Prestation  Moyenne. 
65 TABLE B-6 
Fonds  de  pension  prives,  non  assures,  en  Hollande 
I 
!  Bedrijfspensioenfonds  I 
Fonds  professionnels  (1)  I 
i 
1960 (*)  1963  19~  11%5  i 
-~~~- ~~-~-----,- -~- --~- ~~~-----
I 
I 
I  Salaries  affilies  (millions) 
Pensionnes  (3)  (millions) 
Taux d'affiliation EPN 
Taux de  retraite EPN re  traites (•) 
rs  (Fls  millions) 
Fls  millions) 
's  (5)  (net,  Fls  millions) 
Cotisations - d'employeu 
- totales  (net, 
Revenues  des  fonds  place 
Prestations  - des  retraites  assures  (net,  Fls  millions) 
- totales  (net, 
Investissements  (net (4)  F1 
Accroissement  net (Fls  mil 
Actifs  totau (Fls  milliards 
Fls  millions) 
s millions) 
· liards) 
, en fm  d'annee) 
00) 
Reserves  : prestations 
Reserves  par affilie  (Fls  '0 
Prestation moyenne (Fls 
Rapport RP  A/PM 
'000) 
'000)  Cotisation moyenne (Fls 
Prestation  moyenne  ~ 
n % du salaire moyen non-agricole)  (e 
Cotisation moyenne 
.93 
I 
.15 
35 
49 
. . 
260 
90 
50 
65 
285 
.30 
2.98 
46: 1 
3.20 
I  .44 
7.3 
I 
.28 
I 
I  7.8 
I 
I 
I 
5.1 
1.07  1.15 
I, 
1.21 
.19  .20  .22 
37.8  39.5  39.4 
56  62  66 
220  245  256 
351  422  477 
140  94  73 
68  77  86 
91  108  123 
400  488  527 
.44  .52 
:  .56 
4.11  4.63  5.19 
45  : 1  43: 1  42: 1 
3.84  4.03  4.29 
.49  .53  .55 
7.8  7.6  I  7.8 
! 
I  I 
.33  .37 
I 
.39 
7.1  6.5  I  6.5 
4.7  4.6 
I 
4.6 
Sources:  Cenrraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Verzekeringskamer,  Ministere d'Affaires Sociales  et de Sante  Publique. 
(*)  Estimations partielles. 
(
1
)  Fonds etablis pour des industries ou branches entieres, dont le nombre etait 74 en 1963,  82 en 1965. 
(2)  Fonds de pension (1596  en 1965) et fonds d'epargne (40 en 1965}, geres par des entreprises individuelles. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
Ondernemingspensioenfonds 
Fonds d'entreprise (1) 
1960 (*) I  1%3 
1 
19~  1  1%5 
----------
.50  .50  .50  .51 
.07  .08  .10  .09 
18.9  17.5  17.3  16.6 
24 
!  25  26  27 
; 
..  279  362  412 
295  350  436  490 
210  290  i  307  256 
75  99  112  I  124 
105  139  169  178 
400  500  574  568 
.40  .49  .58  .61 
4.30  5.64  6.22  6.83 
41  : 1  41  : 1  37: 1 
I 
38: 1 
8.65  11.4  12.3  13.3 
1.44  1.65  1.92  1.89 
6.0  I  6.9  6.4  7.0 
I 
I 
.59  I  .71  .87  .96  I 
25  I  23.5  23.7  22.3 
I  10.4 
I 
10.1  10.8  11.3 
~---
Total/Average 
Moyenne/Total 
1960 (*)  1963  1964  1965 
--- ~--
1.43  1.57  1.65  1.72 
.22  .27  .29  .32 
54  55.3  56.9  56.1 
75  81  88  94 
..  499  607  668 
550  701  858  967 
300  430  400  330 
125  167  189  210 
170  230  277  301 
680  900  982  11095 
.70  .94  1.09  1.17 
7.28  9.75  10.85  12.02 
43: 1  42: 1  39: 1  40: 1 
5.09  6.21  6.58  6.99 
.76  .85  .95  .94 
6.7  7.3  6.9  7.4 
.39  .45  .52  .56 
13.4  12.1  11.7  11.1 
6.8  6.4  6.4  6.6 
( 3)  Y compris des survivants et des invalides; le nombre des retraites en 1963 etait d'environ 180,000 (dont 135,000 affilies  des caisses  professionnelles);  avec une prestation moyenne  de  Fls 930  (Fls  505)  par  an 
(')  Variation dans  les  reserves investies (voir tableau B-7). 
(
6
)  Deduction faite pour les frais de gestion, soit investissements nets plus prestations, moins cotisations (arrondi). 
(")  Les taux de retraite reels se situent aux environs des taux indiques (EPN =  Emploi Prive Non agricole). TABLE B-7 
Fonds  de  pension  neerlandais:  Direction  des  investissements  en  1965 
Immobilier 
Hypotheques 
Valeurs  mobilieres 
Pr~ts a long-terme 
Divers 
Total 
Immobilier 
H  othe  ues  yp  q 
Valeurs  mobilieres 
Prets a long-terme 
Divers 
Total 
Fonds 
professionnels 
.62 
.62 
1.03 
2.45 
.12 
4.84 
.091 
.091 
.016 
.332 
-.003 
.527 
I 
I 
I 
! 
Reserves investies des fonds  prives 
(fin  d'annee,  Fls  milliards) 
Fonds  Fonds 
d'entreprise  d'epargne 
.70 
I  -
.60  -
2.60  .02 
2.22  -
.32  -
6.44  0.04 
(Investissements  net) 
.092 
.065 
.144 
.243 
.023 
.567 
I 
-
.002 
-.001 
TABLE B-8 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
Total 
1.32 
1.22 
3.65 
4.67 
.45 
11.32 
.183 
.158 
.160 
.575 
.019 
1.094 
% du 
total 
11.6 
10.8 
32.2 
41.3 
4.0 
100 
Taux  d'interet 
par fonds 
d'entreprise (%) 
---~---
6.4 
5.1 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
4.8 
Reserves  investies  des 
fonds publiques 
(Florins  (%)  milliards) 
.16  1.6 
.04  1.6 
1.72  17.0 
8.01  79.5 
.15  1.5 
10.08  100 
Tendences  recentes  des fonds  publics  neerlandais 
1963  1964  196s 
1 
1966 
~---------~---------~----- ~-~--
Salaries  affilies  (  milliers)  465  496  490 
!  507 
Pensionnes  (milliers)  148  154  162  167 
Cotisations  (Fls  milliers)  1.24  1.39  1.72  2.07 
Prestations  (Fls  milliers)  .62  .70  .84  .93 
Reserves  (Fls  milliards  fin  d'  annee)  6.63  7.55  8.66  10.08 
Reserves  par affilie  (Fls  '000)  14.3  15.9  17.7  19.7 
Prestation moyenne (Fls  '000)  4.2  4.5  5.2  5.5 
Rapport RP  A/PM  3.4  3.5  3.4  3.6 
(*) Estimations  partielles  d'apres  les  rapports  annuels  du  Pensions  Board. 
67 TABLE B-9 
Fonds  de  pension  prives  aux  Etats-Unis (1) 
1950  I  1955  I  1960  I  1963 
I  ~~---~~ 
i  I  • 
1964  1965  I  1966  1----
I 
Salaries  affilies  (millions)  9.8  15.4  21.2  23.8  24.6  25.6  27.0 
Pensionnes  (millions)  .5  1.0  1.8  2.3  2.5  2.7  3.0 
Taux d'affiliation (en% d'Emploi Prive Non-agricole)  25  35  46.5  49.5  50  50.5  51 
Taux  des  retraites  (en  %  de EPN  retraites)  17.5  25  34.5  40.5  43  45  47 
Cotisations  ($  milliards)  2.1  3.8  5.5  6.2  6.9  7.4  8.1 
Revenue net des  fonds  places  ($  milliards)  .3  .7  1.7  2.7  3.1  3.9  3.9 
Prestations  ($  milliards)  .4  .8  1.8  2.5  2.8  3.1  3.5 
Accroissement  net ($  milliards)  1.9  3.7  5.4  6.4  7.3  8.2  8.5 
Reserves  des  fonds  ($  milliards,  fm  d'annee)  12.0  27.4  52.0  69.9  77.2  85.4  93.9 
Reserves : prestations  30: 1  34: 1  29: 1  28: 1  28: 1  28: 1  27: 1 
Reserves  par affilie  ($ 000)  1.22  1.78  2.45  2.93  3.14  3.33  3.48 
Prestation moyenne ($  000)  .80  .80  1.00  1.08  1.12  1.15  1.18 
Rapport RP  A/PM  1.5  2.2  2.4  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0 
Cotisation moyenne  ($  000)  .21  .25  .26  .26  .28  .29  .30 
Prestation moyenne l 
(en% du salaire moyen non 
.  .  agricole) 
Cot1sat10n  moyenne 
23 
6  5.5 
19 
5 
19 
4.5 
19 
4.5 
18.5 
4.5 
18.5 
4.5 
18 
Non  Assures 
Salaries  affilies  (millions)  7.2  11.6  16.3  18.4  18.6  19.2  20.3 
Taux d'affiliation  (%)  18.5  26.5  35.5  38.5  38  38  38 
Reserves  ($  milliards)  6.5  16.1  33.1  46.5  51.9  57.2  63.0 
Reserves  par affilie  ($  000) 
______ __i __  :~o 
1.39  2.03  2.53  2.79  2.98  3.10 
(1)  Fonds assures  et non-assures,  y  compris plans  de  repartition  differes  des benefices. 
Sources:  "Private Pension Funds: Projected Growth" D.M. Holland;  Statistical Abstract  of the  United  States;  National  Industrial  Conference  Board. 
68 TABLE B-10 
Fonds  de  pension  au  Roy  au me  Uni:  estimations 
-------~-~---- --- ---- -------~ 
I 
1955 
I 
1960  1963  1965  1966  I 
! 
---~ -- - ~ -.--- - ---------I 
I 
Fonds  prives,  non-assures 
! 
Salaries  affilies  (millions)  1.9  2.6  3.0  3.6  3.9 
Pensionnes  (millions)  .16  .28  .43  .60  .65 
Taux d'affiliation (%  EPN)  10.5  14  15.5  18  19 
Cotisations (£  milliards)  .12  .19  .23  .33  .38 
Revenues  des  fonds  places  (£  milliards)  .05  .08  .14  .16  .18 
Prestations  (£  milliards)  .03  .06  .10  .15  .18 
Accroissement net (£  milliards)  .13  .20  .25  .31  .34 
Reserves  (£  milliards)  1.28  2.10  2.88  3.29  3.36 
Reserves : prestations  42: 1  34: 1  29: 1  22: 1  19: 1 
Reserves  par affilie  (  £  '000)  .67  .81  .96  .88  .86 
Prestation moyenne (  £  '000)  .20  .21  .23  .25  .28 
Rapport RP  A/PM  3.4  3.8  4.1  3.5  3.1 
Cotisation moyenne (£)  63  72  77  92  98 
Prestation moyenne  (en  % du  salaire  moyen  non- 38.5  31  29.5  29  30.5 
Cotisation moyenne  agricole)  12  10.5  10  10.5  10.5 
Fonds  prives,  assures  et  non-assures 
Salaries  affilies  (millions)  4.0  6.0  7.2  8.4  8.9 
Taux d'affiliation (%)  22  32  37  41.5  43.5 
Pensionnes  (millions)  .20  .44  .55  .62  .65 
Reserves  (  £  milliards)  1.95  3.40  4.88  5.73  6.0 
Reserves  par affilie  (  £  '000)  .49  .56  .68  .68  .67 
Prestation moyenne (£  '000)  .20  .22  .23  .23  .24 
Rapport RP  A/PM  2.5  2.6  3.0  2.9  2.9 
Fonds  publics 
Salaries  affilies  (millions)  3.5  3.7  3.9  4.0  4.1 
Reserves  (  £  milliards)  .80  1.27  1.65  1.95  2.11 
Reserves  par affllie  (  £)  230  345  420  490  515 
Sources:  Benchmark data for 1955  and 1963  from  "Occupational Pension Schemes" Survey by Government Actuary; reserve  aPd  investment data from "Fi-
nancial  Statistics",  "National Income and Expenditure";  Central Statistical  Office. 
69 TABLE B-11 
Hypotheses  sur  les  determinants  principaux  du  rapport  RPA/PM 
(regimes  complementaires  prives,  non assures) 
1960/65  1965/70  !  1970/75  1  ·-~~-75-/80 
-------------------1----------- ----------~---------
1 
Accroissemettt des prestatiotts moyennesfGrowth of  average benqits(%p.a.)  I 
- I 
Deutschland - autonomes  6.6  4.5  4.9  5.1 
- ensemble  des  regimes  prives  5.9  6.4  4.9  5.1 
I  tali  a  - autonomes  14.1  6.5  6.5  6.5 
- ensemble  des  regimes  prives  16.4  8  4.9  6.7 
Nederland  4.7  5.3  7.8  10.7 
Belgique  9.1  7.9  7.4  7.2 
U.S.  (assures  et non-assures)  2.8  4.3  4.5  4 
U.K. (non-assures)  0.9  5.7  5.6  5.5 
Rapport  pensionnes  salaries  affilies/ Retired  as % C?f contributing  mem-. 
hers  (fm  de  periode) 
Deutschland - autonomes  15  18.5  21.5  24.5 
- ensemble  des  regimes  prives  15  20  22  24 
Italia  - autonomes  24  30  29  27 
- ensemble  des  regimes  prives  12  13  14  15 
Nederland  19  20  21  23 
Belgique  15  15  17  19 
U.S.  (assures  et non-assures)  10.5  12  15.5  18 
U.K. (non-assures)  16.5  22.5  24  25.5 
T aux  d' interet 
period,  %) 
(pendant  Ia  periode,  %)  / Interest  rates  (during 
Deutschland  6.6  6.5  5.5  5 
Italia  5.3  5.5  5.5  5 
Nederland  4.3  5.8  5.5  5 
Belgique  4.1  4.3  5  5 
u.s.  4.2  5  5  5 
U.K.  6.2  6.7  6  5 
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